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AND THE 2003 INVASION OF IRAQ

Randy S. La Prairie, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 2021

Sociologists have paid little attention to the structural causes of American participation in
wars. Consequently, the discipline offers few theoretical perspectives on American war making.
Sociological theories that do exist fall under two headings: state-centric and Marxist theories.
Both lack prima facie plausibility. In this dissertation, I advance a unique, alternative theoretical
framework that I argue offers a more tenable theory of American militarism in the post-World
War II period. The elite model of war mobilization, as I refer to it, consists of five interrelated
structural causes of American participation in wars: (1) state-capitalist imperialism; (2) elite
control of public policy; (3) imperial ideology; (4) elite control of the mass media; and (5) elite
influence on academia. The foundations of the theory are a military-industrial complex theory
and a power elite model of politics and culture.
Most recent theoretical work on the causes of American militarism focuses on the 2003
Iraq War. In this study, then, I present a process tracing analysis of the invasion of Iraq that
demonstrates that an elite model of war mobilization provides a fuller, more historically accurate
explanation of the Iraq War than either state-centric or Marxist theories. The elite model suggests

that two pressures for war emerge from the military-industrial complex: a drive for concentrated
decision-making power in the executive branch, and profit-making opportunities for private
defense firms. A major finding of this study is that the Bush administration’s internal reasons for
invading Iraq correspond to these two imperatives. In turn, the power elite social status of key
administration officials largely explains why they accepted and acted on these imperatives. A
virulent form of imperial ideology also contributed to their decision to invade Iraq. As also
predicted by the model, the Bush administration controlled the mass media marketing of their
war campaign, successfully mobilizing public support for the war. And though the war was not
widely accepted among academics, many prominent academics supported the war on the basis of
neo-Wilsonian assumptions that were popular in the academy in the 1990s and which also
informed the administration’s worldview and Iraq policy.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY OF WAR AND THE INVASION OF
IRAQ

The American Sociological Association’s Peace, War, and Social Conflict section
website states that its purpose “is to encourage the application of sociological methods, theories,
and perspectives to the study of peace and war.” Interests of section members are said to include
“the causes and dynamics of war” and “military institutions” (American Sociological
Association 2021).
The study of military institutions and the causes of war is therefore not foreign to
sociology. It is also not new. Every professional sociologist has read C. Wright Mills, who wrote
about the military-industrial complex in his classic work, The Power Elite. Mills (1958) argued
that the ascendant post-World War II military-industrial complex and the ascent of militaristic
ideology among the power elite were likely to bring the United States to war with the Soviet
Union.
Yet, Mills’s classic studies of militarism have not had a strong influence on subsequent
sociological research on the topic. Given the ASA’s commitment to the study of war and peace,
and Mills’s classic exemplars, it is a remarkable fact that sociologists have rarely studied
American militarism or the causes of wars between the United States and other countries. And
given the United States’ unmatched record of military mobilization and aggression in the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries, this fact is even more remarkable. While sociologists have
often studied the causes of war at a very broad level of analysis—across many countries and
many years—the study of the causes of war for the United States remains under-investigated and
under-theorized.
1

In the early 2000s, once it became clear that the George W. Bush administration was
going to start an illegal war of aggression against Iraq, there was a swell of interest among
sociologists in American military imperialism. The ASA issued a statement against the war
(American Sociological Association 2006). My dissertation advisor, Ronald Kramer, coauthored
articles and book chapters with Raymond Michalowski explaining why the Iraq War was a form
of state crime and why it was illegal under international law (Kramer and Michalowski 2005,
2006). Michael Mann, a distinguished historical sociologist at University of California Los
Angeles and University of Cambridge, and John Bellamy Foster, carrier of the monopoly
capitalism tradition of Marxist social science and editor of the influential Monthly Review, also
wrote notable books and articles about the war and American imperialism. Sociologists Michael
Schwartz (2008) and James DeFronzo (2010) also wrote books about it.
That the 2003 US invasion of Iraq was a criminal act—so far one of the most significant
and transformational international crimes of the twenty-first century—is today hardly a matter of
dispute. But efforts by sociologists to explain why the war happened at all, and more
importantly, how it was to be understood as a product of American institutions and traditions, did
not produce satisfactory or convincing results. And after this resurgence of interest in the early
2000s, more recent contributions also have not greatly advanced our sociological understanding
on these questions, either due to basic factual or conceptual errors, or failures to consider
relevant factors. To be sure, edifying accounts of why the Iraq War happened do exist;
sociologists, political scientists, historians, journalists, and other intellectuals have written
perceptively on this and related questions. But a sociologically informed account of the Iraq War
and American militarism more broadly ought to properly consider, among other factors, the class
structure of American society and the particular ways that it interacts with the US military-
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industrial complex (MIC). Sociologists and non-sociologists alike have not adequately
considered these factors in explaining the Iraq War.
Sociologists have advanced mainly two kinds of theories of American war making, or
military imperialism, and the theoretical explanations they have offered for the Iraq War fall into
one of these two categories of explanation. They are what I refer to as state-centric and Marxist
explanations. For their part, Marxist sociologists have not brought to bear persuasive class
analyses, in spite of the centrality of class conflict to Marxist theory, and Marxist and nonMarxist sociologists alike have not grasped the sociological significance of the MIC, which is
too often only employed as a buzz word or as a synonym for the defense industry. Such
conceptualizations are not in accord with the best literature on the topic.
In this dissertation, I assess the viability of these two theories for explaining the Iraq War.
It is my contention that they do not provide adequate explanations for the 2003 invasion of Iraq,
and for American military imperialism more generally. Drawing on my own studies of American
history and institutions, I offer instead an original theoretical framework called an “elite model
of war mobilization,” which incorporates insights from Mills’s classic theory of the power elite,
and from a wide range of theoretical and historical literature. This theory is intended to provide a
framework of analysis for American war making in the entire post-World War II period, though
the focus of my dissertation is a case study of the 2003 invasion of Iraq in which I demonstrate
the explanatory efficacy of the model. As a case study, the Iraq War is significant, given that it
has received more attention from sociologists than any other war in recent history, and because
sociologists have used it to advance different general theoretical claims about American
militarism and imperialism. Generating cogent theoretical propositions about American war
making is necessary, however, for drawing out lessons and policy prescriptions about American
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foreign and defense policy. This is especially true if the structural social causes of the Iraq War
are similar to those that have led the United States to war in or with other countries.
The research question of this dissertation, then, is: How well does the elite model of war
mobilization explain the 2003 invasion of Iraq compared to state-centric and Marxist theories?
Because the literature I draw on in developing the elite model of war mobilization suggests
different theoretical possibilities that may be compatible with my explanation, I also include in
this comparison an assessment of what is called the Open Door theory of American imperialism.
I conclude that an Open Door theory, at least as advanced by scholars more recently, is also
inadequate as a general explanation of war making viz-a-viz the elite model.

The Argument

In the literature review (chapter 2), I outline the arguments advanced by state-centric and
Marxist theorists, and compare these to a host of other sociological explanations that have been
offered by scholars belonging to what I refer to as a broad, cross-disciplinary “anti-war scholarly
tradition.”
In brief, state-centric theorists tend to emphasize the agency of historical actors in
explaining decisions to go to war. Wars are too causally complex to permit systemic, or
structural, explanations, according to state-centric theorists. If there are structural factors that
explain the consistent outbreak of war between states, it is the state system itself, and the
geopolitical struggles between competing states that are endemic to this system. Marxist
explanations, by contrast, tend to emphasize the structural imperatives of capitalist state
development. Advanced capitalist states either need natural resources (such as oil and other raw
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materials) to sustain capitalist growth, or they need to create new opportunities for economic
growth by forcefully opening foreign markets. Since states are managed on behalf of capitalist
classes, capitalists push states to war in order to achieve these objectives.
The elite model of war mobilization outlined in chapter 3 is derived in large part from the
antiwar scholarly tradition. This tradition includes the contributions of the sociologist C. W.
Mills, who advanced a “power elite” theory of American politics, and wrote about the ascent of
the military-industrial complex in post-World War II America. According to Mills’s power elite
theory, states are not only controlled by capitalists, but a more diverse class of capitalist,
government, and military personnel working in conjunction with each other to advance their own
interests as managers of their respective bureaucracies. American capitalism, according to Mills,
had become a military capitalism, explaining the “coincidence of interest between military and
corporate needs, as defined by warlords [e.g. the Joint Chiefs of Staff] and corporate rich” (Mills,
1956:276).
This idea was given more firm empirical grounding in the work of the industrial
economist Seymour Melman, who described the “permanent war economy” of the militaryindustrial complex as a state-managed economy—state capitalism—that bolstered the decision
making power of its state managers in the executive branch and the military bureaucracy.
American military imperialism, according to Melman, represented an exercise and expansion of
power for state managers, and created profit bonanzas for private corporations that benefit from
government production contracts. Managerial power and private profits thus explain the
reproduction of the permanent war economy, or military-industrial complex, and the state
managers’ propensity to resort to war.
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The elite mobilization model is also built on the classic work of Edward S. Herman and
Noam Chomsky (1979, 2004), who described the cultural assumptions underpinning American
imperialism and the origins of this ideological constellation in the American mass media and the
broader elite intellectual community, which included eminent university scholars.
In chapter 3, the insights of Mills, Melman, Herman, Chomsky, and other scholars are
synthesized and presented as the elite model of war mobilization. The model describes the
various avenues by which the power elite control and influence policy and public thinking about
national security and the role of the United States in the world. This they do in order to mobilize
public support for the military-industrial complex and specific war efforts. Unlike state-centric
theories, the theory describes a definite political economy of war operating in American society,
but unlike Marxist theories, one that is animated by state power rather than laws of capitalist
development. The model has five components: (1) state-capitalist imperialism; (2) power elite
control of public policy; (3) elite imperial ideology; (4) elite control of the mass media; and (5)
elite influence on academia. The first four factors are held to be necessary conditions for war,
while elite influence on academia is held to be an important facilitating condition. The model
captures important structural, political, economic, and cultural features of the American
permanent war society while leaving room for the agency of historical actors within this system.
In chapter 4, I describe the research design and methodology for the study. As mentioned
above, the single case study of the Iraq War is used to illustrate the explanatory utility of the elite
model viz-a-viz state-centric and Marxist theories. A form of within-case analysis called process
tracing is thus employed to “trace” the hypothetical conditions specified by the theories through
history to the outcome of the war. This historical method, often used in international relations
scholarship, creates a heavy burden of proof, requiring that hypothetically necessary or sufficient
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conditions for the expected outcome (in this case, war) must be present in the case history and
must be connected to it in the ways specified by the theory. Process tracing is used to “test” the
elite model throughout the empirical chapters of the dissertation, and then to assess the
alternative theories in the conclusion.
Chapters 5 through 10 examine the causes of the Iraq War. Chapter 5 outlines the basic
history of events leading to the war, contextualizing the more focused analyses that follow in
subsequent chapters. Chapters 6 through 10 examine the operation of each of the five
components of the elite model as they pertained to the Bush administration’s decision to invade
Iraq. These chapters demonstrate the explanatory validity of the model for the case of the
invasion of Iraq.
The basic argument presented in chapter 6 is that the Bush administration’s “principal
architects” of the war sought to strengthen their own power as managers of the MIC, and
accordingly sought to demonstrate the credibility of American military power by conquering
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, overthrowing him, and taking control of the country’s political
economy. These motives are shown to be consistent with the organizational imperatives of the
MIC described in chapter 3. As shown in chapter 7, within the Bush administration, the principal
architects of the war all began their careers in the military bureaucracy or working close to it,
largely explaining their personal motives for expanding it, and invading Iraq. In chapter 8, I
show that the Bush administration’s foreign policy ideology was consistent with the ideal type
imperial ideology that is the third component of the elite model and that in the administration’s
specific worldview, Saddam Hussein was seen as an obstacle to US military primacy. Chapter 9
describes the American mass media’s coverage of the debate about invading Iraq throughout
2002 and early 2003, its general failure to challenge the administration’s fallacious claims, and
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tendency to serve instead as stenographers for the administration. Finally, chapter 10 considers
the role of academia and liberal professors in advancing theories and ideologies that were drawn
on by the Bush administration and liberal professors to justify the Iraq War.
In the concluding chapter 11, I assess the explanations for the Iraq War offered by statecentric and Marxist theorists. Here I show that they are not viable explanations, either because of
conceptual errors, or because the necessary conditions specified by the theories were absent. In
particular, state-centric theorists have not grasped the economic dimensions of military
imperialism, maintaining that American military and economic imperialisms are mostly separate
processes. They also have not considered the implications of the state management component of
the MIC, understanding the MIC only as a kind of lobby, distinct from the government. Marxist
theories of the invasion of Iraq are unconvincing mostly because there is no clear evidence that
the Iraq War was precipitated by an economic crisis of any kind, or that such a crisis was a
reason the Bush administration started the war. By failing to examine the administration’s
apparent intentions in invading Iraq, Marxist explanations of the Iraq War have been unduly
functionalist in reasoning, all but erasing the agency of the key players in the Bush
administration. I conclude chapter 11 with several public policy recommendations that might
help shift the United States away from a permanent war economy and prevent future war efforts.
I also suggest recommendations for future research that can be carried out by sociologists and
other social scientists toward the same ends.
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Significance of the Research

This dissertation makes an important contribution to the sociology of war, and in
particular, the sociology of American militarism and imperialism. It also contributes to the
subdiscipline of political sociology, as it weighs in on paradigmatic debates about the relative
strengths of Weberian (state-centric), pluralist, Marxist, and elite theories of politics. This project
also represents a work of historical sociology, which is the domain of sociology concerned with
large scale, substantially important events that unfold over time (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer
2003:4). And as a work engaged with issues that are of great public interest, this dissertation is a
work of critical, public sociology, as defined by Michael Burawoy (2005:16, 24) in his classic
statement.
Indeed, the questions addressed in this dissertation have profound moral and practical
implications, both for Americans and for the global public. The United States has waged war or
intervened militarily in more than seventy nations between 1945 and 2000 (Blum 2004), and has
fought wars or intervened in several others since then, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen,
Philippines, Colombia, Liberia, Haiti, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Niger. These
many wars and interventions have all entailed dramatic human consequences, in terms of lives
and livelihoods lost, and in the cases of more protracted involvement, damage inflicted on entire
societies and cultures from which it has or will take generations to recover. Moreover, the case of
the US-led NATO attack on Libya in 2011 showed that the Obama administration was prone to
making many of the same “mistakes” as the Bush administration in Iraq, as that intervention was
similarly predicated on false pretexts, could have been avoided through diplomacy, and also left
a civil war and the destruction of a viable society in its wake (Forte 2012; Prashad 2012).
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In the case of the Iraq War, it may be the cause, either directly or indirectly, of hundreds
of thousands of Iraqi deaths, according to Brown University’s Costs of War project (Crawford
and Lutz 2019). Using data from Iraq Body Count, the Costs of War project places the number of
civilians killed through 2019 as a direct consequence of the war between 182,382 and 207,156.
Millions of Iraqis have also been displaced, and, in spite of $100 billion committed to Iraq’s
reconstruction, poverty and unemployment remain high, and many parts of the country suffer
from a lack of clean drinking water, electricity, and housing. The 2003 invasion and occupation
also caused an influx of terrorists into the country, including members of al-Qaeda, sparked a
civil war between Sunni and Shia Iraqis, and led to the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS), which in 2014 took over large swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria (Cockburn 2016).
The number of US military personnel killed in the Iraq War is estimated to be 4,572;
American contractor workers, 3,588; and US Department of Defense employees, 15 (Crawford
and Lutz 2019). Opposition fighters killed in the war number between 34,806 and 39,881,
indicating that Iraqi civilians have borne the brunt of the fighting. Journalist and media workers
killed as a result of the war number at 277; humanitarian and NGO workers, 63.
Such numbers cannot adequately capture the degree of suffering that this war has caused,
both to Iraqis and Americans, and other nationals drawn into or affected by the conflict. In the
United States, for instance, this suffering is reflected in epidemics of post-traumatic stress
disorder, depression, and record suicide rates among veterans.
Considering economic consequences, in the United States, militarism has engendered the
decline of industrial production, and after the Vietnam War, contributed to the ascent of
neoliberalism and the socioeconomic inequality associated with it (Melman 1974, 2001, 2003;
Varoufakis 2015). It has also represented a squandering of national wealth that could otherwise
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be fruitfully invested in socially useful initiatives, like alleviating poverty, funding public
education and providing free college tuition, providing universal health care, rebuilding a
crumbling national infrastructure, or creating viable mass transportation systems and a badly
needed “green” economy. The magnitude of opportunity costs is enormous. According to the
industrial economist Seymour Melman, for instance, “Every year from 1952 to 1994, the new
money made available to the Pentagon exceeded the combined net profits of all American
corporations.” “In other words,” he adds, “the combined and working capital embedded in the
Pentagon’s budget was great enough to finance the replacement of the largest part of what is
human-made of the surface of the United States” (Melman 2001:102). In 2008, Joseph Stiglitz
and Linda Bilmes (2008) estimated that the Iraq War would cost the United States $3 trillion.
More recently, the Cost of War project estimates that, between 2001 and September 2020, wars
have cost the United States $6.4 trillion (Crawford 2019).
American militarism and the Iraq War have also had profound negative environmental
consequences. According to sociologist Kenneth Gould (2007:33), “militarization is the single
most ecologically destructive human endeavor.” It appears that the US military in particular is
the single largest organizational consumer of petroleum and other nonrenewable forms of energy
in the United States and the entire world, and is thus “the largest single source of pollution in this
country and the world” (Kramer 2021:174-175). Expanding on his earlier work on the crimes of
the American empire, Ronald Kramer argues that US wars in the Middle East are environmental
crimes. “Using military force to access and control oil helped fuel the Great Acceleration,”
Kramer says, referring to the dramatic increase in economic growth and environmental
destruction after 1950. Kramer adds that
It resulted in greater economic growth, consumer consumption, and
environmental destruction. And it helped to produce climate catastrophe by
11

locking in the relentless search for and extraction of fossil fuels, ensuring that
cheap but dirty forms of energy would be marketed and burned, resulting in the
release of greenhouse gases and the heating of the planet. (Kramer 2021:173)
Finally, American military imperialism has arguably engendered profound moral and
intellectual corruption—some of which is documented in this dissertation. According to some
writers, it may even entail the decline of American democracy itself (Johnson 2006). Indeed, one
can draw a line straight through the Bush administration’s lies about Iraq’s weapons of mass
destruction, to the Republican Party’s climate change denialism, to Donald Trump’s systematic
lying and eventual effort to overturn American democracy on January 6, 2021, predicated on the
big lie that he had actually won the 2020 elections, and that his victory was stolen from him by
the Democratic Party.
Whatever the broader social implications of the invasion of Iraq and American militarism
may be, if one only takes the view that committing war crimes with vast and terrible human
consequences should be avoided, then understanding the sociological causes of war in the United
States may be necessary for preventing such paroxysms of violence in the future. This is
especially true if the causes of the invasion of Iraq were systemic and structural, enduring
features of our society, the same as at other times when the United States used military force.
Indeed, many analysts (e.g. Mann 2003; Dorrien 2004) have insisted or implied that the Iraq War
was unique in that the Bush administration’s unilateral assault on Iraq was rooted in a militaristic
foreign policy ideology that advocated offensive military aggression and American global
domination, whereas American defense policy has traditionally been more multilateral,
defensive, and benign. I argue, on the contrary, that the invasion of Iraq sprang from the same
impulses of powerful individuals and institutional configurations that have led the United States
to war throughout the entire post-World War II period.
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Preventing illegal or otherwise unnecessary wars in the future, then, requires at the very
least a correct understanding of the patterns of social behavior and institutions that cause them.
That is, it requires having the right theoretical explanation at hand to inform public policy and
activism.

Strengths and Weaknesses of the Research Design

Because understanding patterns of behavior and institutional effects implies a study of
multiple cases, one significant weakness of this inquiry is the singular focus on the case of the
Iraq War. This study must be supplemented by studies of American involvement in other
conflicts to prove the validity of the theory across all or most cases. The aim of this study is only
to demonstrate the relative superiority of the elite model of war mobilization relative to the
alternatives offered by sociologists. To the extent that this is achieved, this study will at least
strongly suggest needed public policy changes and avenues for future research and teaching.
(One more point worth noting on the single case study limitation is that no sociologist has
advanced detailed studies of more than one war, either as separate or single works of scholarship,
which again reflects the state of the discipline.)
The strengths of this dissertation are, however, significant. The elite model of war
mobilization is a superior analytic framework to the state-centric and Marxist theories. Statecentric theorists rightly call attention to agency in historical studies and are understandably
critical of the functionalism of structural Marxist theories. But they are mistaken in rejecting
structural explanations entirely. This study examines structural factors—the MIC, the global
political economy, the class structure of American society, the media and academia, the
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American political system, and elements of American culture (foreign and defense policy
ideology)—as well as individual-level factors—such as the social biographies of key Bush
administration war makers—and offers a way of explaining the interaction between structure and
agency in this context.
This study also employs a more rigorous methodology relative to the studies to which it
is compared. The work of sociologists writing about the Iraq War and American empire too often
exhibits the characteristics of slow journalism rather than rigorous scholarship or historical social
science, at least as this was understood by Weber (see Kalberg 2012; Weber 1949). This is to say
that sociologists too often are not explicit, clear, and precise in defining the explanatory factors
of their theories, and do not employ rigorous methods of analysis so that readers can easily
assess when evidence does or doesn’t conform to clearly stated and unambiguous theoretical
expectations.

A Note on the Author’s Background and Assumptions

It is commonplace in qualitative sociology for researchers to provide a statement about
how their social biographies and political orientations may affect their research. Similar
conventions are observed in historical scholarship. This allows readers to assess how biases may
have influenced the outcome of the research.
For my part, I should say that I became a sociologist because of its receptivity to critical
modes of social inquiry. As Michael Burawoy (2005:24) explains, critical sociology is conducted
from the standpoint of those within civil society, rather than from the standpoint of the state (as
in political science) or business (as in economics). In other words, sociologists have been less
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concerned with technical problems of interest to people with power, and more interested in
questions that are significant for those who must live with the consequences of the decisions of
powerful people. Sociology, then, is a discipline that should, in principle, be hospitable to social
scientists whose research questions are, like mine, inspired by a commitment to antiwar activism.
Antiwar activism is almost exclusively the domain of a small segment of the general public, with
a few supporters in Congress, the media, and progressive think tanks. And, incidentally, unlike
feminism, and more recently antiracism, the antiwar movement has relatively little academic
legitimacy as a movement that can provide a set of empirically supported background
assumptions and desirable objectives to motivate research.
Nevertheless, there have been researchers from many academic disciplines who have
advanced arguments that, in my view, seriously challenge the ideologies that motivate American
militarism. (Some of these are reviewed in chapter 2.) I am an antiwar activist because I find
these arguments persuasive and their implications to be of the utmost importance. But as a social
scientist, I remain committed to objectivity as a guiding value. In practice, this means that while
the research question of this dissertation was inspired by comparing what sociologists have said
about the causes of American militarism to what scholars in the antiwar tradition have said about
them, its answer is the result of a rigorous effort toward dispassionate consideration of the
available evidence. If evidence adduced in this dissertation does not support the conclusions I
have reached, perhaps because of an erroneous interpretation or misunderstanding of the facts, or
a jump from a theoretical proposition to an unobservable claim about historical reality, then a
competent scholar should be able to see when this is the case. But I have tried to keep such errors
and omissions to a minimum, and have tried to let the evidence fall into place as it would. In the
end, I believe it supports the contentions of the antiwar scholarly tradition.
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review covers three categories of social science and historical research
about the causes of American-initiated wars. The first category is the dominant framework
adopted by sociologists of war, which I refer to as a state-centric theory. The second category is
Marxist theories. I outline the claims of these theories at the most general level of analysis before
turning to more specific applications of these theories to the American national context. A third
category of literature is one that I call the American antiwar scholarly tradition. This literature
encompasses the work of C. W. Mills, and other writers who have developed elite theories of
militarism. Also encompassed by this tradition is the “Open Door” theory of American
imperialism, and the military-industrial complex (MIC) thesis.
These many theories are assessed according to how well they identify viable necessary or
facilitating causes of American participation in wars in the post-World War II period. I argue
that, of these three bodies of literature, the scholarly antiwar tradition offers the best explanations
for the causes of US wars in the post-World War II period. In particular, the elite theory of
American politics, the MIC thesis, conceptualizations of American imperial ideology, and
theories about their institutional sources in the media and academia are most likely to provide
plausible necessary or facilitating conditions for war. Open Door theories, I argue, suggest
facilitating, but not necessary conditions for war. As for state-centric and Marxist theories, I
argue that they are not likely to offer viable explanations. With regard to state-centric theories,
this is mostly due to a failure to consider the state management component of the MIC and its
implications; the MIC, if considered at all, is thought of as a kind of corporate lobby, which is a
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limited and incorrect conceptualization. This conceptual error entails an incomplete analysis of
the political economy of American militarism and imperialism in the post-World War II period.
Marxist theories are hindered by a lack of supporting evidence and functionalist reasoning that
does not adequately consider the agency of key historical actors.
Sociological explanations of the Iraq War itself are mostly left out of this review unless
the principal expression of a general theory of American militarism or empire was provided with
an analysis of that war. Otherwise, a critical review of sociological accounts of the Iraq War is
left for the concluding chapter. There is also a vast, multidisciplinary literature on the history of
the Iraq War that is left out, for it is beyond the scope of this dissertation, which is concerned
principally with theorizations of American war making.

State-Centric Theories of War

State-centric theories of war are by far the most popular theories of war among
sociologists. As the name I have given to this kind of theory indicates, states—government
institutions—are considered the most important causal factor explaining war. States, rather than
competing national economies or other social arrangements, are in some way most responsible
for wars. According to Wimmer (2014:186), the elaboration of the relationship between state
development and war is sociology’s most widely recognized contribution to the study of war.
One of the most important theorizations of this relationship in historical sociology has
been offered by Charles Tilley. According to Tilley’s (1990) classic formulation, wars helped
create modern states, and states went to war as they expanded. In his analysis of early modern
European history, war has been a tool whereby states expand their dominion—by disarming
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enemies on the peripheries of state territories, for instance, and imposing legal and tax regimes—
which in turn enhances a state’s ability to wage war and expand further.
Another sociologist working within the state-centric tradition is Siniša Malešević (2010),
who has sought to explain why wars have been so prevalent and deadly in modernity, while at
the same time there is an almost universal taboo against killing outside of the institution of war.
Malešević argues that the prevalence of war in modernity is principally the result of two
interrelated processes: the “cumulative bureaucratization of violence,” and the “centrifugal
ideologization of coercion.” The cumulative bureaucratization of violence is essentially Weber’s
classical formulation of the state as the institution maintaining the monopoly of the legitimate
use of violence. Centrifugal ideologization of coercion refers to “a significantly wider
proliferation of ideological discourses that radiate from the centre of a particular social
organization (e.g. the state, social movement, religious institution, the military, etc.) but also
have strong popular resonances” (Malešević 2010:131). Ideology is necessary in order to
dehumanize enemies, which justifies killing them, and provides the collective motivation and
moral justification for waging wars on behalf of the state, military, or other centralized
organization. Among national populations it promotes solidarity.
According to Malešević, sociologists have tended to underestimate the importance of
ideology in promoting modern warfare, and his rich theoretical elaboration of ideology as a form
of “thought action” is his major contribution. However, an explanation of war that only focuses
on states (or organizational centralization) and ideology is not useful for more than a cursory
analytic framework to study specific national historical contexts.
Another leading historical sociologist, Michael Mann (1988), also argues that states, and
more particularly, geopolitical conflict between them, are the principle causes of war. Mann’s
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major contribution to the study of interstate conflict is a four-part “sources of social power”
model, in which states vary in strength and dominance according to their ideological, economic,
military, and political power (Mann 2013b). Dominant states throughout history have been
strong in each of these dimensions of power. But more interesting for the purposes of this study
have been Mann’s claims about the relationship between capitalism and war, and how his
assumptions about this relationship have influenced his analysis of American history and
institutions.
In the modern period, contrary to Marxist and military-industrial complex theories of
war, which he casually dismisses, Mann argues that states, rather than capitalist economies, are
the principal causes of war. Wars existed before capitalist states, Mann reasons, and the
communist states also went to war; a fortiori, capitalism has not been the main cause of
militarism and war. Writing near the end of the Cold War, Mann concluded that “nation states
are the perpetrators of our era’s extraordinary militarism” (Mann 1988:141), and that capitalism
is only “contingently” related to militarism.
Capitalism’s effect on militarism is to make it more lethal, according to Mann, and for
capitalist globalization to spread the threat of militarism around the world (Mann 1988:132-133).
However, militarism is not necessary for capitalism to function, and in fact is harmful for
capitalist development. During the Cold War, militarism was driven by elite ideology (anticommunism), rather than economic necessity. Cold War elites didn’t understand that “class
politics and geopolitics are separable,” (Mann 1988:163-164) and the Cold War rivalry with the
Soviet Union over developing countries was mostly “geopolitical or Western opposition to local
reform,” (Mann 1988:162) though he never says what that reform was usually intended to
achieve—namely autonomous economic development. Mann also doesn’t consider that
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geopolitical conflict with the Soviet Union was rooted in American state planners’ fear that
communism would undermine the global capitalist order they established after World War.1 So,
it is not clear from these reflections why capitalism was only “contingently” related to militarism
during the Cold War.
In his later works about the Iraq War and American imperialism, Mann (2003, 2013a) is
also dismissive of explanations of American foreign interventions that consider the influence of
capitalism, attributing such arguments to the political “left” (Mann 2003:12). In a 2013
contribution about the relationship between American economic imperialism and military
imperialism, Mann finally recognizes the existence of a military-industrial complex, but refers to
it as an industrial defense lobby, and dismisses it as a “more conspiratorial” explanation (Mann
2013:240-241). As will be seen below in reviewing the work of Seymour Melman, this is an
incorrect conceptualization of the military-industrial complex, which also has an important state
managerial component—it is not merely or even primarily a corporate lobby. Like his
explanation of the Cold War, Mann explains the Iraq War and the Bush administration’s
imperialism principally in terms of ideology. I return to his writings about the Iraq War in the
concluding chapter 11.

Marxist Theories of Militarism and Imperialism

Marxist sociological explanations of militarism and imperialism are derived from Marx’s
and Lenin’s theories of capitalist development.

1

See chapter 3, pp. 44-45.
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In Lenin’s (1917) classic formulation of imperialism, the concentration of capital that
Marx explained as a consequence of capitalist development led to a new phase of monopoly
capitalism, which entailed a new wave of imperialist expansion of the European states and the
United States. The advanced capitalist states needed export markets for capital and sources of
raw materials, as investing capital domestically would raise the standard of living for workers,
and draw down profits (Lenin 1917:63). The capitalist monopolies then divided the world among
themselves with the support of states and state alliances:
The epoch of modern capitalism shows us that certain relations are established
between capitalist alliances, based on the economic division of the world; while
parallel with this fact and in connection with it, certain relations are established
between political alliances, between states, on the basis of the territorial division
of the world, of the struggle for colonies, of the ‘struggle for economic territory’.
(Lenin 1917:75)
Then, as the state-backed capitalist monopolies grew, “the more the need for raw materials is
felt, the more bitter competition becomes, and the more feverishly the hunt for raw materials
proceeds throughout the whole world, the more desperate becomes the struggle for the
acquisition of colonies” (Lenin 1917:82), leading to geopolitical conflict and war between states,
as seen during World War I.
Lenin criticized liberal and Marxist “reformers” opposed to imperialism. What these
reformers all had in common was the view that capitalism did not necessarily need to be violent:
free trade between nations would entail peaceful development. For Lenin, this was a “reactionary
ideal,” as it supported capitalism. It was also naïve because it assumed that capitalist
development could revert back to its earlier, mid-nineteenth century phase of more open, free
competition between capitalists. The monopoly phase of capitalism, Lenin argued, was the
logical culmination of capitalist development. Imperialism could only be stalled by transforming
society into socialist societies. Another important insight of Lenin on this topic was his
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observation that “Such simplicity of mind on the part of the bourgeois economists is not
surprising. Besides, it is in their interest to pretend to be so naïve and to talk ‘seriously’ about
peace under imperialism” (Lenin 1917:112). Lenin here pointed to an important phenomenon
discussed by later writers, namely the intellectual’s ideological function and position in the mode
of production.
John Bellamy Foster (2006) and William Robinson (2014) offer more contemporary
Marxist analyses of American warfare and imperialism. Foster builds on Lenin’s theory of
imperialism and developments of Lenin’s ideas by the Marxist “monopoly capitalism” theory
developed by Paul Sweezy and Paul Baran. Foster’s main work on American war and
imperialism is Naked Imperialism: The Pursuit of Global Dominance, which is a collection of
articles written in response to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Foster’s argument is that imperialism
has been a longstanding feature of American society, rather than a policy that began with the
Bush administration, as argued by Michael Mann, for example. Imperialism, for Foster, as for
Lenin, involves a global drive for control of natural resources that are necessary for capitalist
development, and as such, it is not explicable merely in terms of state policy, but also involves
“the mechanisms of trade, finance, and investment” (Foster 2006:101). Foster asserts that various
US military campaigns and foreign policy endeavors were efforts to secure natural resources or
exert control over regions outside of U.S. control, such as the former Yugoslavia.
Of the invasion of Iraq Foster says “Viewed from the standpoint of the historical
evolution of imperialism, it is clear that the real motive behind Washington’s current drive to
start a war with Iraq is not any genuine military threat from that country, but rather the goal of
demonstrating that the U.S. is now prepared to use its power at will” (Foster 2006:85). More
specifically, Foster argues that Iraq was of interest to the Bush administration and the American

22

corporate community due to its vast oil reserves, and because military bases there would help
surround Iran on all its borders with U.S. military bases. Moreover, the invasion
would make it easier for the United states to protect planned oil pipelines
extending from the Caspian Sea in Central Asia through Afghanistan and Pakistan
to the Arabian Sea. It would give Washington a much more solid military base in
the Middle East, where it already has tens of thousands of troops located in ten
countries. It would increase U.S. leverage in relation to Saudi Arabia and other
Middle Eastern states. It would strengthen the global superpower’s efforts to force
terms favorable to Israeli expansion, and the dispossession of the Palestinians, on
the entire Middle East. It would make the rising economic power of China, along
with Europe and Japan, increasingly dependent on a U.S. dominated oil regime in
the Middle East for their most vital energy needs.
In short, “Control of oil through military force would thus translate into greater economic,
political, and military power, on a global scale” (Foster 2006:93).
While control of oil and consolidation of military power were in fact that motivations of
the Bush administration for invading Iraq, Foster provides little in the way of documentary
evidence to support this conclusion. Instead of focusing on key planning documents for instance,
Foster seems to infer motives from his assumptions about the relationship between the capital
class and the state, namely that capitalist control of the state necessitates military aggression to
achieve geopolitical objectives that sustain capitalist growth. Overall, Foster’s analyses of
American imperialism suffer from a lack of historical detail and read more like journalistic
accounts.
The sociologist William Robinson offers a much more detailed Marxist contribution to
the sociological study of war and militarism. Robinson’s “theory of global capitalism” departs
from classical Leninist-Marxist theories of imperialism in arguing that capitalism in the
neoliberal phase is no longer characterized by imperial rivalries between nations. According to
Robinson, the reason for this is because transnational capitalist corporations now prevail as the
predominant form of capitalist enterprise. These corporations cannot be meaningfully thought of
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as belonging to one nation state because their owners, managers, and investors are dispersed
across many countries. These capitalists constitute a “transnational capitalist class” that pursues
its own interests in the global capitalist economy. There are now no longer distinct, nationally
specific capitalist classes, but one predominant transnational capitalist class. Any imperial
rivalries that now exist are between competing factions of the transnational capitalist class, not
between nation states.
Robinson argues that as opportunities for new investment of surplus capital have been
exhausted, the transnational capitalist class has turned to “militarized accumulation” in order to
create new markets and investment opportunities to stave off the crises that are endemic to global
capitalism. Military spending and war achieve these ends in two ways. One is that wars serve to
open new markets for capital investment, in construction and oil exploration, for instance. The
other is that state military spending itself creates new opportunities for capitalist investment,
since in the United States, state-managed military production is carried out by private (and
transnational) firms (Robinson 2014:151-152). The 2003 Iraq War perfectly illustrates this
overarching function, according to Robinson, since the war “violently opened up the country to
transnational capital and integrated it into new global circuits,” and “at a time when the global
economy was showing serious signs of stagnation” (Robinson 2014:123).
While Robinson is careful to say that “militarized accumulation” and particular military
interventions do not have singular causes and do not serve singular purposes (Robinson
2014:149), his argument does strongly suggest that both U.S. military spending (and wars) and
increased global military spending are functions of the inescapable logic of capitalist
development. This is implausible, for reasons I return to below. Robinson also overstates the
agency and solidarity of transnational capitalists. “There is little disagreement among global
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elites, regardless of their formal nationality,” Robinson says, “that U.S. power should be
rigorously applied (e.g., to impose IMF programs, to bomb the former Yugoslavia, for
‘peacekeeping’ and ‘humanitarian’ interventions, and so on) in order to sustain and defend global
capitalism” (Robinson 2014:122). Robinson may be correct that one purpose of these actions has
been to sustain global capitalism, but he does not provide enough evidence to warrant this
conclusion. In any case, there are several instances when other powerful nations have opposed
US-led military interventions in the UN Security Council—UN Security Council Resolution
1970, pertaining to Libya, for instance. And regarding the invasion of Iraq, Robinson says that
France and Germany opposed it only on tactical and strategic grounds, but, again, without
providing evidence (Robinson 2013:123). It is also difficult to understand how loose strategic
alliances against the United States (say between Russia, China, Syria, and Iran in the 2010s) are
explicable within this framework, unless these are taken to be competing factions within the
transnational capitalist class. But that such capitalist rivalries take such distinct national forms
makes it difficult to see what Robinson’s theory explains that older Leninist-Marxist theories
don’t.
In general, both Foster and Robinson’s explanations of war are implausible for at least
two reasons. The first is that they do not pay close enough attention to the actual intentions of
state planners and elites to the degree that these can be known. Elite agency is almost wholly
absent in the Marxist accounts reviewed above, which make them appear as unwitting tools of
the ineluctable logic of capitalist development. Foster, as discussed above, attributes all manner
of economic benefit to the Iraq War, but without showing that these benefits ever actually
entered into the calculations and plans of the Bush administration. Similarly for Robinson—only
he goes further, subordinating the myriad interests of the entire global elite to the logic of
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capitalism. In these accounts, moreover, elite false consciousness does not seem possible—that
elites may pursue policies that do not, in fact, lead to greater economic growth.
That elites may be pursuing militarism contrary to their own interests (i.e. the pursuit of
surplus value or profit, ex hypothesi) is related to the second major problem with these
explanations. The classical Marxist theory that informs Foster and Robinson’s arguments
assumes that capitalist expansion is propelled by the market competition of private capitalists.
Military production in the United States, however, does not depend on competitive markets.
Rather, private military-industrial production in the United States depends on direct government
subsidy rather than market mechanisms for its growth (Melman 1974; 2001). Thus the growth
dynamics of military production are different from those described by Marx. If the assumptions
of Marx’s theory are increasingly less relevant as elites turn to “militarized accumulation,” then
the theory is to that extent potentially incoherent. And because military production may be
ultimately less profitable than civilian industrial production, a different explanation must be
found for state-directed militarism in the United States and other capitalist economies.

The American Anti-War Scholarly Tradition

A loose network of scholars emerged during and after the Vietnam War who opposed US
involvement in Vietnam and, more generally, what they argued was ongoing American
imperialism. Historians, economists, sociologists, linguists, and other professional academics,
they wrote sophisticated social and historical analyses of American foreign policy on which they
based their principled opposition to American militarism and imperialism. Like Foster and
Robinson, who may also be included in this tradition, they explained war in terms of the
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domestic social, political, and economic structures of American society. Yet, their contributions
have been mostly ignored by political scientists and mainstream sociologists. (See for example,
Mann 1988, 2003; Wimmer and Min 2006; Kestnbaum 2009; Wimmer 2014; West and
Matthewman 2016. None of these authors mentions any of the authors reviewed in this section.)
Several theoretical currents are exhibited in this scholarly tradition besides Marxism. One
is referred to as the theory of “Open Door” imperialism, which is a political-economy thesis
similar to Lenin’s, but one predicated on social psychology rather than economic theory in
Williams’s classic formulation. Another is the military-industrial complex thesis, which is also a
political economy theory, but one that differs from both Marxist and Open Door theories in
important ways. Yet another theoretical current, one that has been synthesized with both
military-industrial complex and Open Door theories, is the power elite theory. I will review
scholarly treatments of American militarism and imperialism that illustrate each of these
theories.

Open Door theories.

William Appleman Williams was a leading historian of American diplomacy. His theory
of Open Door imperialism influenced a generation of historians and social scientists seeking to
explain American foreign policy. The Open Door theory is a fundamentally sociological
explanation of the history of American foreign policy, based as it is on a class analysis of
American society. According to Williams, imperialism is the American “way of life.” By “way
of life,” Williams means a worldview—or what other writers call an ideology—that motivates
collective social action (Williams 1980:12). At the core of this ideology is the belief that
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prosperity is not possible without economic expansion that creates wealth opportunities for the
populace—thereby diffusing class conflict—and without necessitating a redistribution of wealth.
However, the failure or unwillingness to recognize that social and economic inequality is
actually endemic to capitalism, or, otherwise, to seek a durable solution for it in wealth
redistribution, has led the elite to seek solutions to what are actually domestic social problems in
foreign economic expansion.
By the end of the nineteenth century, according to Williams, the form of empire adopted
by the United States was one premised on liberal free trade rather than colonial possessions. This
caused the United States to oppose foreign economic nationalism and, later, communism, since
American elites believed such political movements would harm American prosperity in closing
off foreign markets that might otherwise be available. Williams saw the post-World War II
growth of militarism in the United States as a natural consequence of American economic
expansionism, but not one that was functionally necessary for capitalist development. Rather, in
Williams’s analysis, imperialism is motivated principally by cultural and psycho-social factors. It
is a “way of life,”—an ideology—but one that Americans could, in theory, disavow in favor of
social democracy.
Williams’s theory of American empire is effectively a political social psychology of war
in the United States. However, as Williams’s method depends principally on analyses of what
American elites have themselves said and believed, it does not move beyond ideological
analysis, to an analysis of institutions and structures. If agency has been subordinated to
historical, structural developments in Marxist theories, Williams does not offer a structuralinstitutional analysis that explains how elite decisions are formulated and constrained.
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Dutch political scientists Bastian van Apeldoorn and Naná de Graaff (2016) have given
the Open Door thesis a more contemporary social science expression, adding a structural
political economy analysis that was missing from Williams’s theory. Their version of the
argument also differs from Williams’s in that they postulate that it is objective economic
pressures that lead to American foreign military interventions. Wars are intended to open foreign
markets for American, and more specifically transnational, corporations, whose representatives
tend to staff the foreign policy bureaucracy, as van Apeldoorn and Nana de Graaff show in
rigorous network analyses of the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations. Their theory is thus
a combination of an Open Door and power elite theory. Their explanation of the Iraq War is
considered in the conclusion.
About the Open Door theory more generally, one should ask whether desired access to or
control of foreign markets is a necessary condition for US military interventions. A cursory
review of history suggests that it is more likely a facilitating, but not necessary condition.
Consider the 1991 Gulf War, which is usually held to be a war about access to Persian Gulf oil
(e.g. Bacevich 2016). In fact, while the war is widely believed to be about preventing Hussein
from securing control of Kuwaiti oil, non-military diplomatic options were open to the United
States that could have resulted in Iraq pulling out of Kuwait, and the United States keeping
existing oil contracts with Iraq (see chapter 5). It seems that there were other factors pushing the
H. W. Bush administration to war, namely the need to demonstrate US military credibility and
power in the new post-Cold War environment, institutional imperatives associated with the MIC,
as explained below. Other US interventions, such as the one in Somalia in 1993, do not appear to
be linked to Open Door imperatives at all.
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Power elite theories.

The sociologist C. Wright Mills was a contemporary of William Appleman Williams.
His “power elite” theory encompasses a structural analysis missing in Williams’s Open Door
thesis. Mills (1956, 1958) explained the direction of post-World War II foreign policy in terms of
the management of society by the power elite—the core of high-level state, corporate, and
military officials and managers, whose political interests tend to converge due to shared social
backgrounds and institutional functional interdependence between the government, economy,
and military. What was most distinct about the immediate post-World War II period, Mills
argued, was the ascendency of the military elite, and the growth of a “permanent-war economy.”
“American capitalism,” Mills explains, “is now in considerable part a military capitalism, and the
most important relation of the big corporation to the state rests on the coincidence of interest
between military and corporate needs, as defined by warlords and corporate rich” (Mills
1956:276).
According to Mills, the military elites were increasingly influential in politics and
government, “accepted by other members of the political and economic elite, as well as by broad
sectors of the public, as authorities on issues that go well beyond what has historically been
considered the proper domain of the military” (Mills 1956:205). Thus military men were
replacing career diplomats, serving as college administrators, and selected increasingly for
corporate leadership because of institutional knowledge that helped secure government contracts
in the militarized post-World War II economy. This tendency was dangerous, according to Mills,
because the military elite espoused a military “definition of reality” that subordinated diplomacy
to military solutions in international conflicts. Moreover, increased government research and
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development spending on the military was leading to “the militarization of science” at the
relative expense and neglect of basic research, constraining the autonomy of scientists and
researchers in the universities (Mills 1956:216-17).
Unlike Marxists, Mills emphasized that there was a degree of autonomy between
political, economic, and military sectors of society; all decisions of consequence were not merely
the choices of business elites (Mills 1956:277). Yet, Mills was perhaps the first sociologist to call
attention to the militarization of the American economy, an important subject taken up in later
studies, to which I return. And, like Williams, Mills influenced a generation of social scientists
(mostly sociologists) though they have largely ignored his analysis of militarism in the United
States.
A leading historian of American foreign policy, Gabriel Kolko, combined elements of
both Williams’s theory of imperialism, and Mills’s power elite theory. On the basis of his own
analysis of the power elite, Kolko argues that Mills “slighted the economic bases of American
politics and exaggerated the causal and independent importance of the military” (Kolko,
1969:16). And contrary to Mills, he argues that shared social backgrounds are less important than
fixed bureaucratic objectives that do not allow for dysfunctional decisions. The bureaucratic
structure of the state is ultimately one that serves elite interests, particularly that of big business.
In an analysis of 234 high-ranking government officials working in the State, Defense or War,
Treasury and Commerce Departments, between 1944 and 1960, Kolko observes that
foreign policy decision-makers are in reality a highly mobile sector of the
American corporate structure, a group of men who frequently assume and define
high level policy tasks in government, rather than routinely administer it, and then
return to business. Their firms and connections are large enough to afford them
the time to straighten out or formulate government policy while maintaining their
vital ties with giant corporate law, banking, or industry. The conclusion is that a
small number of men fill the large majority of key foreign policy posts. (Kolko,
1969:17)
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The government draws on business so extensively because, as Kolko shows in detail, the
US industrial economy depends on raw materials imports from formerly colonized, developing
countries. Trade policy, the Marshall Plan, and Export-Import Bank loans were all designed,
according to Kolko, to facilitate raw material imports to the United States. These policies and
institutions, in turn, comprising a form of neocolonialism and imperialism, undermine the
development of these countries and create the structural conditions that lead to widespread
discontent and rebellion against the comprador elites supported by the United States, in turn
spurring US military interventions against independent nationalist and left-wing political
movements. US interventions in the 1950s and ‘60s in Cuba, Indonesia, Peru, Argentina, and
Brazil were all related to US business interests that were threatened in this way, according to
Kolko. In advancing a theory of the United States global role, Kolko argues that
In today’s context, we should regard United States political and strategic
intervention as a rational overhead charge for its present and future freedom to act
and expand. One must also point out that however high that cost may appear
today, in the history of Unites States diplomacy specific American economic
interests in a country or region have often defined the national interest on the
assumption that the nation can identify its welfare with the profits of some of its
citizens—whether in oil, cotton, or bananas. The costs to the state as a whole are
less consequential than the desires and profits of a specific class strata and their
need to operate everywhere in a manner that, collectively, brings prosperity to the
United States and its rulers (Kolko, 1969:84)
It is in these terms that Kolko explains the US intervention in Vietnam.
Kolko’s later writings emphasize that the motivation of American foreign policy remains
control of natural resources and the global economy (see Kolko 2002:109, where he cites a 1996
Pentagon defense report to this effect). Unlike Mills, then, Kolko sees militarism as the
consequence of specific economic interests in the natural resources of developing countries, and
unlike Williams, articulates a structural basis for elite power in the government bureaucracy.
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To return to the military-industrial complex thesis, Seymour Melman (1974, 2001, inter
alia), persuasively argues that the post-World War II economy of the United States must also be
understood as a state-managed permanent war economy, echoing Mills. The central institution in
the permanent war economy is the Pentagon (the Department of Defense), which Melman argues
was transformed under Robert McNamara’s leadership into a central administration office for a
massive, centrally managed military economy. McNamara standardized a form of cost
management that emphasized increasing, rather than decreasing, production costs for industrial
military contractors. This system enables military contractors to consistently increase profits
without economizing production since the federal government provides almost unlimited
subsidies through the national defense budget. According to Melman, this system constitutes a
form of state capitalism that operates in tandem with the private capitalist economy of the United
States, but according to a different logic of capitalist development than described in classical and
standard economics, for it does not depend on market mechanisms for growth, but public
subsidy.
Melman recognizes that the military economy serves foreign policy aims similar to those
described by Kolko (Melman 1974:284), but emphasizes the profit incentive for private military
contractors who stand to benefit from a militarized foreign policy, and the power that accrues to
the top military officials, particularly the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Melman, 2001:105) and the
president, who, as commander in chief, is the top manager of the Pentagon system. Melman
argues that these latter factors were the principal causes of US involvement in Vietnam, and that
Kolko was mistaken in taking at face value claims made in the Pentagon Papers about raw
materials in Indochina (Melman 1974:266-267). Thus, Melman emphasizes the independent
causal influence of the military-industrial complex as a force in American foreign policy.
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Any review of writers in the American antiwar scholarly tradition would be incomplete
that did not include a discussion of Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman’s co-authored works.
These two authors collaborated on several books and articles about American foreign policy and
war. What is distinct about their analysis is a consistent principled or moral critique of American
foreign policy and the ideology that underpins it. Chomsky has regularly asserted that US leaders
have never been seriously concerned with promoting democracy or protecting human rights, in
spite of what they say, as evidenced by consistent support for anti-democratic, authoritarian
regimes in Europe and formerly colonized countries, efforts to overthrow democratically elected
governments, and the repeated humanitarian crises entailed by US war efforts. Herman and
Chomsky’s earlier works documented US support for authoritarian governments in countries
including the Philippines, Indonesia, South Vietnam, Guatemala, El Salvador, Brazil, and Chile,
among others (Herman and Chomsky 1979). Like Kolko, they often explain this support, and
corresponding lies and mystifications to justify it, in terms of American economic interests in
these various countries and surrounding regions.
Chomsky and Herman’s analyses focus largely on the intellectual culture and mass media
in the United States. The mass media, policy-oriented intellectuals, and professional academics
serve to disguise the real class interests that guide American foreign policy and take the United
States to war (Chomsky 2008). Professional academics and journalists are ensconced in
institutions that, because of their structural connections to the state and corporate economy,
promote conformity to official state ideology—in particular, American exceptionalism. Between
Herman and Chomsky, their most well-developed arguments regarding these tendencies were
made about the media. Their “propaganda model” (Herman and Chomsky 2002) predicts that the
corporate media will conform to elite perspectives of the world, and marginalize views that fall

34

outside of the range of elite opinion. Thus, Herman and Chomsky explain the media’s tendency
to limit criticism of American foreign policy to questions of strategic success and failure; the
actual morality of foreign policy is virtually never questioned in the media, Herman and
Chomsky show. The United States may occasionally fail to achieve allegedly benevolent
intentions, as in Vietnam, but its policies are never held to be wrong, and that its foreign policy
may be motivated by material interests rather than noble ideals is virtually never entertained by
the media.
Herman and Chomsky’s arguments are well-supported with rich documentary evidence
about many cases and their scholarship shows a sensitivity to historical detail that is less
common in academic sociological research about war. Yet, while they often seem to imply that
their propaganda model does influence public opinion, they are careful to avoid drawing this
conclusion, maintaining that the public at times may not be aligned with elite perspectives, even
if the media do not offer alternatives. However, other scholars have shown that in important
cases, public opinion does tend to correspond to the range of elite opinion on foreign policy (e.g.
Western 2005). Moreover, the two authors never provided a model that adequately describes the
institutional constraints and incentives in academic institutions that mute moral criticism of
foreign policy and promote instead a tendency to reinforce elite ideology. Still, Herman and
Chomsky enable us to better understand why Americans have been unable to confront the reality
of American imperialism—the fundamental problem of American imperialism identified by
William Appleman Williams.
To mention just one more writer belonging to the antiwar scholarly tradition, political
scientist Carl Boggs has written several works about American militarism and empire. In a more
recent contribution, Origins of the Warfare State, Boggs (2017) synthesizes many of the theories
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outlined above, particularly regarding the military-industrial complex, the power elite, and the
militarized culture in the United States, tracing the origins of these to World War II, and
examining their implications. Boggs (2017:xiv) regrets that more scholars have not taken up
these subjects, and sees his work as an update to the classic but dated contributions of Mills,
Melman, Kolko, Chomsky and others. Boggs (2017:10) seeks to provide greater conceptual
clarity and theoretical insight about the American “warfare state,” a “broad ensemble of
structures, policies, and ideologies: permanent war economy, national security-state, global
expansion of military bases, merger of state, corporate, and military power, an imperial
presidency, the nuclear establishment, [and] super-power ambitions” (Boggs 2017:3). But while
his syntheses of history are masterful, and his descriptions of American foreign policy,
institutions, and culture are informative, Boggs’s analyses read more like journalism in that these
many concepts are often used without precise definitions, and are not always clearly linked to US
warfare in a clear cause-and-effect analysis. Rather, the character of his analysis is more
anecdotal and polemical than social scientific, intended more to elucidate the moral hypocrisy of
historical American policies and wars than to provide an analytic framework useful for social
scientists.

Conclusion

With regard to the research question of this dissertation, what does this review show?
State-centric theories are inadequate on two counts. The major problem associated with
them is a false state-economy distinction. States and economies are intimately linked in ways not
recognized by state-centric theories. In the United States, the state is intimately linked to the
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economy through personnel (the power elite) and through state-capitalist economic
arrangements, particularly the military-industrial complex, which isn’t recognized by statecentric theorists, or is wrongly conceptualized as a corporate lobby. State-centric theories are
also too broad in scope to be analytically useful for studying specific national contexts and
specific wars.
The Marxist theories reviewed are functionalist in reasoning, and do not adequately
incorporate agency and decision-making processes that are causally relevant. And because
Marxist theories are built on Marx’s theory of capitalism, they do not explain the logic of statemanaged economies such as the American military-industrial complex, which does not depend
on competitive market mechanisms.
The non-Marxist American antiwar scholarly tradition presents at least four distinct
theoretical possibilities. The first is a military-industrial complex thesis, whereby war and
mobilization for it serve to enrich capitalists who profit from government subsidies, and
concentrate decision-making power in the president’s office. The Open Door theory, on the other
hand, is an economic expansionist thesis, whereby war serves to secure markets and resources
for American capitalists when these are threatened by populist or nationalist movements.
Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model and a more general elite theory of American politics
are both compatible with these two theories. In the last analysis, however, because there are war
efforts in post-World War II American history in which maintaining access to foreign markets
does not appear to be a relevant factor, the MIC seems more likely to be a necessary condition
for war than pressure to open foreign markets. The latter factor may often be a facilitating
condition, but not a necessary cause.
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On balance, therefore, the MIC, power elite, and ideological management functions of the
mass media and academia are more plausible necessary causes of American war making than
those that have been identified by state-centric and Marxist sociologists. However, two problems
exist. One is that the way university intellectuals sustain militarism needs a stronger, more
detailed theorization than has been provided by Chomsky. Another is that these various
components have not been well-integrated into a single, coherent explanatory framework useful
for social scientific analysis. In the next chapter, therefore, I show how the MIC, the power elite,
elite ideology, the mass media, and academia can be integrated into a single elite model of
American war making.

38

CHAPTER 3

MILITARISM, IMPERIALISM, AND THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SYSTEM: A
SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION OF WAR

In this chapter, I present an elite model of war mobilization. War mobilization refers to
the processes whereby Americans are socially conditioned, called on, and motivated to wage
wars in a social and political system that is dominated by a power elite. The power elite refers to
the decision-making class constituted by the intersection of the social elite, corporate rich, and
high-level employees within political policy-planning organizations like think tanks. I argue that
this power elite, in virtue of the control they exert over major political, economic, and cultural
institutions, are able to mobilize the public for wars that they wage for their own special
interests, which are not consonant with the subjectively perceived or objective interests of
general public, and are different from their official, public declarations about their intentions and
purposes.
The model is intended to apply to the post-World War II period to the present. It is based
on the fact that by the end of World War II, the United States had become a global empire.
Empires are forms of global or semi-global governance in which other territories are controlled
either directly or indirectly by a country (McCoy 2017:40; cf. Mann 2013:214-217). Because the
term “empire” has long had a negative connotation in American political discourse, Americans
do not commonly understand the United States as an empire or perceive that an American empire
exists. The invisibility of the empire is also a consequence of the related fact that it is an informal
empire that does not depend on direct territorial administration, as with the large European
empires that collapsed after World War II.
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The American empire exists to realize the power elite’s interests in a global capitalist
order that privileges American business and sustains a domestic military-industrial complex
(MIC)—a permanent war economy and the global military apparatus it sustains. Throughout the
post-World War II period, the military-industrial complex expanded to meet the foreign policy
objectives of successive presidential administrations. Among these objectives, opening the
world’s nations and people to a US-led capitalist global economy has been one of the most
important and enduring (see van Apeloorn and de Graaff 2016, chapter two, for a thorough
review of the historical literature). As challenges to this world order proliferated throughout the
twentieth century, and the permanent war economy expanded, American elites became
increasingly fixated on projecting power, for the sake of power itself and for the profits that
accrued to them as managers and owners of military industrial firms, or civilian businesses
linked to them. Wars have been a principal means for projecting this power throughout the world
and reinforcing elite control over political and economic life at home.
Of course, American war efforts are explained quite differently by the power elite
themselves. US government officials and opinion leaders in the media explain wars in terms of
the defense of “national interests” or “national security” rather than the base desires for
economic domination or geopolitical power, which are held to be illegitimate causes both in
international politics and by American citizens. This is especially important since American
citizens are needed to support war efforts by offering their service as soldiers and in other
capacities. Perceived threats to their power are therefore translated by the elite into material
threats to Americans themselves, and broadcasted to the public as such. Sometimes, these threats
are real, as in the cases of al-Qaeda’s attacks on the World Trade Center. In these cases such
translations are not necessary. However, the historical origins of such threats in American
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imperial ventures are hidden from Americans so that their outrage is directed at the official
enemies rather than at elites who may bear responsibility for making enemies in the first place.
In order to explain why and how the United States wages war, then, requires
understanding how such transformations of reality occur in the minds of Americans. I argue that
this is accomplished principally through the education system and mass media, which produce
and disseminate a worldview that causes Americans to believe that the United States is a morally
exceptional nation with a history of defending righteous causes, such as defeating the Nazis and
Communism and fighting al-Qaeda. War and the military are thus associated with promoting
world peace, freedom, and national security. The less exceptional and ideologically useful parts
of American history are filtered out of the education system and media discourse (or otherwise
justified as clumsy deviations from our righteous path), along with sociological analyses that
challenge the notion that the American political system is an open, democratic one in which
foreign policy is formulated according to a democratically achieved consensus.
A power elite model of war mobilization, then, explains American wars—wars and
military interventions instigated by the United States, or those in which it participates—in terms
of five interrelated structural features of American society. These are (1) state capitalist
imperialism, (2) elite control of politics, (3) pro-war, imperial ideology, (4) elite control of the
media, and (5) elite influence on academia. This model explains why the power elite wage wars,
and how they are able to mobilize the rest of society for war through control of the key
institutions of the economy, government, academia (and by extension, public education), and the
media. It is through their control of these institutions that they are able to shape the dominant
ideology that provides the justifications for war. The remainder of this chapter explains how each
of these factors operate and lead to war.
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State-Capitalist Imperialism

Scholars identify three phases of American imperialism (e.g., Nugent 2008). The first
phase involved continental expansion across North America, the second one overseas expansion
that led to US domination of the Western hemisphere, and the final phase, a global hegemony
beginning at the end of World War II and lasting to the present day. This section focuses on this
third phase of American imperialism and the configuration of institutions that sustain it. I refer to
this configuration of institutions as state capitalism.
The United States emerged from World War II as the most powerful country in the world,
politically, militarily, and economically. The historian Alfred McCoy summarizes the situation
this way:
Militarily, Washington had a brief monopoly on nuclear weapons and a navy of
unprecedented strength. Diplomatically, it was supported by allies from Europe to
Japan, an informal empire in Latin American secured by the Rio mutual-defense
treaty of 1947, and an official anticolonial foreign policy that eased relations with
the world’s many emerging nations. The foundation for this newfound power was
the overwhelming strength of the American economy. During World War II,
America’s role as the “arsenal of democracy” meant massive industrial expansion,
no damage to domestic infrastructure given that fighting only occurred elsewhere,
and comparatively light casualties—four hundred thousand war dead versus seven
million for Germany, ten million for China, and twenty-four million for Russia.
While rival industrial nations struggled to recover from the ravages of history’s
greatest war, America “bestrode the postwar world like a colossus.” With the only
intact industrial complex on the planet, the US economy accounted for 35% of
gross world output and half of its manufacturing capacity. (McCoy 2017:51)
This situation presented policy makers in the United States with a special opportunity to
create a new US-led world order. In their position of uncontested global power, they created a set
of international institutions that would form the basis of a global political, economic, and legal
order intended to prevent the outbreak of another world war and another depression by
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stabilizing the global capitalist economy. These institutions were the World Bank, established in
1944; the United Nations, International Court of Justice, and International Monetary Fund (IMF),
established in 1945; and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, established in 1947, which
later became the World Trade Organization.
The World Bank and IMF were central to the United States’ plan for the global economy,
developed at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. Originally
called the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank was
intended to facilitate the reconstruction of the world economy, though in Europe this was
ultimately achieved through grants disbursed as part of the 1947 Marshall Plan. At Bretton
Woods, the plan for the global economy—developed by the United States with little input from
other countries—was to inject US capital into Western Europe—especially Germany—and later,
China, to create along with the United States three industrial-financial anchors for the global
economy. (When the Chinese Communist Party took power in 1949, US state planners turned to
Japan as the country that would serve as the industrial-financial center of Asia.) The Bretton
Woods plan also established the dollar as the global reserve currency, and fixed exchange rates
between all participating countries. When a country experienced an economic downturn, rather
than adjusting its exchange rate to protect its national economy, the IMF would come to the
rescue with loans to help the country recover economic strength, preventing the downturn from
spreading to the rest of the global economy. This system, it was believed, would prevent both
economic depression, but also war, since the system was predicated on open trade and
cooperation rather than economic competition between nations.
In the years immediately after the end of World War II, state planners also established
permanent military and intelligence institutions within and outside the United States to protect
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this global system. Outside of the United States, this included military alliances such as the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, 1949), Middle East Treaty Organization (1955), the
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO, 1954), and bilateral alliances with Australia, New
Zealand, the Philippines, and Japan (McCoy 2017:35-36). The United States also expanded its
network of global military bases to approximately 300 by 1954, which increased to about 800 by
1988, before declining to the current number of approximately 700 (McCoy 2017:53). Within the
United States, The National Security Act of 1947 established the Department of Defense,
National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Air Force. The National
Security Act worked in tandem with Truman’s containment doctrine, the purpose of which was
to “contain” global communism. Communism was a natural enemy of American state planners,
given that they associated American security with the stability and growth of global capitalism.
The Soviet Union and the form of political-economic organization it encouraged stood in the
way of the plan for the global economy developed at Bretton Woods. Thus after a brief strategic
alliance with the Soviet Union during World War II, the United States turned against it again at
the close of the war, so beginning the Cold War.
The new military-intelligence apparatus was used to prevent autonomous politicaleconomic development, first in Europe, and then increasingly in developing countries, when it
was deemed incompatible with the US-led capitalist world order. Covert military operations in
industrialized countries like Italy (1948) and Greece (1946), and developing countries such as
Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954), were intended to eliminate both communist parties and other
various nationalist political parties and movements that intended to control their own economic
development outside of the US global framework. Because this framework relegated many
developing countries to the status of neocolonial dependencies, hindering their industrial
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development, it bred nationalist resistance to what was perceived as neocolonial imperialism in
many of these countries (Kolko 1969). When necessary, US planners falsely characterized such
nationalist movements as communist to justify military aggression against them or covert support
of military coups. And US opposition to political movements that did not support its interests
often meant that the United States was allied with violent authoritarian regimes that would do
Washington’s bidding, democracy and human rights be damned. Such regimes have typically
been recipients of extensive US military aid and training.
Another important institutional development that began during World War II, and which
was consolidated under the Kennedy administration, was the development of what is usually
referred to as the military-industrial complex. In this dissertation, the military-industrial complex
refers to the Pentagon-managed private military industry of the United States and global military
apparatus. As described and meticulously documented by Seymour Melman (1974, 2001, inter
alia), this “permanent war economy” is a state-managed capitalist economy whereby the
Pentagon distributes production contracts to thousands of private military-industrial or “defense”
firms. While the ownership of these corporations is private, the management of military
production within them is centralized in the Pentagon and White House. The sheer size of this
industrial system means that it constitutes one of the largest sectors of the entire American
economy, and its maintenance has become central to its health. And as a state managed and
funded economy, it depends not on market mechanisms for its growth, but government subsidies.
Hence the increasingly large national military budgets of the United States for the last 70 years.
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Figure 1. United States Military Spending, 1948-2020
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The chart shows approximate Department of Defense base budgets between 1948 and 2020, in constant 2020
dollars, adjusted for inflation. After 2001, the Pentagon maintained a base budget in addition to an Overseas
Contingency Operations budget. The chart reflects the sum of these expenditures after 2001. Spending on nuclear
and other defense-related activities is not included. Souces: McCartney (2015) and Department of Defense Green
Book (U.S. Department of Defense 2019).

The military-industrial complex, Melman argued, constitutes a permanent war economy
for two reasons. One is that immense profits accrue to the major defense firms, which in turn are
able to put pressure on policy makers to sustain a large military budget and other policies that
protect the defense industry. The other reason is that, as managers of a massive centrally planned
economy and military, the President, Pentagon managers, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff accrue
tremendous power over economic and political life, both within the United States and abroad.
Consequently, as the twentieth century progressed, military force was utilized less often to
defend specific economic interests or promote the health of the global economy, but increasingly
to demonstrate the “credibility” of US power as military and political defeats by Third World
adversaries accumulated. Successive wars in defense of the “national interest” or “national
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security” served to continue justifying large military budgets to the American public. Though
control of the global economy remained a top priority of state and military planners in
Washington, power lust and vested interests in the military-industrial complex became
increasingly important factors explaining their motivation to use military force. Thus, when the
Cold War ended, and communism largely disappeared as a political force, new justifications for
excessively large military budgets and military activism were devised, and a widely anticipated
post-Cold War “peace dividend” never materialized. The US focus remained on developing
countries, though now the pretexts for military intervention variously included fighting drug
traffickers, “rogue states,” and terrorists; human rights and democracy promotion; and genocide
prevention. Yet, comfortable alliances with authoritarian regimes remained a feature of
American foreign policy.
Another consequence of the expansion of the military-industrial complex is that military
spending during the Vietnam War finally ended the creditor status of the United States, which
has since become a chronic debtor nation, and which led to the collapse of the Bretton Woods
system in 1971, particularly the abandonment of fixed exchange rates and the gold standard
(Varoufakis 2015:92-93). Military spending, mostly associated with the Vietnam War, combined
with social spending under Johnson’s Great Society programs, caused inflation to increase
throughout the global economy in the 1970s. This contributed to a processes of national
deindustrialization in non-defense sectors. The United States began importing consumer goods
that it once produced from countries like Japan and China, acquiring large trade deficits.
However, the United States has been able to sustain massive spending and trade deficits because
of the dollar’s continued role as the global reserve currency (Mann 2013; Hudson 2003:30;
Varoufakis 2015:101-102). Surplus nations recycle their accumulated surplus dollars back into
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the United States’ financial system, financing US deficit spending. They effectively have no
other choice, since they depend on US purchases of their consumer goods, and no other national
currency is supported by an economy large enough to replace the dollar as reserve currency.
Hence, the situation of the neoliberal period that followed the collapse of the Bretton Woods
system is that trade surplus nations finance the American empire and military-industrial
complex, a reversal of roles of the immediate post-World War II period when the United States
used its surplus status to rebuild the global economy and create outlets for US surplus capital.
In spite of—indeed, because of—this transformation of the US and global economy, the
United States has maintained a dominant position in the global economy throughout the postWorld War II period. “As economic competitors grew rapidly in the prosperous years after
World War II,” writes McCoy, “the US share of the world’s gross product slipped from an
estimated 50 percent in 1950 to only 25 percent by 1999. Even so, at the close of the Cold War,
American multilateral corporations were still the engines of global growth” (McCoy 2017:55).
The strength of the American economy and the dollar’s role as the global reserve currency also
enable the United States to impose economic sanctions on official enemy states as a form of
economic coercion (Williamson 2013:82). The “legal” imposition of sanctions can be achieved
through the United Nations Security Council, where the United States is one of the five
permanent member states with veto power, another important institutional arrangement
established after World War II. The United States also maintains extensive control over the
World Bank as a result of its large shareholder status. This has enabled it to implement
development policies in developing countries, such as the infamous structural adjustment
programs of the 1980s, that have mired developing countries in debt and retarded their economic
growth, but have benefited the American economy (Prashad 2007).
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It is because the US military-industrial complex creates such a strong impetus for military
interventions and a generally militarized foreign policy, and because state-managed trade
relationships enable the deficit spending necessary to sustain it, that I refer to the post-World
War II form of imperialism exercised by the United States as state capitalist imperialism.
Moreover, even before the military-industrial complex was consolidated under the Kennedy
administration, the global political-economic order established by the United States depended on
multilateral institutions and alliances that were and still are essentially state institutions.
However, at the same time, the maintenance of capitalist institutions, including the militaryindustrial complex, has not ceased to be a functional purpose of these arrangements.

Power Elite Control of Public Policy

A definite class structure characterizes American society. At the top of this class structure
are the power elite, a decision-making class constituted by the intersection of social elites, the
corporate rich, and high-ranking employees within political policy-planning groups (Domhoff
2014:xii). This class formation largely dominates the political decision-making process of the
United States. Social class is differentiated from the economic class category of the corporate
rich given that not all members of the latter group share the same social and political-economic
goals—that is, a minority of members of the corporate rich can and do work in the interests of
nonelites. But the power elite theory recognizes that there is a strong tendency for the corporate
rich to prefer a well-defined set of policies from which they benefit at the expense of the rest of
the society. As documented by G. William Domhoff, this includes opposition to the following
policies: government jobs for the unemployed, making government social provisions such as
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health care, unemployment, and social security more generous, and workplace rights and
protections that “make it more difficult for the corporate rich to control the workplace”
(Domhoff 2014:xiv). The corporate rich fund and serve on the governing boards of policyplanning groups—tax free foundations, think tanks, and policy-discussion groups—that promote
these policies in Washington.
In my view, Domhoff’s theory was incomplete to the extent that it failed to consider the
power elite’s foreign policy preferences, and related policy preferences such as military
spending. To Domhoff’s anti-labor, pro-capital elite agenda, we can also add opposition to the
following policies: decreasing the military budget, transitioning to a peacetime economy,
decreasing the size of the military, decreasing the number of global military bases and nuclear
weapons, and a less interventionist foreign policy. If these policy preferences are largely the
result of pressure from the military-industrial complex, as explained above, what is the
relationship between the military-industrial complex and the power elite?
Domhoff (1996) argued that there was not a “separate” military-industrial complex—that
is, separate from the corporate community. He showed that the largest military-industrial firms
were among the largest corporations in the United States, and that their boards of directors
overlapped with those of the largest non-military, civilian corporations. Thus military-industrial
firms are at the core of the American economy and power elite networks. Though Domhoff
argues that this shows that a “separate” military-industrial complex does not exist (that is,
separate from the corporate community), this finding is actually consistent with Seymour
Melman’s permanent war economy thesis. For, according to Melman, what differentiates the
state-managed military-industrial firm from the civilian corporation is not personnel or
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ownership, but (a) the locus of managerial control, and (b) related cost-maximizing accounting
practices that are specific to Department of Defense subcontractors (Melman 1974:34-35).1
The fact that the military-industrial complex is so central to the US economy and elite
networks explains why the corporate rich consistently support a set of national policies that
contribute to its growth (large military budgets, an enormous weapons arsenal, a network of
roughly 700 global military bases, and perpetual war). The elite have been resoundingly
successful in achieving these policy objectives, as the post-World War II tendency has been for
the federal defense budget to increase, weapons arsenals to expand, the number of global military
bases to increase, new domains of military dominance to emerge, including space and cyber
space, and the frequency and length of wars to increase. As with public policy in general, the
corporate rich have been able to achieve these policies through their control of the executive
branch of the federal government, where the most important foreign policy decisions are made,
and through control of policy-planning organizations.
A long line of scholarship has shown that top-level foreign policy decision-making
positions in the executive branch are staffed overwhelmingly by the corporate elite—corporation
owners, founders, inside and outside directors, high-level managers, and corporate lawyers
(Mills 1956; Kolko 1969; van Apeldoorn and de Graaf 2016). The most recent scholarship shows
that this is no less true of the post-Cold War period than it was in the immediate post-World War
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With regard to managerial control, investment and production decisions are all ultimately made in the White House
with the approval of Congress. And regarding cost-maximizing, as Melman documented, it is not market
mechanisms that determine the profitability of military-industrial firms, but government subsidies. Beginning in
1961 under the management of Robert McNamara, the Department of Defense began requiring defense contractors
to use an accounting practice known as “cost-plus” or “historical costing” to determine input costs. This leads to
rapid increases in expenses for defense firms. So, rather than economizing production as private sector firms seek to
do, defense firms are required by the Pentagon to increase production costs and to seek larger government subsidies.
This has a twofold effect. One is that it increases the profits of military-industrial firms. The other, as mentioned
above, is that it increases the power of the executive branch. Naturally, increasingly large military budgets are
necessary to sustain this institutional arrangement.
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II period. Van Apeldoorn and de Graaff conducted an analysis of “87 key cabinet-ranking and
senior advisers involved in the making of U.S. grand strategy, 30 (with some overlaps between
Clinton and Obama) from each of the three post-Cold War administrations . . . in the starting
year of each administration (1993, 2001, and 2009)” (Van Apeldoorn and de Graaff 2016:64).
These officials included “the president and the vice president; the secretaries and deputy
secretaries of state, defense, and the treasury; the attorney general; the secretary of commerce;
the U.S. trade representative; the chief of staff of the White House and his two deputies; the
(three) senior advisers to the president; the national security adviser; the director of the CIA; the
director of the National Economic Council; the ambassador to the UN; the director of the Office
of Management and Budget; and the chair, as well as two members of the Council of Economic
Advisors.” The sample also included “influential policymakers at crucial positions below
cabinet-level rank within that particular administration,” such as Zalmay Khalilzad and Richard
Perle of the Bush administration, and Richard Holbrooke under Obama (van Apeldoorn and de
Graaff 2016:64-65).
What van Apeldoorn and de Graaff’s analysis shows is that the majority of these
policymakers move from corporate leadership positions to their government positions, and that a
smaller, but still large portion (about half) move back to corporate positions after their tenure in
government. This means that the foreign policy bureaucracy of the government is effectively
staffed by the corporate rich, seriously challenging theorists who maintain that the state and
economy are separate and autonomous entities (e.g. Mann 1988, 2003, 2013). The 30
policymakers in the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations maintained 197, 157, and 126
corporate affiliations, respectively, including their positions before and after government tenure.
(The numbers for the Obama administration are incomplete, since this analysis was conducted in
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2016.) Most of these affiliations are with large, Fortune 500, transnational US corporations. The
most numerous affiliations are with finance and law and consultancy firms, followed by a
relatively even distribution of other industries: technology, defense, energy, media and
marketing, transport, and consumer goods and services (Van Apeldoorn and de Graaff 2016:74).
According to Van Apeldoorn and de Graaff, these findings do not show sectoral capture
of the state by a particular industry—all major sectors of American capital are connected to the
executive branch—or suggest that this is the primary way in which specific industries influence
the government. Rather, the implication is that policymakers tend to form their understanding of
the world and their own perceived interests and values in the sociocultural milieu of the
corporate world (Van Apeldoorn and de Graaff 2016:75). To the extent that the corporate
community is integrated with the state-managed permanent war economy, this suggests, too, that
corporate leaders internalize the values and associated ideologies that sustain the militaryindustrial complex, facilitating easy transition to executive branch foreign policy leadership
positions. It also suggests that government officials whose early career socialization occurs
within the foreign policy bureaucracy, as was true of many top Bush administration officials (see
chapter 7), will also form similar values.2
As with domestic policy, among the most important institutional mechanisms for seeing
through preferred policies are policy-planning organizations. Membership organizations, think
tanks, interest groups, and lobbies, including “letterhead organizations,” are kinds of policy-

This is an important point, theoretically and methodologically. Kramer and Michalowski (2006:24) write that “The
organizational level of analysis links the internal structure of specific economic or political units with the external
political-economic environment, on the one hand, and with the way in which the work-related thoughts and actions
of the individuals who occupy positions in those units are conditioned by the requirements of the positions they hold
and by the procedures of the organization, on the other. Differential association [theory], by focusing on the social
relations that give meaning to individual experience, directs us to examine the symbolic reality derived from social
interaction within bounded organizational niches.” The “symbolic reality” of the power elite is examined in section
3, below.
2
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planning organizations that the corporate rich fund and manage for the purposes of influencing
policy in Washington. Think tanks are especially important for this purpose. Their “[s]taff
members conduct independent research, testify to Congress and other government agencies, and
appear frequently as media commentators,” according to leading international relations scholar,
Stephen Walt.
Most think tanks engage in extensive outreach efforts via their own websites,
blogs, publications, seminars, legislative breakfasts, and other events, all intended
to enhance their visibility inside Washington, facilitate fundraising, and increase
their influence over policy. Think tanks can also play a critical role in many
stages of a foreign policy professional’s career: they provide entry-level
opportunities for young policy wonks seeking to make their way into government
positions, and they provide sinecures for former government officials, including
those seeking to return to public service at a later date. . . . [S]ome parts of it
operate as a “shadow government” preparing people and policies for future
administrations. (Walt 2018:99)
A relatively small subset of think tanks constitute a “core group” that have maintained
connections with successive presidential administrations (van Apeldoorn and de Graaff 2016:7888). The core group includes The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the Trilateral
Commission, the Bilderberg Group, the RAND Corporation, the Aspen Institute and the Aspen
Strategy Group, the Atlantic Council, the Brookings Institution, the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, the Peterson Institute for International Economics, the Hoover Institution,
the Carnegie Corporation and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Rockefeller
Foundation, the Foreign Policy Association, the Committee for Economic Development, and the
Bretton Woods Committee. Each of these planning bodies maintained at least 3 ties to one or
more of 30 select executive branch positions in the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations,
according to van Apeldoorn and de Graaff’s analysis. The CFR, Trilateral Commission, and
Bilderberg groups maintained the most ties, with 35, 15, and 14 ties, respectively, to these same
three administrations (Apeldoorn and de Graaff 2016;82).
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While the think tanks and other policy-planning groups maintain extensive connections
with decision makers in the White House, they are also extensively networked with the corporate
rich through corporate funding and personnel on their boards of directors and trustees. The core
group think tanks receive extensive funding from a diverse range of industries within the
corporate sector. Most corporate funders are transnational corporations, and are evenly
distributed among finance, energy, defense, media, entertainment, and technology industries (van
Apeldoorn and de Graaff 2016:89). While corporate funding does not necessarily convey direct
control of the intellectual content of the policy-planning organizations, it is unlikely that this
funding does not have an influence on the kinds of policies promoted by these institutions (van
Apeldoorn and de Graaff 2016:91). As for think tank-corporate director/trustee interlocks,
among the nine most connected think tanks, more than half of their total directors/trustees also
held board positions in a major corporation, accounting for connections to hundreds of different
companies, according to van Apeldoorn and de Graaff. Approximately 70 percent of the
directors/trustees of the CFR, Bilderberg Group, Aspen Institute, Brookings Institution, and
Center for Strategic and International Studies, were also corporate directors (van Apeldoorn and
de Graaff 2016:91-92).
Stephen Walt writes that “Although certain think tanks and research organizations are
explicitly nonpartisan and aspire to high standards of scholarship, the line between research and
policy advocacy is increasingly blurred” (Walt 2018:99). Van Apeldoorn and de Graaff go
further, arguing that think tank nonpartisanship and “neutrality” serve as ideological cover for
promoting a consensus in favor of imperialism (van Apeldoorn and de Graaff 2016:86). Their
survey of core group think tanks suggests that each of them tend to work within the ideological
parameters of Open Door imperialism—keeping open the global economy for US capital
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penetration. So, while think tanks such as the CFR promote nonpartisan research and analysis,
and maintain extensive links to both Democratic and Republican administrations, they tend to
promote policies that are favorable to the military-industrial complex. Even Walt concedes that
there is a “bias” in favor of US global hegemony “in the largest think tanks and research
organizations such as the Brookings Institution, the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, the American Enterprise Institute, and the Heritage Foundation.”
These organizations do not have a strict “party line” on many issues, and the
people who work at them do not always agree on specific policy problems or
foreign policy priorities. Nonetheless, several of these organizations were
originally created to convince Americans to play a more active role in world
affairs, and all of them lean strongly in the direction of greater U.S. engagement.
(Walt 2018:115)
Control of the executive branch and the major policy-planning organizations are some of
the most important ways in which the power elite control foreign policy, directing it in militarist
and imperialist directions. But there are other ways as well. The American electoral system, with
a few exceptions in certain states, incorporates first-past-the-post voting systems, which prevents
third parties from being competitive. Because the two major political parties in the United States
both promote an imperialist foreign policy, voters have few opportunities to elect either
presidents or members of Congress who support antiwar or peace agendas. Moreover, such
politicians have little chance for success in a political system that allows for virtually limitless
corporate spending on political campaigns, and many politicians accept funding directly from the
major military-industrial corporations. For incumbent members of Congress, opposition to war
or the military-industrial complex is bound to rouse accusations from mainstream politicians,
government officials, and the media of being “soft,” or “isolationist” (Walt 2018:143). Military
bases are located every state (U.S. Department of Defense 2018), and military-industrial firms
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contract work in every state (U.S. Department of Defense 2021), making opposing the MIC a
risky activity for members of Congress.
Once government officials are elected, the general public has little direct influence on the
character of foreign policy and foreign policy decision-making. Foreign policy is largely
formulated in secret without public oversight and without regard for public opinion. The public
may occasionally protest, even in large numbers, but there is no guarantee that this will prevent
the outbreak of war, as the 2003 invasion of Iraq illustrated so clearly. The president may choose
to obey federal law and submit decisions to go to war to a vote in Congress, but this is often not
the case, reflecting the increasing power of the executive branch in the post-World War II period.
Presidents may also wage covert wars, invoking national security as a justification for
circumventing Congress. Congress may try to stop the executive branch from waging war, but it
is not necessarily responsive to public opinion, and it is likely to support the president in
decisions to go to war or prepare for it, whether these are submitted to a vote or not. As liberal
scholars point out, politicians do monitor public opinion polls when making decisions to go to
war in order to assess political risks to retaining office (Western 2005). But beyond these limited
ways, the decision to go to war is decided by the power elite.
Moreover, the public is largely ideologically aligned with elite opinion on the use of
military power in world politics. That is, the underlying assumptions about the benevolent role of
American power that make military intervention and war seem morally justified are widely held
among the public. However, there are several indications that the public favors different policies
related to the military and war. For instance, Stephen Walt argues that the public is typically
much more in favor of limiting military interventions than are elites (Walt 2018:260). Gallup
polls also indicate that the public has consistently held that military spending is too high and
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national defense is too strong, or are where they should be, even as the government
simultaneously increases military spending (Newport 2019). These trends indicate that foreign
policy is not a function of public preferences.

Imperial Ideology

As Marx and Engels famously wrote in the Communist Manifesto, “The ruling ideas of
every age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class.” In the United States, the ruling ideas
pertaining to war and peace, the military and war, and the role of the United States in the world
are the ideas of the power elite. The ways and means by which these ideas have become the
ruling ideas—the dominant ideology accepted by elites and the public alike—will be discussed
in subsequent sections. Here I describe the characteristics of America’s imperial ideology and
explain how they promote militarism and war. These include American exceptionalism, procapitalism, pro-democracy, the externalization of evil, and military “credibility” (Van Apeldoorn
and de Graaff 2014:35-36).
Americans tend to understand the United States as an exceptional nation in the world and
in world history. American exceptionalism, as I will use the term, entails the idea that the United
States is and has always been guided by a higher morality in its foreign affairs and in the ways its
society is arranged. Its relationship to other countries is motivated by moral precepts rather than
material interests, and if it is motivated by material interests at all, these interests are in the
interests of other nations and people too. If the United States goes to war, it is always in selfdefense against the aggression of others. The United States is not an aggressor nation and does
not violate international law. Sometimes, the United States may veer from its righteous path and
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get carried away in its effort to do good, and bloody interventions such as the Vietnam War may
be remembered as “blunders” or “tragic mistakes” (Herman and Chomsky 2002:172-173).
The United States is also unique in its commitment to democracy, according to the
dominant ideology. Americans often believe their democratic tradition is the best one and should
be emulated by other nations with weaker democratic, or undemocratic, political traditions. Thus
the United States seeks to promote democracy throughout the world. (The notion of a power elite
is foreign to this ideology.) A corollary is that the United States also seeks to promote capitalism
throughout the world. Capitalism, or “free enterprise,” is associated with “freedom” more
broadly so that anti-capitalist or anti-imperialist governments, movements, or ideologies are
understood as antithetical to freedom and democracy. Moreover, it is a moral imperative for the
United States to actively promote these values and institutions.
States or movements that stand in the way of American global designs and ambitions
become official enemies of the United States. Such resistance to American imperialism is
understood not as emanating from the nature of American imperial policies, but from moral
flaws of the people who resist imperialism. Since American interests are synonymous with the
interests of everyone, and are inherently good, only people who are evil or otherwise morally
inferior are thought to oppose the global proliferation of American institutions, policies, or
ideology (Walt 2018:154). Worse, they may even be sub-human. (Racist dehumanization has
always been an element of American imperialist ideology [Dower 2010:18-19].) In either case,
such a characterization serves to legitimize killing or otherwise forcefully repressing them (cf.
Walt 2018:154).
There is a tendency for ideologues of state-capitalist imperialism to inflate global threats.
“Threat inflators,” writes Stephen Walt about imperialists in the foreign policy “community,”
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“typically describe potential enemies as irrevocably hostile, irrational, and impossible to deter,
which in turn implies that they must be removed” (Walt 2018:153). Moreover, there are always
numerous enemies constituting dire threats, according to the dominant ideology, whether they
are threats to Americans themselves or threats to other people whom Americans must protect.
A final element of American imperial ideology is that US “credibility” is always at stake,
since failure to respond to threats will destroy US credibility either with allies who allegedly
depend on us for leadership, or enemies who need to be deterred from nefarious conduct by
displays of American force. This implies that “the United States must respond in places that
don’t matter in order to convince adversaries it will act in places that do,” according to Stephen
Walt (2018:149). Kolko (1988:5) argues that as American elites became increasingly pessimistic
about their ability to control world events, especially after the Korean War, they were
increasingly motivated by a concern to demonstrate military credibility, which led to military
interventions in countries and regions that were only of secondary importance to the American
economy, such as Vietnam.
The ideological function of ubiquitous, hostile, and unpredictable enemies, and appeals to
credibility, is to create a cultural milieu in which it appears that war is almost always necessary,
while American exceptionalism serves to make war seem good and righteous. If the world is
understood through this broad set of ideological assumptions, then the military-industrial
complex and military interventions motivated by narrow economic interests seem justified,
especially since the ideology hides the real class interests that guide foreign policy behind a false
“national interest.” It is important to note that the dominant ideology is inconsistent with
historical or sociological reality. As mentioned above, imperialism has often allied the United
States with antidemocratic regimes, and the United States has itself overthrown democratic
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governments that failed to do Washington’s bidding. And as explained above, military
interventions serve the narrow economic interests of the Pentagon managers, and the power elite
more broadly. And, while sometimes the United States does face real threats, many political
scientists have shown that these threats are often inflated and exaggerated (see Walt 2018:147148 for discussion and extensive references).
Of course, not all Americans believe or subscribe to the dominant ideology, and not all
elites espouse it. Sometimes, elites may even challenge its assumptions. However, enough
Americans subscribe to the dominant ideology to create a critical mass of public support for war
efforts and the military-industrial complex. And most elites do subscribe to some version of the
dominant ideology. Doing so is usually a requirement for career advancement in policy-planning
organizations, the corporate media, the foreign policy bureaucracy of the federal government,
and in many institutions managed by or closely linked to the power elite.
Among elites, there are also important ideological differences that fall within the
parameters of the dominant ideology described above. These pertain to differences in strategy.
The inability of the United States to control other countries with military force or win wars
against nationalist movements engendered an ideological split between elites who argue for a
more limited role of the US military, and those who argue for a more interventionist foreign
policy. A corresponding ideological split also exists between those who advocate a universalist
approach to foreign relations, and those who favor a more unilateralist position. Scholars of
American foreign policy thus identify four corresponding groupings among foreign policy
planners: realists, isolationists, hardline unilateralists, and liberal multilateralists (Western
2005:10-14).3 But, while they may disagree on strategy, American elites do not disagree on the

3

According to Western, realists believe US power should be used to defend US interests and primacy, but in a way
that does not overextend US forces or damage the reputation of the United States. Isolationists are unlikely to
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basic principle that the United States has the right to intervene in any part of the world where
their perceived interests are at stake (Kolko 1988:294).

The Doctrinal System: The Media

How has this imperialist ideology become the dominant ideology in the United States?
That is, how has it become the prevailing worldview among American citizens? What are the
domestic, institutional sources of the ideology? And how are the power elite able to use them to
promote it? There are two key institutions responsible for creating and disseminating political
ideology in modern societies: the mass media and the education system. I argue that it is through
control of these institutions that the power elite are able to heavily influence public thinking
about militarism and war. I will discuss the education system in the following section. In this
section, I describe the institutional characteristics of the American corporate media that cause
them to carry out a propaganda function for the power elite.
In their classic work, Manufacturing Consent, Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky
describe the social function of the mass media this way:
The mass media serve as a system for communicating messages and symbols to
the general populace. It is their function to amuse, entertain, and inform, and to
inculcate individuals with the values, beliefs, and codes of behavior that will
integrate them into the institutional structures of the larger society. In a world of
concentrated wealth and major conflicts of class interest, to fulfill this role
requires systematic propaganda. (Herman and Chomsky 2002:1)

advocate the use of military force, believing that it should be reserved principally for meeting imminent threats to
US political independence or territorial integrity. Hardline unilateralists advocate increased military power to
address various threats, discounting potential costs of military engagement. Liberal multilateralists emphasize the
interconnectedness of the global order and defending American values, particularly democracy and free markets.
They are often unwilling to support military interventions when they do not appear to lead to these ends, and oppose
military interventions to support undemocratic allies. It is important to note that isolationists are a minority, and
have little influence on foreign policy. As mentioned above, “isolationist” is often a negative epithet employed
against opponents of military activism.
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In a country like the United States, with an ostensibly “free” press, that the media serve this
purpose is difficult to see, Herman and Chomsky go on to explain.
In countries where the levers of power are in the hands of a state bureaucracy, the
monopolistic control over the media, often supplemented by official censorship,
makes it clear that the media serve the ends of a dominant elite. It is much more
difficult to see a propaganda system at work where the media are private and
formal censorship is absent. This is especially true where the media actively
compete, periodically attack and expose corporate and government malfeasance,
and aggressively portray themselves as spokesmen for free speech and the general
community interest. What is not evident (and remains undiscussed in the media)
is the limited nature of such critiques, as well as the huge inequality in command
of resources, and its effect both on access to a private media system and on its
behavior and performance. (Herman and Chomsky 2002:1-2)
Herman and Chomsky explain that such circumscribed media discourse is a consequence of the
very class inequality in the “command of resources” that the media serve to perpetuate. The
media, they show in several detailed case studies, tend to promote elite ideology, priorities, and
perspectives, while marginalizing perspectives that fall outside the range of elite opinion.
Their “propaganda model” of the mass media is an elite theory of the media that explains
why the media perform this way. A structural, political economy explanation, the model
identifies five structural features of the mass media that they refer to as “filters” of media
content: (1) the large size, concentrated ownership, and profit orientation of the media; (2)
dependence on corporate advertising for revenue; (3) dependence on “official sources” of
information in the government and corporate world; (4) disciplining flak from powerful elites;
and (5) anti-communism, to which they added pro-market ideology after the end of the Cold
War. Other writers conceptualize this last filter more broadly as “convergence in the dominant
ideology” (Pedro 2011:1888).
The way these filters work, according to Herman and Chomsky, is approximately as
follows (see Herman and Chomsky 2002:1-37). Filter (1): The large size and concentrated
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ownership of major news media corporations ensures that only the corporate rich are able to
afford the startup costs associated with owning and operating a large news corporation with
significant public reach. This creates a bias within news corporations towards elite interests, as
owners are able to ensure ideological conformity throughout their companies in virtue of their
power to make hiring decisions, and smaller news companies are barred from competition in
national media markets. Filter (2): Because consumers will not pay a price for news that covers
production costs, the media depend on corporate advertising for revenue. This further biases the
content of news in favor of the interests of large corporations and media conglomerates, which
need to increase sales, and whose owners and managers do not want to see stories that cast them
or their partners in a bad light. Therefore, as Herman and Chomsky quip: the media does not sell
news to audiences, but audiences to advertisers. Filter (3): The profit orientation of the first filter
requires that reporters have quick and easy access to readily available, and prima facie credible,
sources of information. This means the government and corporations, which make information
readily available for journalists and reporters through press releases, conferences, and other
means. This puts the media into a relationship of dependency with the power elite. For if
reporters are too critical of their powerful sources, they risk losing access to these sources of
information, and their firms becoming less competitive. Filter (4): Flak refers to various forms of
harassment and criticism of the media that emanate from different elements of the power elite
when offended by particular stories or critical reporting that casts them in a bad light. There are
also corporate-funded think tanks whose principal purpose is to criticize the media for alleged
“liberal” bias, such as Media Research Center (see Goss 2013), the Commonwealth Foundation,
the Center for Media and Public Affairs, and Accuracy in Media (AIM). About AIM, Herman
and Chomsky write that its function “is to harass the media and put pressure on them to follow
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the corporate agenda and a hard-line, right-wing foreign policy” (Herman and Chomsky
2002:27). Convergence in the dominant ideology (5): The dominant ideology described above is
the framework of analysis that informs reporting and commentary in the corporate media. Selfcensorship and the managerial selection of appropriately indoctrinated managing editors and
reporters ensures ideological conformity throughout the major news corporations.
Herman and Chomsky, and later several other critical media scholars (e.g., Goss 2013;
McCleod 2018; Zollman 2017), provided abundant evidence of systematic media propaganda in
the domain of foreign affairs reporting. Generally, this research has demonstrated that there is a
strong tendency for reporting and commentary to reflect elite understandings of the world and
specific events. American exceptionalism and righteousness characterize reporting, and the
corporate media is unanimously pro-capitalism. Government official enemies are routinely the
subjects of “sustained propaganda campaigns” in which they receive extensive, negative media
coverage. The crimes of enemy states receive extensive coverage and righteous condemnation,
and may even be exaggerated. Such reporting is often supported by unreliable sources, such as
domestic threat inflators in government or policy-planning organizations, or foreign dissidents
with special interests in overthrowing a certain government. The United States and its allies,
however, are rarely subject to such critical reporting when they commit crimes and atrocities.
These are more likely to be characterized as unfortunate “mistakes.” US allies with undemocratic
political systems tend to receive little media criticism, and may be described as taking
appropriate steps towards democracy, while harsh condemnation is heaped on undemocratic
official enemies for their political systems, which may be accompanied by calls for military
intervention to overthrow their governments.
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In short, news corporations in the United States—the largest network television channels,
radio stations, and press—reproduce and disseminate the dominant, imperial ideology of the
power elite. The general public has little opportunity for exposure to alternative definitions of
reality in the media. While “independent” news sources do exist—news companies that do not
depend on corporate funding and official sources—they have a relatively small public following,
due precisely to the structural features of the corporate media that make them ubiquitous in the
society. While this does not necessarily imply that the public or sections of it will always believe
state-corporate propaganda, it does imply that the public is ideologically primed to support the
military-industrial complex and military interventions. This helps explain why presidents are
able to gain a critical mass of support from the public prior to major wars, even in the presence
of large antiwar movements—the perspectives of which are blocked from media coverage.

The Doctrinal System: Academia

The mass media would likely not convey effective propaganda without the support of an
education system that reinforces the same ideological content. The public education system and
the university, like the media, serve to socialize young people into the institutions and class
structure of the existing society. An important latent function of the education system is to instill
ideological conformity (Schmidt 2000), as innovative thinking about social and political
problems largely occurs within the ideological parameters of elite thinking. As a top-down
process that affects the broader educational system, educational indoctrination begins in the
university, where the expert scholars—who write history, civics, and economics textbooks for
the public education system, and scholarly articles and books for academic and public
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consumption—are trained. Professionally trained university scholars thus define the nature of
American society and heavily influence the way Americans think about themselves and the
world. They shape and constrain public thinking about politics and economics, and about the
military and war. Public secondary schools, colleges, and universities are also sites of military
recruitment and house Reserve Officer Training Corps programs.
These facts are largely explained by the institutional history of the American university
system. The post-World War II university system developed with crucial assistance from federal
government agencies and private philanthropic foundations. These provided the funding
universities and academic departments often needed to survive (Simpson 1994:53; Parmar
2012:10). With the assistance of networks of willing professional academics, themselves often
connected to the government and major philanthropic foundations, these elite institutions
decisively shaped the research agendas of social science disciplines (Simpson 1994:57-62;
Parmar 2012:7; Solovey 2013). Private philanthropic foundation leaders—their founders,
directors, and trustees, all members of the power elite (see Parmar 2012:31-64)—sought to
mobilize academia for the purpose of promoting and strengthening US imperialism. They funded
area studies and international relations programs at elite universities such as Harvard, Princeton,
and Yale, that were expressly designed to study the practical problems of managing a global
empire and to provide training for government foreign service (Parmar 2012:7). Like the think
tanks discussed previously, which they also lavishly funded, the foundation leaders funded
university research programs that were intended to mobilize elite and public opinion against
isolationism and pacifism (prior to World War II), and in favor of an active military role for the
United States in the world (Parmar 2012:79). According to Parmar (2012), promoting an
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imperial foreign policy agenda has remained the goal of the major private foundations: the
Carnegie Corporation and its offshoots, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Ford Foundation.
For its part, the federal government funded university social science departments and
“gray area” (Rohde 2013) research institutes that blurred the distinction between state and
private institutions. In the early Cold War period, most of this funding came from the military. It
was given to university programs like MIT’s Center for International Studies, and research
institutes like the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) and RAND Corporation
(Rohde 2013:5). SORO researchers were tasked with studying the sources of communist
insurgency in formerly colonized countries where US interests were at stake (Rohde 2013). The
ill-fated Project Camelot, which employed political scientists, sociologists, and anthropologists,
was launched by the Kennedy administration for similar purposes (Rohde 2013:63-88). The
state-managed National Science Foundation (NSF) was established in 1950, and became another
major source of government funding for the social sciences thereafter. According to Solovey
(2013), in the early Cold War period, the military, NSF, and private foundations (Solovey refers
specifically to the Ford Foundation) constituted a “system” that exerted a conservative influence
on the social sciences. He argues that this system committed social science to quantitative,
scientistic approaches to the study of society that rejected humanistic and historical forms of
inquiry dedicated to improving social life, such as Marxism. Instead, the patronage system
steered social science towards technocratic social engineering, as determined by the needs of the
corporate state (Solovey 2013:4-5).
The state and large private foundations thus played a direct role in the formation of the
social sciences. The elite patronage system has not been modified in any significant way. As
anyone working in the academic social sciences knows, aspiring graduate students and junior
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faculty compete for large private and state grants to fund their research. In addition to enabling
their research, grant awards also confer prestige on individual scholars, and many academic
departments require grant-chasing for career advancement. Parmar offers the following
explanation as to how this influences their work:
The intellectuals’ own political-ideological development is determined by their
primary, secondary, and tertiary socialization as well as by the posteducational
structures of opportunities available to intellectuals to become occupationally and
politically tied to a variety of social groups. U.S. philanthropic foundations have
attempted to create strong networks precisely to recruit and mobilize the most
promising academic intellectuals for a whole range of large-scale projects,
including the development of the American state in domestic and foreign affairs.
The intellectuals so mobilized are provided with strong career-building
opportunities, well-funded programs, opportunities for policy influence, and are
systematically well integrated, and they tend therefore to produce research of a
utilitarian, technocratic character that is methodologically compatible with the
positivistic orientations of foundation leaders. This is not to suggest that
foundations directly interfere with researchers or research results, let along
pressure researchers. It is only to suggest that given the conditions of perpetual
financial crisis within academic institutions, the large-scale funding programs of
foundations prove very attractive to researchers and influence the selection of
research topics, research questions, and methodologies. (Parmar 2012:10,
original emphasis)
This system is not all powerful, however, and Parmar adds that researchers may still
arrive at conclusions that challenge “hegemonic thinking.” But because scholars working in
policy-relevant disciplines like international relations work in academic departments that may be
staffed by former government officials, and may themselves seek positions in the government or
elite policy-planning networks, they are unlikely to work outside the ideological parameters of
elite thinking (Walt 2018:122-124). And as explained above, this opportunity structure itself is
shaped by state, military, and economic institutions. This is not to imply that academia is a
monolith on foreign policy questions or questions about war and peace, or that there is not
ideological variation; it implies only that professional academic production is likely to occur
within the parameters of elite thinking to the extent that it is institutionally dependent on elite
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sources of funding, or that academics seek employment in the state bureaucracy or elite policyplanning organizations.
This tendency is visible in scholarly research across several disciplines. For example, the
historian Alfred McCoy remarks that, relative to studies of European colonialism and
imperialism, there has been very little serious study of American imperialism (McCoy 2017:44).
Similarly, few scholars have dedicated themselves to studies of the military-industrial complex.
To take another example, Parmer observes that political scientists have rarely studied the role of
philanthropic foundations in foreign policy making, in part because the dominant framework of
understanding is that foundations are nonpartisan and nonpolitical actors, and in part because
international relations is a state-centric discipline; political scientists tend not to incorporate elite
theories of the state (Parmar 2012:3-4). Elite studies have also fallen by the wayside in sociology
(Parmar 2012:4; Domhoff 2018:38-39). And as discussed at length in the literature review,
sociologists of war after C. Wright Mills have been dismissive of elite theories and militaryindustrial complex theses. In yet another example, in the communications discipline, the Herman
and Chomsky propaganda model has been marginalized, even though it is well-supported by
numerous studies, and no one has been able to demonstrate that it is not valid. Herring and
Robinson (2003) find no explanation for this tendency other than ideological bias resulting from
the operation of something like the propaganda model itself within universities.
While critical studies of American imperialism and war do exist, the professional
university researchers who find employment in the state, influential policy-planning
organizations, and NGOs, who are invited to comment in the mainstream media, or speak before
Congressional committees, are usually those who subscribe to the dominant frameworks of
understanding. They lend the prestige associated with their institutions and their credentials to
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the latest military programs and war efforts, and scholars who may be equally qualified to speak
on American foreign policy, but offer a critical perspective, are marginalized, their perspectives
shut out from hearing in the larger society.

Conclusion

To summarize the argument made in this chapter, five interrelated features of American
society cause the United States to go to war. The most fundamental is a form of imperialism
exercised by the United States to control the global political economy and exert military control
over states and movements that are perceived by American elites as challenges to it. The
military-industrial complex creates an added incentive to use military force against such
perceived challenges. The power elite of the United States have a vested interest in the militaryindustrial complex, given its centrality in the national economy, and because the corporate rich
benefit from the US-led globalized economy, they also occasionally favor using military force to
protect and further these interests. Because the power elite exert near total control over the
American political system, they are able to implement policies that further these interests,
unchallenged by anti-imperialist and anti-war elements of the society. The power elite are able to
mobilize the general populace behind imperialism, militarism, and specific wars through their
control of the mass media and education system, which systematically disseminate the ideology
and specific justifications that make war seem necessary and righteous.
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CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

The main purpose of this dissertation is to demonstrate that the elite model of war
mobilization offers a superior explanation of the 2003 Iraq War compared to the state-centric and
Marxist theories offered by sociologists. This requires presenting an explanation of the war in
terms of the model, and comparing it to the alternative explanations. A case study of the war
should be able to show that the antecedent conditions specified by the model existed in historical
reality and led to the outcome of the war, and that the conditions specified by the state-centric
and Marxist theories were not present or did not cause the war, or that if they did account for
causally significant factors, the theory is inadequate due to a failure to account for all historically
necessary conditions.
The research design and method used for achieving these objectives is a single historical
case study employing process tracing. Process tracing is a form of within-case (as opposed to
cross-case) analysis that shows how antecedent conditions are causally related to expected
outcomes. It is a historical method especially suited for theory development and theory testing
with single case study research designs. The following sections outline the structure of the
research design and its logic, and describe the methods employed in this dissertation.

Adequate Causation and Process Tracing

The sociological study of war lends itself especially well to qualitative, historical case
study research designs. The reason for this is that wars exhibit a degree of causal complexity that
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it may not be possible to meaningfully capture in quantitative research designs. Large-scale or
macro historical events like wars have five kinds of causes: necessary and facilitating conditions,
diachronic and synchronic social processes, and the conjunctural interaction of all of these with
specific historical contexts. In Max Weber’s classic historical-comparative causal methodology,
the identification of all of these in a case study is necessary to establish an “adequate,” or what
contemporary writers refer to as a “sufficient,” cause of a macro-sociological, historical event
(Kalberg 2012:129-143). A strong theoretical explanation for a such an event consists of an
adequate causal explanation. An adequate causal explanation is not a “complete” explanation,
given that it is always possible to consider new facilitating causes of a single event, but a
theoretically grounded explanation.
A necessary cause is a condition that must be present for the occurrence of an event
(Mahoney 2003:341). A facilitating cause is one that is less powerful than a necessary cause, but
may help bring it about (Kalberg 2012:133-134). A necessary cause is a theoretically universal
cause of all phenomena of a single kind, whereas a facilitating cause is not. Necessary and
facilitating causes may be either synchronic—an interaction of different forms of patterned social
action occurring at a specific point in time—or diachronic—a form of patterned social action that
has a causal influence over time and across different contexts (Kalberg 2012:134-137).
Conjunctural interactions are the interactions of necessary and facilitating causes with a
particular cluster of patterned actions at specific points in time; in other words, the specific
historical context in which the necessary and facilitating causes occur. The effects of synchronic
and diachronic patterns are modulated by conjunctural interactions (Kalberg 2012:137).
In brief, establishing adequate causation requires identifying theoretical causes that
unfold over time, and in the context of particular historical events that influence their historical
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effects. Thus, historical narrative explanation must be combined with theoretically guided
analysis of cases, and neither alone is sufficient for establishing adequate causation (Kalberg
2012:132). These methodological assumptions guide the analysis presented in this dissertation.
Contemporary scholars utilize process tracing as a way of identifying and analyzing the
effects of antecedent conditions on an outcome (Goertz and Mahoney 2012:87-88). The method
is a form of within-case analysis in which the effects of causes are “traced” though history to the
particular outcome of interest. An explanatory model is supported to the extent that the causal
processes specified by the model are shown to be evident in the case history. For this purpose,
methodologists suggest the use of so-called “hoop tests” and “smoking gun tests” to establish
necessary and sufficient conditions, respectively, in process tracing analyses (Goertz and
Mahoney 2012:93-96). The requirement of a hoop test is that evidence of a necessary condition
and its causal relationship to the outcome must be present in the case history. This is a necessary,
but not sufficient requirement to establish the explanatory utility of a model for a particular case.
The requirement of a smoking gun test for establishing a sufficient condition is the same, only
evidence of a sufficient condition is sufficient, by definition, to show explanatory significance.
Many necessary conditions may work in conjunction to form a sufficient condition.
I combine the logic of process tracing with Weber’s theory of adequate causality to assess
the strength of the elite mobilization model and the other theories. In doing so, I substitute
Goertz and Mahoney’s “sufficient” causation for Weber’s more robust conception of “adequate”
causation. This substitution requires a more richly textured historical analysis, raising the bar for
historical, sociological explanation.
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Necessary and Facilitating Conditions Established by the Elite Model of War Mobilization

The elite model of war mobilization presents five interrelated factors that interact in open
ended ways with their historical contexts to cause wars: (1) state-capitalist imperialism, (2) elite
control of politics, (3) elite ideology, (4) elite control of the media, and (5) elite influence on
education. For the purposes of analysis, the first four factors are classified as necessary
conditions, while the last factor, education, is considered a facilitating condition. I do not
maintain that these are, in fact, necessary or facilitating conditions for all cases. Empirically
establishing such status requires cross-case analysis, the comparison and analysis of the range of
relevant cases. I do not conduct such an analysis in this dissertation. The elite mobilization
model, then, is only intended to offer a framework of analysis for this dissertation, and its
ultimately validity is a question for future research.
Following Weber in this regard, the model is best thought of as providing a set of ideal
types that pertain to a specific national context and period of time, and which may be modified in
light of new evidence from other case studies. This is how I assigned the necessary and
facilitating statuses to the five factors of the model. At the beginning of the study, I began with
the assumption that all the factors were necessary conditions, but upon its completion, I
concluded that I was not able to establish with the evidence I found that the fifth factor was a
necessary cause of the Iraq War.
It should be fairly clear from the presentation of the model in chapter 3 that the social
processes it identifies are synchronic, diachronic, and dynamic, rather than a static set of
variables. The model identifies institutional configurations, namely the military-industrial
complex and the structure of the media and university system; the cultural force of elite
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ideology; and the social and political processes facilitating elite control of politics. These are
diachronic agglomerations of social action, enduring institutional and cultural “legacies” that
have not been modified in any significant way throughout post-World War II history, and which
appear to continually exert causal influence in American society. The elements of the model are
also synchronic in that they interact with each other at given points in time to produce the result
of a war. And they are also dynamic or conjunctural in that though they are enduring
characteristics of American society, they must be “activated” by historical events—some
extraneous to the model itself—in order to lead to war; otherwise, the model would seem to
imply that wars would simply occur all the time.

Research Design

In order to assess the relative strength of the model according to the logic of adequate
causation and process tracing, I have broken down the analysis of the causes of the Iraq War into
seven chapters: one to establish the historical context in which it occurred (chapter 5); five
chapters corresponding to each component of the model (chapters 6-10); and one chapter
(chapter 11) to address the viability of the alternative theories. Chapter 5 contains an analysis of
the various conjunctural causes of the Iraq War as these unfolded in the history of US-Iraq
relations prior to the 2003 Iraq War, beginning in the early 1950s. This history includes
significant “catalyzing events” (Kramer and Michalowski 2006) or facilitating causes such as the
first Gulf War, the rise of the neoconservatives in the Republican Party, the selection of George
W. Bush as president, and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The presentation of this
historical context enables a more detailed analysis of the case history according to the framework
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provided by the elite model of war mobilization. In the five chapters dedicated to each
component of the model, I show how each causal process manifested itself in the build-up to the
war and led to its occurrence.
In writing this historical account, I relied on a variety of sources. These included
secondary treatments of the Iraq War and other related historical developments; biographical
accounts of Bush administration figures; and primary source material such as Bush
administration planning documents, corporation annual reports, neoconservative think tank
publications, and newspaper articles. (In some cases, as with the 1992 Defense Planning
Guidance for instance, the original document is not available, in which case I have followed
scholarly convention in citing press coverage of the document.) In most of the details, the history
I present is familiar and uncontroversial, and similar, albeit less theoretically engaged, accounts
can be found in standard treatments of the Iraq War (e.g. Anderson 2012; Record 2010)
After the analysis of the war’s causes presented in chapters 6 through 10, in the
concluding chapter, I critique specific sociological works on the Iraq War, in particular, those of
Michael Mann (2003, 2013), Muhammad Idrees Ahmad (2014), John Bellamy Foster (2006) and
William Robinson (2014). In commenting on the Open Door theory of American imperialism, I
also comment on the work of Bastiaan van Apeldoorn and Naná de Graaff (2016), particularly
their treatment of the Iraq War. In addressing works specifically on the Iraq War, I have sought
to avoid criticizing straw person representations of the theories that are the focus of this
dissertation. If these state-centric, Marxist, and Open Door accounts of the Iraq War can be
rejected on empirical grounds, then these theories would not be tenable theories of American war
more broadly. Weber’s adequate causation notwithstanding, at a minimum, if the theories do not
identify necessary conditions of the Iraq War, they cannot identify necessary conditions at the
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level of theoretical generality. The basis of my critiques of alternative theories is that they do not
identify necessary conditions of the Iraq War, due principally to empirical and conceptual errors.

Best Practices for Process Tracing

To ensure reliability in a process tracing analysis, Bennett and Checkel (2015)
recommend ten “best practices” for process tracing. These are: (1) Identify many alternative
explanations; (2) Be equally tough on alternative explanations; (3) Be alert to potential bias of
sources (both of secondary analysts and actors or subjects of the study); (4) Take into account
whether the case is a least or most likely case (cases least likely to support a theory may offer
strong support for a theory if they do support it); (5) Justify where a case study begins, time-wise
(how far back in time to go); (6) Gather diverse, relevant evidence, but justify when to stop; (7)
Combine process tracing with case comparisons when useful and feasible; (8) Be open to
inductive insights; (9) Use deduction to articulate empirical expectations about specific
observations; and (10) “Remember that conclusive process tracing is good, but not all good
process tracing is conclusive” (Bennett and Checkel 2015:30). Bennett and Checkel recommend,
additionally, to create “elaborate,” fine-grained theories with many indicators to allow
assessment of the relative performance of competing explanations. This prevents the use of
vague terms, and specifies how exactly variables should cause an outcome. And, furthermore,
they also recommend the use of counterfactual (or “control”) observations to help isolate causal
processes and their effects.
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In executing this study, I have tried to follow these practices. In the case of alternative
theories, I chose the three alternatives that presented themselves in the literature, and I have tried
to subject them all to rigorous scrutiny viz-a-viz available evidence.
With respect to the biases of sources, it is a commonplace in historical and political
studies that historical actors often have reasons for being unclear or lying about the purposes of
their action. In the case of the Bush administration and the Iraq War, they have never been
forthright about why they invaded Iraq, perhaps for obvious reasons. To discern their real
motives, then, I have relied less on their official rationales for the war and more on the
interpretations of dissidents within the administration and government, on secondary analysts,
and my own historically informed interpretations of available evidence.
With respect to how likely the case was to support my own theoretical propositions, other
theorists (e.g. Ahmad 2013; Mann 2003, 2013) have ruled out, however unpersuasively, the
utility of military-industrial complex explanations of the Iraq War. This being the case, it is
possible that the Iraq War represents a hard test for my theory. As for the length of time covered
by my case study, in chapter 5, I begin with the post-World War II situation in Iraq and the
United States. To me this seemed like an appropriate time to begin, since in Iraq the proximate
developments that led to Saddam Hussein’s regime occurred during this period, while in the
United States, the institutions described by the theory had taken shape during this time, and
because the United States had just become increasingly active in the Middle East.
As for diverse evidence, I have relied on as many sources as I thought was minimally
necessary to make the arguments and claims I needed to make.
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Perhaps needless to say, I approached my study with an open mind towards modifying
the theory I started with on the basis of evidence I might come across. For the most part,
however, such modifications were not necessary.
The research design does not make explicit use of cross-case comparative analysis. Time
simply did not permit such a study. However, I sometimes include in the analysis accounts of
past wars to make points relevant to the 2003 Iraq War. But these are not exhaustive treatments
of other cases.
Concerning the conclusiveness of my study, I believe that the balance of evidence
presented in this study provides clear support for the theoretical propositions advanced in chapter
3. I believe these propositions are detailed and clear, and in the beginning of each chapter, I have
outlined what I believe the expectations would be if my theory were correct, and proceeded with
the analysis accordingly. And when appropriate—namely regarding the first four components of
my theoretical model—I have tried to consider what might have happened if the history I present
had been different, that is, if the causal processes identified had been absent.

Advantages and Disadvantages of the Research Design

The advantages and disadvantages of using single case study designs in social research
are well known. A major advantage of analyzing few cases is that detailed descriptions of
historically concrete causal processes can be provided that are often obscured or invisible in
cross-case statistical analyses of large samples in which the goal is to identify associations
between variables. Another advantage is that the use of process tracing in even a single case can
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contribute to theory formation since the case can be used to confirm or invalidate the
expectations of a theory (Rueschemeyer 2003).
These same advantages may also entail disadvantages. If smaller samples enable in-depth
description of causal mechanisms, they also limit the ability to make inferences about the crosscase generalizability of a theory. Because generalizations are made to theory rather than about all
available cases, it is therefore difficult to know how well the theory can explain other cases.
While the analysis of a few cases in a single study adds more support for a theory than a single
case study design, the analysis of a representative body cases is necessary to demonstrate that
something is a necessary condition at the level of general theory. It is for this reason that the
principal aim of this research design is to develop a theory—the elite model of war
mobilization—and show that it does more explanatory work than alternatives for a particular
case, rather than to test to the external validity of theory.

81

CHAPTER 5

THE 2003 US INVASION OF IRAQ: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND PRECIPITATING
EVENTS

This chapter outlines the historical background of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, also
known as the Iraq War. It is divided into two sections. The first section outlines US-Iraq relations
during the post-World War II period to the end of Clinton’s presidency in 2001. The second
section outlines the series of events that led to the invasion during the George W. Bush
presidency. This longer history is necessary for understanding the context in which the Bush
administration made its decision to invade. That is, it is necessary for understanding why the war
happened. But it is the sequence of precipitating events presented in the second section that the
elite model of war mobilization is marshalled to explain in later chapters.

Historical Background: US-Iraq Relations, 1954-2001

In the immediate post-World War II period, the imperatives of the Cold War—containing
communism and building US hegemony—largely determined US policy in the Middle East,
along with securing access to oil in the region. Among other regional military alliances, in 1954
the United States brokered the creation of the Central Treaty Organization (also known as the
Baghdad Pact), a mutual defense agreement that included the United States, Britain, Iraq, Iran,
Turkey, and Pakistan (Prashad 2007:38, 98). Under this agreement, member countries received
military aid from the United States.
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An extension of the Monroe and Truman Doctrines, the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957
informally established the Middle East as a new domain of US military control. Formally, this
presidential resolution declared that the United States had the right intervene in any Middle
Eastern country threatened by “armed aggression from any country controlled by international
communism” (quoted in Blum 2004:89). William Blum observes that the doctrine advanced a
“simplistic and polarized” Cold War view of the region that failed to consider various political
currents of anti-Israeli sentiment, nationalism, pan-Arabism, non-alignment or neutralism,
communism, and socialism. The conflicts in the region were thus often characterized by
American state planners as emanating from the Soviet Union (Blum 2004:89-90, 93).
Iraq attained formal independence from Britain in 1930, but the ruling Hashemite
monarchy remained close allies of the British, who were thus able to exert strong influence over
Iraq’s national development. As in many formerly colonized countries, after World War II,
currents of nationalism, anti-imperialism, and anti-colonialism became increasingly influential
political forces in Iraq. Pan-Arabism was popular, especially after Nasser’s rise to power in
Egypt in 1952. Yet the monarchy opposed pan-Arabism, and in 1958, the Iraqi premier Nuri alSaid ordered the Iraqi army to Jordan in an effort to quell pan-Arabism there. A group of panArabists in the army—the Free Officers—refused, and subsequently overthrew the AngloAmerican-backed monarchy in a military coup. The 1958 Free Officers coup brought to power
General Abdul Karim Qassim.
Qassim implemented a series of social, political, and economic reforms intended to
promote national development. His administration closed British military bases, renamed the
country the Republic of Iraq, and withdrew from the Central Treaty Organization, declaring nonalignment in the Cold War. Under Qassim, Iraq also purchased weapons from the Soviet Union.
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Qassim withdrew Iraq from the British sterling block, reduced the length of the working day,
increased salaries for government workers, implemented a social security system for the elderly,
and passed progressive laws for women (Anderson 2011:15). Qassim also planned for the
gradual nationalization of the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC), which had transferred 95 percent
of Iraq’s oil revenues to British, French, and American corporations under King Faisal II’s
regime (Anderson 2011:16). The Western owners of the oil companies affected by the
nationalization were outraged, according to Anderson. “They contacted the Eisenhower and later
the John F. Kennedy administrations, and the CIA began to encourage Iraqi military officers to
stage a coup” (Anderson 2011:16).
After receiving international condemnation for invading Kuwait, Qassim broke off
diplomatic relations with many Arab states (Anderson 2011:16). This was an unpopular move
among Iraqis, and in an effort to gain political support, Qassim allied with the Iraqi Communist
Party, the largest communist party in any Arab state, supported by approximately one fifth of
Iraq’s population (Prashad 2007:159). These developments alienated the Free Officers
Movement, which attempted a coup. Later, in October 1959, a group of Baathist party members,
including Saddam Hussein, attempted to assassinate Qassim. They were unsuccessful, and
Qassim attempted to crush the Baathist party.
The Baathists were a political movement that originated in Jordan. They were socialist
pan-Arabs, but bitterly anti-communist, earning them the support of the CIA in the United States.
In February 1963, days before Qassim’s nationalization of the IPC was to go into effect, the
Baathists staged a coup, and overthrew Qassim. Backed by the Kennedy administration, they
murdered Qassim, along with approximately ten thousand communists and other supporters. The
Baathists took power, and Kennedy provided the new regime with weapons, while Bechtel,
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Mobil, and other American corporations began doing business in Iraq (Anderson 2011:17). The
Baathists held power for only nine months before a counter-coup led by Army General Abd alSalam Arif, an ally of Qassim, overthrew the Baathists and brought Arif to power. After Arif
died in a helicopter crash, his brother Abd al-Rahman Arif was elected to the presidency. Then,
in July 1968, the Baathists staged yet another coup, taking power. Arif was exiled.
Iraq broke off diplomatic relations with the United States during the Six-Day War in
1967, turning towards the Soviet Union, which became Iraq’s principal supplier of weapons
under the Baathists. In 1972, the two countries signed the Iraq-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation, and in June 1972, Iraq finally nationalized the IPC. After the 1973 Arab-Israeli
War, relations with the United States deteriorated further when Iraq led the newly formed OPEC
cartel in imposing an oil embargo against the United States (Juhasz 2006:152-153). The embargo
led to dramatically increased oil prices and revenues for Iraq, which strengthened the new
Baathist regime. There were large investments in public services, but 40 percent of oil revenues
were spent on weapons and military purchases.
By the time of the 1968 coup, Hasan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein had become the top
leaders of the Baath party. Al-Bakr became president and prime minister, placing Hussein in
charge of the security and intelligence services (Tripp 2007:188). Al-Bakr and Hussein ruthlessly
liquidated political opposition within the ranks of the government, including the communists and
elements of the Baath party that were not loyal to al-Bakr and Hussein. In 1977, Hussein took
control of Iraqi oil policy, giving him control of the country’s principal export commodity and
means of development. At the same time, Hussein’s brother-in-law and first cousin was
appointed by al-Bakr to head the Ministry of Defense. As al-Bakr’s health declined in the late
1970s, it was becoming clear that Hussein would assume the presidency. But before taking office
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in 1979 Hussein carefully established client networks of political support that helped him
consolidate absolute power over the state (Tripp 2007:209).
In 1979, the Carter administration added Iraq to an official list of state sponsors of
terrorism because it supported the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and other
organizations in the region. Economic sanctions followed (Juhasz 2006:157). But the Iranian
Revolution fundamentally changed US-Iraq relations. The United States suddenly lost one of its
major regional allies and oil suppliers when the Iranians ousted Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
and brought Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to power. When the United States offered to bring the
Shah to the United States for medical treatment on October 22, outraged student revolutionaries
broke into the American embassy in Iran and took fifty Americans hostage. The hostage crisis
and Carter’s bungled military response weakened his 1980 presidential campaign, and Ronald
Reagan defeated Carter to become president in 1981.
Meanwhile, sensing a moment of opportunity after the revolution, Hussein invaded Iran
on September 22, 1980, beginning the bloody eight-year Iran-Iraq War. After the Iranians
counterattacked and made their way into Iraq, the Reagan administration began supporting Iraq
(Bacevich 2016:90). To facilitate this support, in March 1982, Reagan quietly removed Iraq from
the list of state sponsors of terrorism. By November 1984 Reagan had restored full diplomatic
relations with Iraq, “under extreme influence from US business interests, but against the advice
of many within Reagan’s administration,” according to Antonia Juhasz (2006:158). Reagan
favored Iraq in the war because Hussein was seen as a bulwark against the spread of further
revolution in the Gulf region. The other reason for supporting Iraq was to create business
opportunities there for American corporations, especially those linked to the Reagan
administration that pushed for normalized relations.
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As Antonia Juhasz puts it, “it was difficult to distinguish between business and political
activity in Iraq,” (Juhasz 2006:165) during this period. In December 1983 Reagan’s envoy,
Donald Rumsfeld—former US defense secretary under Ford, and future defense secretary under
George W. Bush—met with Hussein to discuss a major oil pipeline deal with Bechtel. This
project did not come to pass, though Bechtel would secure contracts with Hussein in 1988 to
manage a petrochemical complex that was intended to produce precursor chemicals for the
production of mustard gas. This happened only four months after Hussein attacked the Iraqi
Kurdish city of Halabja with mustard gas, in March 1988, according to Juhasz (2006:168), an
attack which killed an estimated 5,000 people (Tripp 2007:236). (In fact, Iraq had used chemical
weapons against Iranian soldiers as early as 1983 (Harris and Aid 2013), with the full knowledge
of the Reagan administration. But neither did these war crimes prevent Reagan from supporting
Hussein.)
Other corporations also did business in Iraq. Halliburton, for instance, under both Reagan
and H. W. Bush, was contracted to repair oil export terminals damaged during the war, build
major oil pipelines, and provide equipment and training for the Iraqi State Oil Exploration
Company (Juhasz 2006:167). Other corporations that did business in Iraq in the mid-1980s
included AT&T, Hewlett Packard, General Motors, and Philip Morris (Juhasz 2006:168). Many
of these corporations sold Iraq “dual-use goods” that could be used for either civilian or military
purposes, prompting fears in the Pentagon that they would inevitably be used for the latter
purpose. Between 1985 and 1990, the sale of such goods to Iraq amounted to $782 million, and
included various agricultural commodities, computers, helicopters, and transport planes. The
United States also sold conventional and chemical weapons to Iraq through third party countries
such as France and Italy (Bacevich 2016:91; Juhasz 2006:168).
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Beyond providing weapons, technology, and agricultural goods, the United States
provided direct military support to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. Beginning in July 1982, the
CIA began providing intelligence to the Iraqi military on Iranian battlefield positions (Bacevich
2016:93). Such intelligence was provided throughout the war with the knowledge that Iraq would
use it to expedite chemical weapons attacks.1 Then, in 1987, after Iraq attacked the American
USS Stark in the Persian Gulf—probably deliberately, as revenge for the Iran-Contra affair
(Bacevich 2016:97)—the Reagan administration blamed Iran. Reagan also blamed Iran for
obstructing the flow of oil in the Persian Gulf, even though Iraq had inaugurated the tactic of
attacking international oil tankers in order to cut off Iranian oil exports. To prevent Kuwait from
enlisting the help of the Soviet Union, Reagan set about to provide military protection for
Kuwaiti oil tankers. When the first Kuwaiti oil tanker under US military protection—and
disguised as an American vessel—was struck by what was assumed to be an Iranian land mine,
this led to Operation Praying Mantis, an offensive US military operation targeting Iranian
positions in the Persian Gulf. (During this engagement the United States also shot down the
civilian Iranian Air flight 655, killing all 290 passengers, an event for which Bush refused to
apologize.) Iran agreed to a ceasefire on July 20, and the war ended the next month, in August
1988.
The Iran-Iraq War left Iraq with enormous debts to neighboring countries, about half of
which was owed to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. As Iraq’s economy stagnated after the war,
Hussein insisted that the debts be forgiven; in his view, Iraq had saved Arabs from a Persian

1

Harris and Aid (2013) maintain that the United States was not yet providing battlefield intelligence to Iraq in 1983,
the year they suspect Iraq first used chemical weapons. However, as mentioned, Bacevich notes that the CIA began
providing intelligence on Iranian positions in July, 1982. Whatever the case may be, Harris and Aid, observing the
documentary record, maintain that the Reagan administration supplied battlefield intelligence to Iraq in 1987 when it
was expected that an Iranian offensive might defeat Iraq in the spring of 1988. Reagan did this knowing that Iran
would use chemical weapons.
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invasion (Anderson 2012:32). Saudi Arabia and Kuwait demanded to be repaid, so Hussein
responded by massing troops on the border of Kuwait, and threatened to invade. Hussein was
especially annoyed with Kuwait for increasing oil production after the war, lowering its price
and reducing Iraq’s revenue on its principal export. He therefore devised plans to take over
disputed oil fields on the other side of the Iraq-Kuwait border, claiming they belonged to Iraq,
and setting the stage for the Gulf War of 1990-1991. Hussein began massing troops on the border
with Kuwait in mid July 1990, and after failed negotiations with Kuwait on August 1, Iraq
invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990 (Anderson 2012:34).
Reagan’s vice president, George H. W. Bush, became president in 1989. The strong US
relationship with Iraq continued under Bush; Juhasz writes that “his administration led the most
aggressive courtship of Saddam Hussein to date” (Juhasz 2006:169). This relationship was
determined entirely by access to oil and investment opportunities for American corporations.
Under Bush, Iraq became the United States’ second-largest trading partner in the Middle East;
the United States purchased one quarter of Iraq’s oil exports, and became Iraq’s largest supplier
of nonmilitary goods (Juhasz 2006:171). Sales of dual-use technology continued, and the Bush
administration was still providing military intelligence to Iraq in May 1990 (Juhasz 2006:171).
Just prior to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the Bush administration was in direct
communication with Hussein about Kuwait at least three different times. US ambassador to Iraq,
April Glaspie, met with Hussein on July 25, and reassured him that the United States sought
close relations with Iraq and did not take sides in the border dispute. A personal message from
Bush himself, days later, reinforced this message. While a message from a mid-level State
Department official warned against an invasion (Anderson 2012:33), the meeting with Glaspie
and the personal message from Bush probably suggested to Hussein that the United States would
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not object if Iraq took over Kuwaiti oil fields. And, after all, the United States had supported
Iraq’s war against Iran, and had built extensive trade relationships with Iraq under Bush. Instead,
when Iraq finally invaded Kuwait, the Bush administration denounced the military aggression,
and imposed sanctions on Iraq through the United Nations. The United States became directly
involved in the war on January 15, 1991, and easily expelled Iraq’s forces from Kuwait. The fact
that the Bush administration rejected Hussein’s offers to negotiate a withdrawal prior to the
intervention strongly suggests that the principal war aim of the Bush administration was to
impose military control over Iraq or demonstrate US military power, rather than to expel Iraq
from Kuwait or prevent Hussein from controlling more oil.2
In fact, the UN sanctions imposed on Iraq entailed a near total embargo on its economy,
with the exception of medicine. The sanctions continued throughout the 1990s, and led to the
deaths of approximately 1.5 million people, including 500,000 children between 1991 and 1998.
The United States also imposed a no-fly zone over Iraq, nominally to prevent Hussein from
attacking Kurds in northern Iraq and Shias in the south, which he had done near the end of the
Gulf War, after the Bush administration encouraged them to rebel against Hussein. The Bush
administration did not themselves attempt to overthrow Hussein because they believed that an
occupation would destabilize Iraq, making withdrawal very difficult, and because they did not
have international support to do so; the UN resolution authorizing US involvement in the Gulf
War did not authorize overthrowing Hussein. Their efforts to remove him from power continued
after the Gulf War, however. In 1992, the CIA helped establish the Iraqi National Congress
(INC), an anti-Hussein political organization. According to Anderson,
Forty groups opposed to Saddam made up the INC, and they held a meeting
during June [1992] in Vienna, where they declared they would create a new
government that would respect “human rights and the rule of law within a
2

On the administration’s rejection of negotiations, see Chomsky (1991:190, 191, 206-208).
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constitutional, democratic, and pluralistic Iraq.” The CIA funded INC, supplying
over $20 million in its first year . . . (Anderson 2012:41)
The Bush and Clinton administrations also used United Nations Security Council
Resolution 687 as a cover to overthrow or destabilize Hussein’s regime. Resolution 687
established the United Nations’ Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), an inspections regime
that was intended to locate and eliminate Hussein’s nonconventional weapons—so-called
“weapons of mass destruction” or WMDs—and facilities for their production. According to
Resolution 687, if Iraq disarmed of its WMD capabilities under the auspices of UNSCOM, the
aforementioned economic sanctions would be lifted. But according to Scott Ritter, a UNSCOM
inspector deeply involved in the inspections process, the United States never intended to lift the
sanctions. “The strict requirements placed on Iraq by Res. 687,” Ritter says, “which required a
100 percent level of accountability for all weapons, weapons programs, and associated material,
made a finding of compliance virtually impossible.”
However, the intrusive nature of the work carried out by UNSCOM made a
finding of “qualitative disarmament” quite possible. By 1998 it could be safely
stated that Iraq had been disarmed to the point that it no longer represented a
threat with regards to its WMD capabilities, and that given the high-quality of the
ongoing monitoring and verification inspections that were in place, any attempt
by Iraq to reconstitute its WMD programs would not go unnoticed. (Ritter
2001:31-32)
The sanctions were never completely lifted, however.
After Clinton took office in 1993, a policy-planning network composed of former Reagan
and Bush administration officials began to coalesce around a vision for a stronger, overtly
imperialist American foreign policy agenda. Collectively referred to as “neoconservatives,” they
advanced what they called a “neo-Reaganite foreign policy” of “benevolent global hegemony”
(Kristol and Kagan 1996). Central to their agenda was removing Hussein from power. In 1997,
they established the letterhead organization, Project for the New American Century (PNAC).
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PNAC wrote an open letter about Iraq to Clinton in 1998, claiming that diplomacy had failed,
and that it should be the policy of the United States to remove Hussein from power. The letter
was influential in the Republican majority Congress, and in 1998, Congress passed the Iraq
Liberation Act, which made removing Hussein the official policy of the United States (though it
did not specify how this was to be done). Clinton signed the act into law.
The UNSCOM inspections effectively came to an end when the Clinton administration
pulled out weapons inspectors in order to carry out a large-scale bombing campaign called
Operation Desert Fox, in December 1998, which had been planned in early 1998 (Ritter 2005).
In response to the bombings, Hussein closed UNSCOM operations in Iraq, preventing further
inspections. Clinton bombed Iraq almost continuously in the final two years of his presidency.
This is the historical context in which George H. W. Bush’s son, George W. Bush Jr.,
was selected to be the 43rd president of the United States in 2000. As discussed in the next
section, Bush Jr’s administration brought to power the neoconservatives, who were chosen to
staff most of the administration’s foreign policy positions. From the historical background
discussed in this section, however, the long series of events that created the conditions for the
2003 Iraq War, prior to Bush Jr. assuming office, should be clear. Saddam Hussein himself rose
to power with the support of the United States during the Kennedy years, and was supported
again by Reagan and Bush. Reagan’s support for Iraq (and Iran) during the Iran-Iraq War most
likely prolonged that war, which in turn created the conditions for the Gulf War. Hussein’s
invasion of Kuwait set the stage for the 2003 US invasion, as did the rise of the neoconservatives
and foreign policy hardliners in the Republican Party, and their taking office in 2001.
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The Buildup to the Invasion: January 2001-March 19, 2003

The standard history of the buildup to the Iraq War is largely uncontroversial because the
Bush administration’s deceit in making the case for war was so obvious, and their methods so
crude, that several state officials and politicians spoke out against the administration, and unlike
the Gulf War, the invasion of Iraq failed to gather UN support.
George W. Bush became president on January 20, 2001. Dick Cheney was Bush’s vice
president. The two were closely allied with the neoconservatives, and appointed more than half
of the founding members of PNAC to key foreign policy positions in the executive branch
(Dorrien 2004). These included Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense; Paul Wolfowitz as
Deputy Secretary of Defense; I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby as Wolfowitz’s aid, and later Cheney’s
assistant; Douglas Feith as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy; John Bolton as Undersecretary
of State for Arms Control and International Security; Richard Perle, James Woolsey, and
Kenneth Adelman were all assigned to the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board Advisory
Committee; David Frum was selected for White House speech-writer; and Stephen Hadley and
Zalmay Khalilzad were selected for the National Security Council (Anderson 2012:62).
In bringing on the neoconservatives and hardliners like Rumsfeld and Powell, Bush and
Cheney thus built an executive branch eager for war with Iraq. At the first National Security
Council (NSC) meeting of the administration on January 30, 2001, Iraq was a top discussion
item. CIA Director George Tenant presented photos to Bush that he said were chemical or
biological weapons factories. Though Tenant admitted to having no “confirming intelligence” to
prove they were weapons facilities, the NSC was assigned various tasks towards destabilizing the
regime. Rumsfeld was told to “examine our military options” (Suskind 2004:72-75).
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Iraq also figured prominently in the administration’s early considerations regarding
energy policy. Bush placed Cheney in charge of the National Energy Policy Development Group
(NEPDG), a secret task force formed on January 29, 2001. “Cheney’s Energy Task Force,” as
the group was called, recommended supporting “initiatives” to increase access to Middle East
oil. Its members included cabinet secretaries, energy industry representatives, and possibly Iraqi
opposition figures (Juhasz 2006:179-180). “It included executives from Exxon Mobil, Enron,
British Petroleum, Duke Energy, and the American Petroleum Institute,” and representatives
from Bechtel, Chevron, and Halliburton (Juhasz 2006:179). According to Juhasz,
legal proceedings forced the Bush White House to reveal a series of lists and
maps prepared by the Task Force that outlined Iraq’s entire oil productive
capacity and the foreign countries and companies lined up for contracts. Compiled
in March 2001, the documents include detailed descriptions of Iraq’s “super giant
oilfields,” oil pipelines, refineries, and tanker terminals. Two lists, entitled,
“Foreign Suitors for Iraqi Oilfield Contracts as of 5 March 2001,” list more than
sixty companies from some thirty countries with contracts in various stages of
discussion for oil and gas projects across Iraq. (Juhasz 2006:180)
The UN Oil-for-Food program, initiated in 1996, allowed some access to Iraqi oil for certain
corporations, but, according to Juhasz, “the companies within the Task Force were closed out of
Iraq’s oil market and were watching from the sidelines as the country’s oil was divvied up to
everyone but them” (Juhasz 2006:180).
These facts indicate that members of the administration were planning an invasion of Iraq
upon taking office, long before they made the case for doing so to the public. The September 11th
attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon provided the pretext the administration would
need for making their case. Indeed, many of them perhaps hoped for such an event, a “new Pearl
Harbor” as they referred to it in a policy document written by PNAC in 2000. Such an event
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would garner public support for the massive increases in military spending the neoconservatives
believed was necessary.3
On the very afternoon of September 11, 2001, Rumsfeld directed his staff to look for
evidence linking the attacks to Hussein (Anderson 2012:70). It was, however, perfectly well
known within the administration that the attacks were most likely perpetrated by al-Qaeda. Still,
when the administration met in the small hours of September 12, to the astonishment of
counterterrorism advisor Richard Clarke, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were seeking to connect the
attacks to Iraq. The afternoon of September 12, Bush met with Clarke personally and insisted
that he search for an al-Qaeda-Iraq connection. Clarke insisted that there was no connection, a
finding that was confirmed across all departments and intelligence agencies (Clarke 2004:32).
On September 21, Bush’s daily intelligence briefing stated unequivocally that there was no
evidence linking the September 11 attacks to Iraq and that there was little evidence of contact
between al-Qaeda and Hussein. What evidence of contact there was indicated an effort to
monitor the group, for Hussein saw al-Qaeda as a threat to his government (see Waas 2005). On
September 14, the CIA also warned the administration against drawing a connection between
Iraq and al-Qaeda, since such contacts were plainly implausible (Anderson 2011:112). But the
principals in the administration ignored the intelligence.
At a war council meeting on September 15-16, Wolfowitz attempted to make the case for
attacking Iraq, but was rebuffed by Secretary of State Colin Powell, who held that there was no
connection between Iraq and al-Qaeda (Woodward 2004:25). The administration’s immediate
focus remained on the impending war in Afghanistan. But it is clear that the principals intended
to turn to Iraq after Afghanistan. At the same war council meeting, while believing the

3

See chapter 8.
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administration should focus first on Afghanistan, Cheney expressed interest in going after
Hussein (Woodward 2004:25). And on September 20, Bush told British Prime Minister Tony
Blair that a war against Iraq should follow the war in Afghanistan (Rose 2004). In October, the
State Department established The Future of Iraq Project, which, “contacted and organized over
200 Iraqi engineers, businessmen, lawyers, doctors, and other ‘free Iraqis’ into working groups
where they discussed topics concerning post-Saddam Iraq” (Anderson 2012:96-97). On
November 21, Bush ordered the Pentagon to begin preparations for an invasion of Iraq
(Woodward 2004:1-3, 30).
In December 2001, Bush and senior White House officials began publicly linking alQaeda and Iraq on the network news, suggesting that Iraq was in some way responsible for the
September 11 attacks. Then, on January 29, 2002, Bush gave his famous “axis of evil” State of
the Union address. In his speech, Bush told Americans that terrorists were everywhere in the
world—not just Afghanistan—plotting to attack the United States. He identified North Korea,
Iran, and Iraq as threats to global peace, the three countries constituting an “axis of evil.”
North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction. . .
. Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror. . . . Iraq continues to
flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has
plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade.
This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own
citizens—leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is
a regime that agreed to international inspections—then kicked out the inspectors.
This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world. States like
these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, aiming to threaten the
peace of the world. (Bush speech in Ehrenberg et al 2010:60)
Now, in addition to the alleged al-Qaeda-Iraq connection, the administration began
claiming that Iraq was developing WMDs, including nuclear weapons, which it might give to
terrorists (Ehrenberg et al 2010:59). In February, Powell told the House International Relations
Committee that Iraq was pursuing a nuclear weapons program, and between March and October,
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according to Anderson, Cheney publicly claimed that Iraq was actively pursuing nuclear
weapons at least four times (Anderson 2012:96-98). In an important speech at the Veterans of
Foreign Wars National Convention in August, for instance, Cheney told the audience that “we
now know that Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons” and that “Saddam
also devised an elaborate program to conceal his active efforts to build chemical and biological
weapons” (Ehrenberg et al 2010:77). In one television interview in mid-April, aired in Britain
but not in the United States, Bush told an interviewer that “Saddam needs to go.” “The worst
thing,” he explained, “that could happen would be to allow a nation like Iraq, run by Saddam
Hussein, to develop weapons of mass destruction, and then team up with terrorist organizations
so they can blackmail the world. I’m not going to let that happen” (Anderson 2012:99-100).
On May 21, while arguing for a dramatically increased defense budget, Rumsfeld told the
Senate Appropriations Committee that “we have to recognize that terrorist networks have
relations with terrorist states that have weapons of mass destruction, and that they inevitably are
going to get their hands on them, and they would not hesitate one minute in using them. That’s
the world we live in.” He claimed terrorists were linked not only to Iraq, but to North Korea,
Iran, Libya, Syria, and other nations, warning that “We are going to be living in a period of
limited or no warning.” And al-Qaeda was inside the United States and “very well trained”
(Suskind 2006:121).
Rumsfeld also authorized a secret bombing campaign against Iraq at this time. The
purpose was to provoke a response that could be used as a pretext for war. In April, the United
States bombed Iraq in the southern no-flight zones established after the Gulf War. Such
bombings were authorized, but only in self-defense against Iraqi ground attacks, and only if
necessary and proportionate. However, in May, bombing increased dramatically to 7.3 tons, and
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to 10.4 tons in June. It remained steady at 9.5 tons in July before increasing again to 14.1 tons in
August (Smith 2005).
On June 1, Bush gave a graduation speech at West Point, outlining what became known
as the “Bush doctrine” of preemptive war. Bush explained that the Cold War strategies of
deterrence and containment were no longer adequate because “unbalanced dictators with
weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to
terrorist allies.” Invoking the “war on terror,” initiated after the September 11 attacks, Bush
explained that the “war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the
enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we
have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action.” He added that “our security will
require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action
when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives” (Ehrenberg et al 2010:65-67). This
speech was understood by administration officials as an effort to prepare Americans for invading
Iraq.
The administration made a definite decision to invade Iraq no later than July 2002, as
revealed by the famous Downing Street memo, leaked to the press in 2005. The Downing Street
memo, which recorded a July 23 meeting between senior officials in the Bush administration and
the British government, revealed, according to British intelligence chief, Sir Richard Dearlove,
that “Military action was . . . seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through
military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts
were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no
enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime’s record” (Ehrenberg et al 2010:68-69).
British and American officials also discussed the legal issues related to the invasion. British
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officials concluded that self-defense and humanitarian intervention would not be plausible legal
justifications. “The [British] attorney general was instructed to consider legal advice with the
Foreign Office and Ministry of Defense,” according to Philippe Sands. “The chosen route was to
build up the intelligence to support the claim that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction,
which could provide a potential legal justification. This meant persuading Bush to take the
United Nations route, which Blair achieved by working with Colin Powell” (Sands 2005:184).
The administration began a more focused propaganda campaign to sell the war after
Labor Day. For this they established the White House Iraq Group (WHIG), which included Rice,
presidential advisor Karl Rove, vice presidential advisor Scooter Libby, and White House Chief
of Staff Andrew Card Jr. (Woodward 2004:168-169). The purpose of WHIG was, according to
deputy press secretary Scott McClellan (2008:142), “to coordinate the marketing of the war to
the public.” “[C]onditions looked favorable for the Bush team as it launched its campaign to
convince Americans that war with Iraq was inevitable and necessary,” McClellan says. “The
script had been finalized with great care over the summer, and now, September 2001 [sic],4 was
the time to begin carrying it out” (McClellan 2008:121). The secret bombing campaign also
escalated in September, with bombing increasing sharply to 54.6 tons. In October it declined to
17.7 tons, before increasing to 33.6 tons in November, and then to 53.2 tons in December.
Bombing during this time was directed at Iraq’s air defense system, in an apparent effort to
weaken it prior to the impending invasion (Smith 2005).
The administration, and Cheney in particular, put tremendous pressure on the CIA to
produce the correct narrative about WMDs in Iraq and the connection to al-Qaeda. According to
Anderson: “Although vice presidential visits to CIA headquarters had been rare in previous

The correct year is 2002. This is apparently a typographical error in McClellan’s book. McClellan is referring to
the marketing campaign of September 2002, just prior to the 2002 midterm elections.
4
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administrations, Cheney visited the agency’s headquarters almost a dozen times, grilling agents
and demanding more work on possible leads that eventually would support the administration’s
claims” (Anderson 2012:104). Cheney and the neoconservatives did not trust the CIA to produce
an intelligence analysis on Iraq that would support the administration’s case for war.5 Thus, after
the September 11 attacks, Douglas Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, established a
covert intelligence unit to provide the right “intelligence” on Iraq. Feith was a loyal protégé of
Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Libby, and the covert unit apparently produced the
intelligence products that Cheney wanted about an Iraq-al-Qaeda connection, conveniently
scrubbing them of contradictory information (Waas 2005).
The administration’s propaganda campaign drew from the covert unit’s “intelligence” to
amplify the two major claims about Iraq they had advanced in the previous months: the Iraq-alQaeda connection, and that Iraq had or was developing WMDs, including nuclear weapons.
Throughout September, Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Powell, and Rice made several appearances on
major network news programs claiming that Iraq posed an imminent threat to the United States,
and that it would attack the United States. WHIG also established a connection with Judith
Miller of the New York Times, who had been publishing stories since the 90s on Iraq’s alleged
WMD programs. Throughout the autumn of 2002, Miller’s stories relied on discredited INC
figures and false information fed to her from Cheney’s office. The administration then cited her
stories to provide ostensibly independent support for their own claims. The national media, with
few exceptions, reported uncritically on the Bush administration’s case for war, from the

Cheney alleged that he didn’t trust the CIA because it failed to predict Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and the 9/11
attacks. However, that Cheney did not trust the CIA because it failed to predict 9/11 seems unlikely. In January
2001, the Bush administration received several warnings from George Clarke about an imminent al-Qaeda attack,
but ignored the issue until April, having shifted their focus to Iraq. Preventing an al-Qaeda attack was simply not a
priority of the administration (see Anderson 2012:62-63).
5
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beginning of the sustained propaganda campaign in January to the beginning of Operation Iraqi
Freedom in March 2003. This and the media’s role in persuading the American public to support
the war are subject of chapter 9.
The administration’s claims throughout 2002 about Iraq’s connection to 9/11 and
unconventional weapons were based on several subsidiary claims, all known to be false at the
time they were made. Cheney had claimed that Iraq was developing nuclear weapons on the
basis of a report he received from the CIA—which had received the information from Italian
military intelligence—about an Iraqi purchase of “yellowcake” uranium from Niger. Neither the
CIA or the State Department thought the report was credible, and a subsequent CIA investigation
ordered by Cheney himself also found no evidence of such a purchase. Cheney’s office received
the CIA’s report on the findings, but he continued to cite the yellowcake story as evidence that
Iraq was developing nuclear weapons.
Cheney and other officials also claimed that 9/11 hijacker Mohammad Atta had met with
an Iraqi intelligence agent in Prague five months before the 9/11 attacks. CIA investigators found
no evidence for this meeting and briefed Cheney accordingly, but he continued to present the
fabled meeting as evidence linking Iraq to 9/11. The story’s source was Feith’s covert
intelligence unit.
Another source on the al-Qaeda-Iraq connection was a captured al-Qaeda commander
named Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi, who told the CIA that Osama bin Laden had sent operatives to Iraq
for training in the development of chemical and biological weapons. Al-Libi provided the story
to the CIA after its interrogators tortured him. He later recanted his story, affirming what he had
previously told the FBI—that there was no affiliation between al-Qaeda and Iraq. Yet, al-Libi’s
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torture-induced story was used by the Bush administration in speeches beginning in September,
2002, including major speeches at the United Nations (Anderson 2012:115).
Another story used by the administration beginning in September came from an Iraqi
political refugee named Rafid Ahmed Alwan, known for years by his codename, Curveball.
Alwan told German intelligence officers that he had worked at a mobile biological weapons
facility in Iraq in 1998. In reality, the facility was a seed purification plant, satellite photos of the
facility did not match Alwan’s descriptions, and Alwan was not in Iraq in 1998 (DeFronzo
2010:141-142). The Germans therefore doubted Alwan’s story and told the CIA that he was an
unreliable source, that he was “crazy,” and an alcoholic (Risen 2006:117-119).
Finally, Ahmed Chalabi, leader of the INC, fed false information on Iraq’s alleged
WMDs to the CIA, along with other INC members (DeFronzo 2010:139-140). Chalabi and the
INC were strongly favored by the neoconservatives and Cheney to govern Iraq after Hussein was
overthrown, but were not trusted by the CIA to provide reliable information about Iraq.
On September 7, in a speech delivered in Cincinnati, Ohio, Bush asserted, without
evidence, that Iraq was six months away from developing nuclear weapons. Then, in a primetime address to the nation on the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, he warned Americans that Iraq
posed an imminent threat to the United States and the world. On September 12, the president
addressed the United Nations, claiming that Iraq had attempted to purchase aluminum tubes that
would be used to enrich uranium, and that Iraq would possess nuclear weapons within one year.
He also claimed Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons. According to Bush, all of this
meant that Iraq was in breach of United Nations Security Council resolutions implemented after
the Gulf War barring Iraq from possessing WMDs. According to Bush, military force would
therefore be necessary to enforce the resolutions if Hussein did not comply.
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Five days after Bush’s UN address, on September 16, Iraq agreed to unconditional
inspections of Iraq.
On September 4, Bush invited 18 senior members of the House and Senate to the White
House where he made his case for war against Iraq. He asked them to support a resolution that
would authorize military force, and to vote on it before congressmembers left Washington to
campaign for the 2002 midterm elections (Woodward 2004:169-170). In this, the
administration’s goal was to put pressure on Congress to support a resolution authorizing war by
making the war a campaign issue. According to Bob Woodward, Cheney and Rice thought “The
president should demand quick passage of a resolution so voters would know before the election
where every congressman and senator stood on Saddam Hussein and his dangerous regime”
(Woodward 2004:165).
Meanwhile, Tenet attempted to persuade the Senate intelligence committee that Iraq
possessed WMDs and had restarted its nuclear program. Skeptical Democratic senators requested
to see a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) outlining the evidence behind the administration’s
claims. Tenet admitted that one did not exist, but had the CIA prepare one after the Democratic
senators on the Senate intelligence committee wrote the president a letter demanding to see one.
The NIE on Iraq was given to the chairman of the Senate intelligence committee, Robert
Graham, on October 1. Under intense pressure from the administration and the committee, Tenet
had the document prepared in only three weeks, whereas NIE estimates normally take several
months to produce. The NIE reproduced the administration’s assertions about the al-Qaeda
connection and WMDs, including the claim that Iraq could produce nuclear weapons within six
months to year. Yet, the NIE also contained dissenting views from the intelligence community
that seriously challenged the view that Iraq had WMD (Pillar 2011:73). The Democratic senators
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who saw the NIE attempted to alert the public that it contradicted the administration’s public
claims. But to sway public opinion and Congress in favor of the resolution, Condoleezza Rice
asked Tenet to call the New York Times and tell a reporter that the CIA supported the
administration’s claims. He did, telling the Times that “There is no inconsistency between our
view of Saddam’s growing threat and the view expressed by the President” (Cramer and Duggan
2012:206).
The propaganda campaign succeeded. On October 11, Congress passed a joint resolution
authorizing the use of force against Iraq. Most of Congress was not able to see the actual NIE
given to the intelligence committee. Instead, they were given a white paper summary that
omitted dissenting views found in the NIE and conveyed consensus and certainty on the threat of
Iraq. Indeed, the white paper was not based on the NIE at all (Cramer and Duggan 2012:206). In
the House of Representatives, the bill passed 296 to 133 in favor of the resolution, and in the
Senate, 77 to 23 in favor. On DeFronzo’s count, “About 97 percent of Republican
representatives and 39 percent of Democratic representatives approved of the war resolution”
and “98 percent of Republican senators and 57 percent of Democratic senators [voted] for the
bill” (DeFronzo 2010:143). Senior Democrats in Congress, including those seeking to run for
president in 2008, supported the resolution. Along with other Democratic politicians, they feared
being seen as “soft” on terrorism or on Iraq, especially right before congressional elections. For,
at that point, most Americans seemed to support a war against Iraq (DeFronzo 2010:143-144).
The Bush administration and the media had succeeded in convincing most of them that Iraq was
in some way responsible for 9/11, and that military force should be used to overthrow Hussein’s
regime.
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After eight weeks of tense negotiations, on November 8, the UN Security Council passed
Resolution 1441. Drafted jointly by the United States and Britain, the resolution gave Iraq a
“final opportunity” to dismantle its alleged WMD programs, and to comply with the 1991
Security Council Resolution 687, which was supposed to ensure that Iraq disarmed itself of
WMDs after the Gulf War. Resolution 1441 threatened “serious consequences” if Iraq was found
to be in breach of past obligations to disarm, but it did not authorize states “to use all necessary
means” to enforce compliance (Sands 2005:185). As Sands (2005:185-193) cogently argues,
Resolution 1441 also did not authorize the use of force on the basis of earlier Security Council
resolutions, particularly Resolutions 678 (November 1990) and 687, which authorized force to
expel Iraq from Kuwait, and to disarm Iraq, respectively. But academics in the United States and
Britain would later argue that these earlier resolutions in conjunction with Resolution 1441
authorized force against Iraq.6
Hussein had already agreed to unconditional weapons inspections in September, and in
December, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
(UNMOVIC) arrived in Iraq for 60 days of inspections. More intrusive than the inspections
regime of the 1990s, they were to be unconditional and could be carried out at any location
without notice. Hans Blix, head of UNMOVIC, was to report on its findings on January 27.
The Bush administration apparently had no intention of waiting for the UN to arrive at a
conclusion about Iraq’s WMDs, or working within the framework of the Security Council.
According to Feith’s account of the December 18 NSC meeting, the administration did not
believe that Hussein was cooperating with the UN inspectors. The administration maintained that
Iraq had provided an inadequate declaration of its WMD capabilities to UNMOVIC (December

6

On American legal scholars who used this argument to support invading Iraq, see chapter 10.
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8), allowing them to claim that Hussein was hiding something, in breach of Resolution 1441.
War was thus seen as “inevitable,” as Bush put it (Feith 2008:338-343). On another occasion,
Rumsfeld stated that it was actually impossible for Iraq not to have WMDs; if the UN didn’t find
any, it was because Hussein had refused to cooperate in the weapons inspections.
On January 27, 2003, the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) and
UNMOVIC reported the preliminary results of the ongoing inspections in Iraq to the UN.
Mohamed ElBaradei, a respected Egyptian diplomat, was the director general of the IAEA,
responsible for nuclear weapons inspections. Blix’s UNMOVIC searched for biological and
chemical weapons. ElBaradei and Blix reported that there was no evidence that Iraq had WMDs
(Blix 2003; ElBaradei 2003). Blix cautioned that the inspections did not rule out the possibility
that there were WMDs and called for ongoing inspections. Less cautious than Blix, ElBaradei
also called for further inspections, which he said would provide “credible assurance” that Iraq
did not possess a nuclear weapons program. ElBaradei also debunked Bush’s claim made during
his September UN speech that Iraq had purchased aluminum tubes to create centrifuges; in fact,
the tubes were used to build small rockets. At this stage, then, there simply was no evidence that
Iraq had WMDs (see Blix 2004:138-140). This was important since UNMOVIC had inspected
sites recommended by US intelligence thought to be the most likely to turn up evidence (Cramer
and Duggan 2012:207-208).
The day after Blix and ElBaradei reported to the United Nations, Bush gave his second
State of the Union speech. He again made the case for war against Iraq, contradicting what Blix
and ElBaradei reported the day before: he repeated the aluminum tubes myth, the false
yellowcake story, and emphasized that Iraq was aiding al-Qaeda and might provide the
organization with WMDs. Hussein was not disarming, according to Bush, but “deceiving.” If
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Iraq did not disarm, Bush told Americans, then the United States would invade. Yet, on January
31, in another meeting with Tony Blair, Bush told him that there would be an invasion with or
without UN approval, and whether or not inspectors found WMDs (Anderson 2012:121-122).
In a last-ditch effort to gain international support for the impending invasion, the
administration sent Powell to the United Nations on February 5, where he delivered his famous
speech on Iraq. Echoing Bush, he repeated the administration’s lies. Iraq was in material breach
of Resolution 1441, Powell asserted, because Hussein was deliberately hiding its WMD
programs from the UN inspectors. Citing the same flawed “intelligence” sources—the NIE and
al-Libi, though he didn’t mention the yellowcake story—Powell advanced the familiar claims
about mobile biological weapons factories, a nuclear weapons program, and Iraqi government
support for al-Qaeda. It turns out that Powell “was never informed about al-Libi, and had no idea
that many intelligence officers felt his statements on al-Qaeda-Saddam links were nonsense,
forced by torture” writes Anderson (2012:123). Indeed, after rejecting a draft of the UN speech
from Cheney’s office that he called “bullshit,” in the days before the speech, Powell accepted a
new draft from Tenet, who assured him that he supported its assertions (Anderson 2012:122123).
The following day, Bush had his turn at the UN where he gave a speech that might have
included the “bullshit” from Cheney. The president repeated the familiar claims, but added that
“Iraq has developed spray devices that could be used on unmanned aerial vehicles with ranges
far beyond what is permitted by the U.N. Security Council. A UAV launched from a vessel off
the American coast could reach hundreds of miles inland” to spray biological and chemical
weapons on Americans (Bush quoted in Anderson 2012:123). And, “Senior members of Iraqi
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intelligence and al-Qaeda have met at least eight times since the early 1990s” (Bush quoted in
Anderson 2012:123).
Blix and ElBaradei contradicted such claims again in reports throughout the rest of
February and March. On February 14, Blix reported that the ongoing inspections found no
stockpiles of WMDs, and that Iraq had improved cooperation with the inspectors (Blix
2004:175-178). On March 3, ElBaradei reported that the documents supporting the yellowcake
story were forgeries. And on March 7, Blix reported once again that no WMDs had been found,
and that Iraq had largely cooperated with UNMOVIC in announced and unannounced
inspections, and in destroying missiles outside of the permissible range set by the Security
Council (Blix 2004:208-211).
The inspections and verification reports prevented the Bush administration from
gathering support at the Security Council for a new resolution authorizing military force against
Iraq. In early 2003, the United States, UK, and Spain sought a Security Council authorization
that would declare Iraq in violation of disarmament obligations under Resolution 1441, and that
this posed a threat to international security and peace (Kramer, Michalowski, Rothe 2005:61).
But on March 5, 2003, the foreign ministers of France, Russia, and Germany met in Paris. They
declared that the inspections process had showed increasingly promising results, and that it was
possible to disarm Iraq through the inspections process. The foreign ministers also declared that
their countries would “not let a proposed resolution pass that would authorize the use of force”
(Blix 2004:206). It thus became clear to the administration that they would not be able to pass
through a new resolution. The administration waited until the March 7 inspection report to make
their decision to invade unilaterally.
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After publicly discrediting Blix and UNMOVIC, and bent on war, the administration
pressed forward with their plans. On March 17, Bush issued an ultimatum to Iraq. Because all
diplomatic options had been exhausted, he alleged, and because Iraq had “uniformly defied
Security Council resolutions demanding full disarmament,” Bush demanded that Hussein and his
sons leave Iraq within 48 hours, or face an invasion. As Blix and ElBaradei had demonstrated,
neither of these claims were true. And while Blix did not say that the Iraqis had cooperated to the
letter with resolution 1441 (Blix’s major concern was that Iraq had not acted “immediately” and
“proactively,” as required by 1441), his report did not support the notion that Iraq had
“uniformly” defied the United Nations. In fact, Iraq, aware that the United States and Britain
were positioning military forces for invasion in neighboring countries, had largely cooperated
with UNMOVIC in a vain effort to prevent the invasion. Though he held Iraq to the highest
standards regarding its disarmament obligations under Resolution 1441, Blix acknowledged
Iraq’s cooperation in his February 14 and March 7 reports to the Security Council. Moverover,
the Bush administration rejected an invitation by the Iraqis to allow thousands of US troops or
FBI agents to search Iraq for WMDs (DeFronzo 2010:151).
It was not expected by anyone that Hussein would step down from power, and on March
19, 2003, Bush announced the invasion. The administration gave up working through the United
Nations, as it was clear that a resolution supporting the invasion would not be supported by the
Security Council. While 49 nations supported the United States in what the administration called
a “coalition of the willing,” in many of these countries, most of the population did not support
the invasion. World-wide antiwar protests emerged on February 15 after Blix delivered his report
to the United Nations. “Over eight million people marched on five continents against a possible
war against Iraq,” recounts Anderson. “In the United States, millions of citizens participated in
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Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and New York City. Larger protests were held in Europe:
a million in Madrid, more in Rome, and even more in London, the largest demonstration ever in
Britain. Indeed, this was the largest global opposition to an American foreign policy in history”
(Anderson 2012:127).
Yet, in the United States, most Americans had been convinced by the Bush
administration that war was necessary. In February 2003, in the days after Powell’s speech, polls
showed that 63 percent of Americans supported the invasion; in March, the number rose slightly
to 64 percent.

Conclusion

As Cramer and Duggan argue, it is “highly likely that WMD was not a sincere motive
[for the invasion of Iraq]. Instead, it appears WMD was merely an instrumental argument used to
mobilize the public for a regime change policy motivated by other reasons . . . predominantly
unrelated to WMD.” “We find,” they write, “there is little question the administration, in
collusion with the British, fabricated the WMD threat entirely—it was ‘made from whole cloth’”
(Cramer and Duggan 2012:202-203). The presentation above supports these conclusions. It is
clear the administration did not have credible evidence that Iraq possessed WMDs or that an alQaeda-Iraq connection existed, and that it pressured the CIA to produce reports that would
ostensibly provide this evidence. (In the case of the al-Qaeda connection, this entailed torturing
prisoners to obtain the right information.) At different times administration officials received
intelligence briefings and reports from the CIA or from UNMOVIC and the IAEA that
contradicted their claims. It is clear that Bush and Cheney willfully ignored such information,
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apparently having decided to invade Iraq no later than July 2002, and having discussed doing so
as early as the first month the administration was in office. Cheney, Wolfowitz, and Feith likely
knew there was no evidence that Iraq had WMDs, explaining their distrust of the CIA and the
United Nations. That the CIA knew there was no evidence explains why a NIE was not produced
until Democratic senators demanded one, and why the NIE white paper given to Congress was a
false representation of the real NIE. That UN inspections failed to reveal WMDs also explains
why the administration publicly discredited Blix and UNMOVIC, and didn’t let inspectors come
to definite conclusions about Iraq’s WMD capabilities before declaring war.
The longer history of US-Iraq relations reveals that the key actors in the administration
did not sincerely believe that Hussein’s past aggression was fundamentally wrong—including
chemical and biological weapons attacks against Iranians or Iraqi civilians or aggression against
other countries—for many of them, including Rumsfeld, Powell, Khalilzad, Libby, Bolton, and
Card, supported Hussein in the Reagan administration, and others, including Condoleezza Rice,
supported him in the Bush Sr. administration. The very same people who were calling for a
preemptive war to stop a possible Iraqi WMD attack (for which there was no evidence in any
case), armed Iraq with WMDs and conventional weapons in the 1980s and supported Hussein’s
international aggression and terrorism.
If it is uncontroversial that the Bush administration did not wage a preemptive war to
prevent an Iraqi WMD attack against the United States, there is more scholarly disagreement
about how the many layers of reasons for the invasion are best understood. In the following
chapters, I show that the war is explained well by the elite model of war mobilization.
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CHAPTER 6

STATE-CAPITALIST IMPERIALISM AND THE IRAQ WAR

In this chapter and the ones that follow I show that a power elite model of war
mobilization explains why the Iraq War happened. That is, the model explains why the Bush
administration waged the war and why Congress and the general public supported it, even
against the pressure of a historically unprecedented anti-war movement.
The explanation is offered in terms of the five components of the model described in
chapter 3: state-capitalist imperialism, elite control of politics, imperialist ideology, media
propaganda, and elite influence in academia. In five chapters corresponding to each factor, the
manifestations of each factor are located in the precipitating events of the war and described in
careful detail. Some of these events have already been discussed in chapter 5, but a deeper
historical and sociological analysis is offered here and in subsequent chapters. This analysis also
shows how the historical instantiations of each factor were causally related to the outcome of the
war. In the present chapter on state-capitalist imperialism, events that occurred after the initial
invasion during the US occupation of Iraq are also analyzed. The reason for this is to describe
Bush administration motives for the invasion by considering their prewar occupation plans and
how they were actually implemented after the invasion.

State-Capitalist Imperialism and the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq

According to the power elite model of war mobilization, we would expect to see evidence
of state-capitalist imperialism in the build-up to the war and in its execution, and evidence that
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the imperatives of this institutional configuration were necessary causes, linked in sequential
ways to its occurrence. More specifically, we would expect the war to be linked to the
maintenance or expansion of the military-industrial complex, including the maintenance or
expansion of concentrated decision-making power within the executive branch and increased
spending on defense programs. We would expect to see the use of military force to demonstrate
military credibility and primacy. We would therefore expect to see false pretexts advanced to
hide from public view these institutional motivations and the individual and social class interests
in sustaining these institutions within the president’s administration. And finally, we would
expect to see the international elements of the US imperial system at work: deficit spending to
fund the war, and compliant foreign elites to assist the war effort.
The pretexts have already been analyzed in the previous chapter. It is clear that the Iraq
War was not a preemptive or preventive war to rid Iraq of WMDs. What then were the real,
imperial ambitions of the Bush administration? Scholars have identified two overlapping aspects
of the administration’s foreign policy that qualify it as imperial. The first is a drive towards
global military primacy in which the administration sought to make the United States the world’s
sole, unrivaled superpower. Two important aspects of this drive for primacy were (a) a desire to
increase the power and authority of the executive branch in foreign policy decision-making, and
(b) to ensure that US military power was unrivaled (Cramer and Duggan 2012). The other feature
of the administration’s imperialism was that it sought to open Iraq’s economy to American
corporations, especially those closely linked to the Bush administration (Juhasz 2006). Doing so
would facilitate control of Iraq’s oil, which was also understood to be key to US global primacy.
These two interrelated imperial motivations are discussed in turn.
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A war to assert US primacy.

Cramer and Duggan argue persuasively that the main cause of the Iraq War was a drive to
assert US imperial primacy. The key architects of the war, Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld, they
argue, were ideological primacists.1 Cheney and Rumsfeld—whom Cheney recruited to be
Secretary of Defense—brought extensive foreign policy experience to the administration and
were among the principal architects of the war in the administration. Bush did not have foreign
policy experience, but deferred to Cheney in a division of labor whereby Cheney managed
foreign policy, and Bush focused mostly on his domestic agenda (Warshaw 2009). Cramer and
Duggan argue that “Throughout their careers they [Cheney and Rumsfeld] focused on what they
perceived as two crucial ingredients for achieving US primacy: first that the US president needed
to be unencumbered in the pursuit of US foreign policy goals (free from interference by
Congress, the UN, the public and the press) and second the United States must have by far the
most technologically advanced and superior military force in the world” (Cramer and Duggan
2012:230-231). The analyses offered here and in the following chapters on the social
backgrounds of the key architects of the war support Cramer and Duggan’s argument.
As discussed in the previous chapter, regime change in Iraq was discussed at the first
National Security Council (NSC) meetings of the Bush administration in January and February
2001. Ron Suskind’s account of these meetings—told from the perspective of the
administration’s Treasury Secretary, Paul O’Neill, who was present at the meetings and assisted
Suskind in writing the account—casts light on the administration’s purposes in invading Iraq.

“Primacist” corresponds to Western’s “hardline unilateralist” category, mentioned in chapter 3, page 61. The
primacist ideology—or unilateralism, as I will refer to it—of the Bush administration is discussed in detail in
chapter 8.
1
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After the first meeting, according to O’Neill, where NSC members were given various tasks
towards destabilizing Hussein’s regime, he received a budget planning memo from Rumsfeld
titled, “Talking Points, FY01 and FY02-07 Budget Issues.” In the memo Rumsfeld criticized the
Clinton administration’s cuts to the defense budget and called for increases in defense spending,
“between $255 billion and $842 billion over the next five years.” Such increases were necessary
to carry out the changes in defense policy needed to meet the new security “threats” of the postCold War period, according to Rumsfeld. As Suskind summarizes the memo:
The premise . . . was that threats to U.S. security had taken root and grown
quickly in the years since the globe’s bipolar orderliness had dissolved. As new
regional powers with intense hostility to the United States “are arming to deter
us,” Rumsfeld wrote, trade in advanced technologies has made it possible for even
“the poorest nations on earth to rapidly acquire the most destructive military
weapons ever devised.” This dire prospect of a planet teeming with nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons—and, it was assumed, a desire to use them on
the United States—is unavoidable, a fait accompli, the memo asserted. “We
cannot prevent them from doing so.” (Suskind 2004:81)
Suskind adds that “Rumsfeld listed Iraq, along with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, as
moving down this path—and then noted an observation of former Defense Secretary William
Cohen, in the Clinton administration, that a missile threat to the United States could emerge in
one year” (Suskind 2004:81-82). All of this, according to Rumsfeld, would “limit our ability to
apply military power” (Suskind 2004:81), and “deter us from bringing our conventional or
nuclear power to bear in a regional crisis” (Suskind 2004:77).
Suskind observes that Rumsfeld’s nascent defense strategy reflected neoconservative
strategic thinking during the 1990s, and Andy Marshall’s “Revolution in Military Affairs”
(RMA) school of thought, which called for transforming the American military to utilize
“smaller, swifter, technologically augmented force on land and sea, supported by precision longrange weapons and a sophisticated, intelligence-driven air attack” (Suskind 2004:79) capability.
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Both the neoconservatives and RMA advocates stressed the need to dramatically increase
defense spending in order to “modernize” the military. As discussed at length in chapter 8, the
neoconservatives saw these objectives as necessary to maintain global US primacy; that is, to
prevent challenges to American power and global hegemony. In Rumsfeld’s version, it was
necessary to prevent the spread of WMD and long-range missile technology that could be used
against the United States, and to “dissuade nations abroad from challenging our interests”
(Suskind 2004:82).
Regime change in Iraq fit into this picture because it would serve as a demonstration of
US power and military credibility; it would “dissuade” other nations from acquiring WMD or
long-range missiles and challenging US “interests.” As Rumsfeld put it at the second NSC
meeting on February 1, 2001, “Imagine what the region would look like without Saddam and
with a regime that’s aligned with U.S. interests. . . . It would change everything in the region and
beyond it. It would demonstrate what U.S. policy is all about” (Suskind 2004:85). Later, in July
2001, Rumsfeld made a similar argument: “If Saddam’s regime were ousted, we would have a
much-improved position in the region and elsewhere . . .. A major success with Iraq would
enhance U.S. credibility and influence throughout the region” (Butt 2019:274). The exact
meaning of these statements is ambiguous, but in the context of neoconservative and hardline
defense strategy, they strongly suggest that a principal reason for invading Iraq was to assert US
power and thus preserve global military primacy. This is in fact how O’Neill interpreted
Rumsfeld’s remarks and the administration’s focus on Iraq:
O’Neill thought about Rumsfeld’s memo. It described how everything fit
together. The sudden focus on Saddam Hussein made sense only if the broader
ideology—of a need to “dissuade” others from creating asymmetric threats—were
to be embraced. That was the why.
A weak but increasingly obstreperous Saddam might be useful as a
demonstration model of America’s new, unilateral resolve. If it could effectively
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be shown that he possessed, or was trying to build weapons of mass destruction—
creating an “asymmetric threat,” in the neoconservative parlance, to U.S. power in
the region—his overthrow would help “dissuade” other countries from doing the
same. (Suskind 2004:85-86)
Demonstrating US military power and credibility in a war against Iraq would also add to
the power of the executive branch and the military-industrial complex, reinforcing the “imperial”
presidency that was challenged during the Vietnam War and Watergate scandal (Savage 2007;
Record 2012:132). Restoring presidential authority in defense policy was in fact a central
objective of the Bush administration. Cheney and Rumsfeld shared with the neoconservatives a
view of presidential authority in which the president should be unencumbered in decisions
related to foreign and defense policy, whether by Congress, the Supreme Court, intelligence
agencies, the media, or international treaties and organizations. According to Savage’s
assessment of Cheney and the administration’s views on presidential power,
Cheney was determined to expand the power of the presidency. He wanted to
reduce the authority of Congress and the courts and to expand the ability of the
commander in chief and his top advisers to govern with maximum flexibility and
minimum oversight. He hoped to enlarge the zone of secrecy around the executive
branch, to reduce the power of Congress to restrict presidential action, to
undermine the limits imposed by international treaties, to nominate judges who
favored a stronger presidency, and to impose great White House control of the
permanent workings of government. And Cheney’s vision of expanded executive
power was not limited to his and Bush’s tenure in office. Rather, Cheney wanted
to permanently alter the constitutional balance of American government,
establishing powers that future presidents would be able to wield as well. (Savage
2007:8-9)
Cheney’s view on presidential authority and national security in particular was shaped by
the fallout of the Nixon administration’s secret bombing of Cambodia in the late stages of the
war against Vietnam. In particular, the 1973 War Powers Act was intended to restrain the
president’s ability to use military force without notifying Congress. Cheney subsequently
embraced a “unitary executive” theory of executive power, “which interprets article 2 of the U.S.
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Constitution and vesting of executive power in the president as granting the president complete
control of the executive branch and its declared functions, including of force as commander in
chief,” according to Record. “The theory regards virtually any congressional attempt to limit the
president’s control of the executive branch or to alter executive branch policies in the national
security arena us unconstitutional interference” (Record 2007:134).
By expediting a massive mobilization for permanent war (the war on terror), and major
military invasions and occupations of two countries, the Bush administration cemented into place
“a perpetual emergency that both invited and mandated an expansion of presidential authority
that even Nixon would have envied,” Record observes (2007:135). As the occupation of Iraq
revealed, moreover, the Iraq War gave to the president of the United States neocolonial
administrative control over an entire country. Combined with the massive increases in defense
spending, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq represented vast expansions of the president’s
administrative and decision-making power, both domestically and internationally.

US primacy and Iraq’s oil.

As many writers have demonstrated (e.g., Klare 2012; Bacevich 2016), it has been a
long-standing American policy to secure access to or control of oil in the Middle East, given its
central role in the global industrial economy. For the Bush administration, it is most likely that
control of Iraqi oil was understood by the principal architects of the Iraq War as part of a broader
plan for global imperial domination, and an opportunity to increase Iraq’s oil exports to the
United States. This interpretation is the one best supported by the imperial grand strategy
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articulated by administration officials, prewar planning documents, and policies actually
implemented after the invasion.
The imperial grand strategy of the Bush administration is discussed in greater detail in
chapter 8 under the heading of imperial ideology. For now, it is noted that one of the most
important articulations of the administration’s global strategy—the 1992 Defense Policy
Guidance drafted by Paul Wolfowitz, “Scooter” Libby, and Zalmay Khalilzad for then Secretary
of Defense Cheney—included the view that US strategy “requires that we endeavor to prevent
any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control,
be sufficient to generate global power.” It also identified “access to vital raw materials, primarily
Persian Gulf oil” (Ehrenberg et al 2010:10-11) as a key US national interest.
As also discussed in chapter 5, upon taking office Cheney headed an energy task force
that in early 2001 had already begun preparing contracts for dozens of corporations to extract
Iraq’s oil and natural gas. Later, six months prior to the invasion, the administration consulted
with US oil company executives on Iraq’s oil, including Philip Carroll, former CEO of Shell’s
US oil division and Fluor Corporation, and Rob McKee, former executive of Conoco Phillips,
then chairman of a Halliburton subsidiary. According to Juhasz, the administration was also
advised by the State Department Future of Iraq Project’s Oil and Energy Working Group. The
Working Group included a US-educated Iraqi oil engineer, Ibrahim Bahr al-Uloum, who later
served as Iraqi Minister of Oil during the occupation (Juhasz 2006:253). The Working Group did
not advocate the full privatization of Iraq’s oil, however. Instead, it recommended “production
sharing agreements” (PSA) for new oil fields, and state ownership of existing oil fields under
Iraq’s National Oil Company (Juhasz 2006:254-256). Production sharing agreements largely
privatize oil production, and lock in contracts for several decades. The CPA Orders discussed in
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the next section provided the legal framework for PSAs to operate, and the US-backed Iraqi
president Allawi implemented the PSAs for newly discovered oil fields, of which it was believed
by the Bush administration there would be many.
Like the privatization of reconstruction, security, and other services, the privatization of
Iraqi oil led to massive profits for American oil companies. “Three months after the invasion,”
Juhasz recounts, “Chevron received one of the first contracts to market Iraqi oil. It has since
signed subsequent longer-term deals with Iraq’s State Oil Marketing Organization, as have
ExxonMobil and Marathon, among others” (Juhasz 2006:253). In one estimate, by August 2005,
Iraq was exporting more than 50 percent of its oil the United States, “the majority of which was
delivered by Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Marathon, with the rest delivered by Shell and BP”
(Juhasz 2006:253). US oil imports from Iraq reached nearly record levels in the months and
years after the invasion, in terms of total barrels-per-day exports, and daily averages. A degree of
regularity of exports was also achieved that had not been attained in the past (Juhasz 2006:252).

The state-capitalist restructuring of Iraq’s economy.

There were also important economic motivations for the invasion of Iraq. As documented
in rich detail by Antonia Juhasz (2006), the Bush administration sought to transform Iraq’s
economy from a state-managed or centrally planned economy into what they called a “liberal,”
“free market” economy. This would be achieved by removing protectionist barriers to trade and
investment, privatizing most of Iraq’s state-owned industries and services, reducing taxes, and
other measures. While the administration described this as an effort to introduce “free enterprise”
into Iraq, it is clear that, in reality, the invasion and occupation actually served to open Iraq to the
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Pentagon-managed state-capitalist economy. Thus the war served to replace one state-managed
economy with another—one that approximated a neocolonial arrangement—rather than to
introduce a liberal capitalism that depends principally on competitive market and price
mechanisms for the distribution of goods and services.
On the organization of Iraq’s economy, the intentions of the administration are evident
from their prewar planning, and the actions taken after the invasion during the military
occupation to implement their plans.
The invasion phase lasted from March 19 to May 1, 2003, and was followed by a period
of formal occupation that lasted until June 28, 2004, at which point a transitional Iraqi
government took control of Iraq. During the occupation phase, the United States established the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to govern Iraq. The CPA was managed exclusively by L.
Paul Bremer III, a power elite figure who worked for the State Department for 23 years before
becoming a managing director of Kissinger Associates, a secretive consultancy firm that
specializes in foreign relations, founded by Henry Kissinger in 1982. He then became chairman
and CEO of an insurance company specializing in risk assessment and insurance for
multinational corporations operating in politically unstable countries. Bremer was a firm believer
in national privatization and the corporate globalization it supports, and understood well the
negative political responses to it in countries where it had been introduced (Juhasz 2006:191192). It is for this ideological conviction that the Bush administration chose him to administer the
CPA. He was chosen to replace Jay Garner, head of the CPA’s predecessor organization, the
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, probably because Garner opposed the
administration’s plans for radical privatization of Iraq’s economy.
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This planning began as early as October 2001, when the administration established the
State Department Future of Iraq Project. The project’s Economic and Infrastructure Working
Group produced a report entitled “An Economic Empowerment System,” which advocated the
privatization of Iraq’s economy (Ehrenberg et al 2010:364-365). Concrete plans for privatization
were developed as early as February 2003, when the US Agency for International Development
(USAID) produced a report for Bearing Point, Inc. outlining a plan for restructuring the
economy. The planning document, entitled “Moving the Iraqi Economy from Recovery to
Sustainable Growth,” suggested “a broad-based Mass Privatization Program.” It explained that
contractors would support “private sector involvement in strategic sectors, including
privatization, asset sales, concessions, leases and management contracts, especially in the oil and
supporting industries." After a year, the contractors would also help design “a comprehensive
income tax system consistent with current international practice” (King 2001). Bremer’s CPA
implemented something approximating the USAID/Bearing Point plan, and USAID awarded
Bearing Point a sole-source (non-competitive) contract in July 2003 to assist the restructuring
process (Juhasz 2006:194-196). However, the CPA restructuring was much more rapid and
heavy-handed than the original USAID plan suggested it would be. Nor was the restructuring in
accord with “current international practice.”
Bremer implemented 100 CPA “Orders” to replace Iraq’s existing laws and begin the
restructuring process. The Orders restructured Iraq’s economy and political system specifically
to advantage foreign corporations. Order 2, for instance, which disbanded the Iraqi military,
transferred security work to US contractors and the US military. This plan, too, was designed by
a private consulting company—Ronco Consulting Corporation of Washington DC—contracted
by the Department of Defense (Juhasz 2006:202). Order 12 eliminated all protective barriers to
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foreign competition, opening Iraq to a flood of US wheat exports. Order 37 eliminated Iraq’s
progressive tax rate, replacing it with a flat tax for corporations and individuals. The most
important order regarding the economy was Order 39, which privatized all of Iraq’s state-owned
industries, with the exception of oil. Order 39, Provision 2 allowed 100 percent foreign
ownership of Iraqi businesses. Provision 3 called for “national treatment,” described by Juhasz as
“a standard element in trade and investment agreements, which restricts governments from
preferencing domestic business or workers over foreign businesses or workers” (Juhasz
2006:217). The result of this provision was that scores of US corporations were awarded billions
of dollars in contracts for Iraq’s postwar reconstruction. And Provision 4 allowed unrestricted
repatriation of profits.
The CPA Orders also exposed as a lie the Bush administration’s claim that it sought to
bring democracy to Iraq, often cited as a reason for the invasion (e.g. Record 2010). Several of
the Orders were explicitly undemocratic. Order 14 put Iraq’s media under CPA control,
implementing effective censorship. Two major newspapers, al-Arabiya and al-Hawza, were
closed. The nominal purpose of the closures and media censorship was to close outlets alleged to
incite violence against the CPA. Ironically, the closure of al-Hawza, the paper of Shi’a leader
Muqtada al-Sadr, led directly to demonstrations and calls for terrorist acts against the CPA
(Juhasz 2006:205-206). Order 62 barred opposition candidates from running for office against
the occupation, the CPA, or its laws. Orders 57 and 77 placed American representatives in key
decision-making positions in each government ministry for five-year terms. Order 97 created a
commission that could disqualify political candidates and parties, and Order 100 transferred all
government authority to an American-favored Iraqi, Iyad Allawi.
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Allawi became interim prime minister on June 28, 2004. He was selected by the Bush
administration because he was a reliable anti-Hussein opposition leader with CIA ties. (Like
Chalabi, Allawi had worked with the CIA in an unsuccessful coup attempt in 1996.) Allawi did
not independently govern Iraq, however. The CPA created an interim constitution based on the
CPA Orders that prevented Allawi’s interim government from modifying them until elections
were held, which was supposed to be no later than January 2005 (Juhasz 2006:241-243). When
elections were finally held, they were widely regarded as illegitimate. They took place under a
declared state of martial law; were plagued by suicide bombings and eight candidates were
assassinated; thousands of candidates delayed announcing their campaigns until the day of the
elections to avoid assassination; elections were boycotted by Sunnis; and there were no election
monitors. Moreover, the CIA interfered with the elections in an effort to get Allawi elected
(Hersh 2005).
After the national elections, on January 30, 2005, Jalal Talabani became president, and
Ibrahim al-Jaafari prime minister. Both were US-backed elites. After taking office, they worked
with the Bush administration in the drafting of Iraq’s new constitution, on which there was to be
a public referendum. The constitution they wrote locked in the CPA Orders and was not
completed until the day of the referendum. Thus, most Iraqis had never read it, and had no idea
what they were voting for. Still, believing they were making a referendum on a democratic future
for Iraq, many Iraqis voted for the new constitution. In reality, they were voting for the
permanent imperial exploitation of their economy by American and multinational corporations.
Corporations with extensive links to the Bush administration’s principals profited
handsomely from federal government contracts in Iraq. These were awarded by USAID and the
State and Defense departments, to several corporations, including those with strong links to the
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Bush administration: Halliburton, Lockheed Martin, Bechtel, and Chevron.2 Contracting
corporations provided numerous services, including the consulting services already mentioned,
logistical support for the military, security, transportation, base construction, housing and dining
services, oil infrastructure repair, and the post-invasion infrastructure reconstruction projects.
One of the first corporations to be awarded a contract in Iraq was Halliburton, which received a
$7 billion contract on March 7, 2003, before the invasion began (Rothe 2006:221). Halliburton’s
profits increased dramatically from contract work in Iraq (McNulty 2004). Its revenues rose from
$12.5 billion in 2002, to $16.2 billion in 2003 (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
2004:22). Similarly, Lockheed Martin’s revenues rose from $26.5 billion in 2002, to $36.8
billion in 2003 (Lockheed Martin 2004); Bechtel’s revenues rose from $11.6 billion in 2002 to
$16.3 billion in 2003 (Juhasz 2006:138); Chevron’s 2002 revenues rose from $1.13 billion in
2002 to $7.23 billion in 2003 (ChevronTexaco 2004:4). Many of the contracts awarded to these
companies were the cost-plus contracts described in chapter 3, which encourage cost overruns,
and guarantee fixed profits.

The global imperial system.

Without the existing imperial apparatus bequeathed to the Bush administration by
previous administrations, the invasion and occupation would not have been possible. Previous
administrations, which of course included members of the Bush administration itself, left an
already massive global military apparatus that was easily mobilized for the Iraq War: 1.45
million soldiers, and 725 global military bases in 130 countries to which they could be deployed;

2

Such connections are the subject of chapter 7.
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and numbers of aircraft carriers, destroyers, nuclear submarines, fighter jets, and bombers
unrivaled by any other nation. Compliant foreign elites in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia
allowed the United States to establish military bases in those countries during the Gulf War that
were used to station troops for the invasion (Jervis 2012:37). And finally, the federal government
was already running a deficit prior to the invasion, but was able to finance the war without
raising taxes through foreign borrowing. Thus the war was financed through borrowing that by
2007 had added nearly $1 trillion to a total national deficit of $9 trillion (Stiglitz and Bilmes
2008:53).

Conclusion

As a manifestation of state-capitalist imperialism, the invasion of Iraq exhibits two
significant characteristics: it was intended to shore up American military power through a
demonstration of resolve that would hypothetically deter future challenges to US power; and it
would concentrate decision power in the executive branch by creating, along with the invasion of
Afghanistan, a “permanent emergency” that could justify sweeping executive authority and
increasingly large military spending budgets. The invasion and occupation also gave the
President neocolonial control over the entire economy and political system of Iraq. The
occupation, in turn, engendered a windfall of state subsidized profits for American corporations
contracted by the Pentagon, State Department, and USAID. The overarching objective of the
invasion, then, to assert US primacy, encompassed political objectives that correspond to the two
major structural imperatives of the military-industrial complex: increasing decision power for the
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executive branch and Pentagon managers by increasing resources for the Pentagon, and
channeling profits to the corporate sector.
Because these objectives would not have been widely accepted, either by the
international community or by the American public, the administration marketed the war as an
extension of the war on terror, and as a defensive maneuver against a future WMD attack. The
administration’s arguments and specific claims in justifying the war were thus intended to skirt
traditional checks on the use of military force, both domestically, and internationally.
Domestically, the administration could rely on traditional propaganda techniques and a
compliant media to market the war (this is the subject of chapter 9). Internationally, because they
knew that the United Nations Security Council would not permit the United States to invade Iraq
on the basis of demonstrably false pretexts, the administration was prepared to reject
multilateralism in order to achieve predetermined goals in Iraq. That the public rationale for
invading Iraq was a cover for different objectives was also evident when the administration
refused to allow the UN weapons inspections process to conclude, and when it publicly criticized
the inspectors after they consistently failed to corroborate and publicly rejected the
administration’s WMD claims.
The material objectives in invading Iraq reflected the priorities of the key architects of the
Iraq War within the Bush administration. In the next chapter, their imperial ambitions are
explained as outcomes of their social positions in the institutional and class structure of
American society, which will also be shown to be necessary conditions for the 2003 Iraq War.
State-capitalist imperialism cannot be understood separately from these societal arrangements.
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CHAPTER 7

ELITE CONTROL OF POLITICS AND THE IRAQ WAR

In this chapter, I show that the imperial motivations for the Iraq War described in the last
chapter stem from the specific socio-economic and political backgrounds of key administration
officials involved in planning and starting the Iraq War.
As explained in chapter 3, because executive branch officials come overwhelmingly from
the world of corporate management, and military-industrial firms are centrally located in the
corporate economy (in terms of directorate interlocks and working relationships with major
commercial banks), the president and other high-level officials are likely to have internalized an
ideology that emphasizes the political and economic need to project American military power in
international affairs. High-level officials may also have large incentives to start wars and sustain
high levels of military spending in order to create profit-making opportunities for the
corporations they come from before taking office, or to benefit the broader corporate sector on
which they depend for political support. Otherwise, government officials use wars to extend
geopolitical power and their own personal decision-making power.
The power projection, corporate war profiteering, and US oil imports facilitated by the
Iraq War have already been described. In this chapter, then, I analyze the backgrounds of key
Bush administration officials, focusing especially on (a) prior executive branch and defense
positions, (b) policy-planning network connections between key Bush administration officials,
and (c) the corporate backgrounds of these officials. According to a power elite model of war
mobilization, we would expect to find these officials had prior organizational affiliations and
occupations that shaped their thinking about American foreign policy and Iraq. In the case of six
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officials reviewed in this chapter, it appears that prior government posts in the foreign policy
bureaucracy, corporate connections to military-industrial and energy firms, and associations with
neoconservative policy planning networks were the most important factors influencing their
thinking about foreign policy and Iraq.

Social, Political, and Corporate Backgrounds of the Key Architects

Within the Bush administration, among the key architects of the Iraq War were George
Bush, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Condoleezza Rice, and Colin Powell.
These were the figures most involved in war planning and organizing public support (Mann
2004). While others were also involved in these efforts, such as I. Lewis Libby, Douglas Feith,
Zalmay Khalilzad, and Richard Perle, in this section I focus on these six officials, as they were
the most powerful decision makers within the administration, and represent a wide range of
different career paths into the administration. At this stage of the analysis, I am principally
concerned with the social, political, and corporate management backgrounds of these officials,
rather than their specific beliefs and ideologies, which are discussed more in the next chapter.
The point here is to show how the imperial objectives of the Iraq War resulted from the prior
institutional affiliations of these officials.

George Walker Bush.

Born into the power elite, Bush was the son of George H. W. Bush, the forty-first
president of the United States. He attended the prestigious Phillips Andover Academy in
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Massachusetts before earning his undergraduate degree in history at Yale, and then an MBA
from Harvard Business School. Like his father, he began his career in the oil industry. In 1977 he
founded a small oil exploration company, which was later acquired by Spectrum 7 Energy
Corporation in 1984. In 1986, Spectrum 7 merged with Harken Energy. Bush was retained as
chairman and CEO of Spectrum 7, and then as a board member and consultant for Harken
(Juhasz 2006:40). In 1989, he bought the Texas Rangers baseball team, which he sold in 1998,
earning $14.5 million in profits. Bush began his political career working for his father’s
presidential campaign, where he helped promote his father among the Christian right. In 1994,
Bush became the governor of Texas, winning the election for the office again in 1998. As
governor, he implemented the familiar Republican policies of the neoliberal period: low taxes,
cuts to state spending, and corporate deregulation. As a result, by 2000, Houston became the
smoggiest city in the United States, and Texas became 49th and 50th in taxes collected and per
capita state spending, respectively. Income inequality dramatically increased (Juhasz 2006:40).
In his 2000 presidential campaign, Bush worked closely with campaign fundraisers and
businessmen Bradford Freeman and Craig Stapleton. Freeman’s partner Ron Spogli was Bush’s
roommate at Harvard and Stapleton had raised money for Bush’s father and invested with Bush
in the Texas Rangers. Freeman was also a trustee at Stanford University, and was friends with
former Secretary of State, George P. Shultz. Shultz was on the faculty of the Hoover Institution,
a conservative think tank that promoted the politics of the Reagan-Bush political tradition. The
Hoover Institution staffed Bush’s campaign team and encouraged him to appeal to the
conservative, Reagan-Bush political ideology that it represented. Bush was already connected to
this political network through his father, and to solidify his conservative credentials among
Reagan conservatives, he asked Cheney to be his vice president running mate (Warshaw
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2009:21-24). After initially declining the offer, and managing Bush’s vice president search,
Cheney accepted Bush’s invitation.

Richard (Dick) Bruce Cheney.

Bush also chose Cheney because he could bring to the campaign something Bush did not
have: foreign policy knowledge and experience. After beginning studies at Yale and then
dropping out, Cheney earned bachelor’s and master’s degrees in political science from the
University of Wyoming. Cheney then began a long career in the federal government. One of his
earliest positions was as Donald Rumsfeld’s assistant in the Nixon and Ford administrations.
When Rumsfeld became Defense Secretary under Ford, Cheney took his place as White House
Chief of Staff. Then, after the Ford administration left the White House, Cheney was elected
Wyoming’s sole congressperson in the House of Representatives, a position he held from 1979
to 1989, consistently voting in favor conservative policies favored by the corporate rich. He is
widely regarded as a “deficit hawk,” though this label does not accurately describe Cheney’s
voting record on military spending. He is said to have joked that, as congressman, he never met a
weapons program he didn’t like.
Cheney moved up the ranks in Congress, becoming more interested in foreign policy. He
served on the House Intelligence Committee, and on the committee that investigated the Irancontra scandal, where he defended Reagan’s illegal sales of weapons to Iran to support
Nicaraguan terrorists on the grounds that the president should be unencumbered by Congress in
managing national security. He was then appointed Defense Secretary by George H. W. Bush,
and was instrumental in planning US involvement in the Gulf War. As Defense Secretary, he
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began to forge stronger connections to the corporate world of defense contractors. “For example .
. . his Defense Department paid the Halliburton Corporation $9 million to study whether the
military’s logistics services should be privatized. After Halliburton determined that the services
should be privatized, it was awarded the first privatization contract” (Juhasz 2006:102). Then,
from 1995 to 2000, Cheney was the CEO of Halliburton, during which time the corporation
dramatically increased its government contracts (and thus its profits) under the Clinton
administration.1 It is also worth noting that Cheney’s wife, Lynne Cheney, served on Lockheed
Martin’s board of directors from 1994 to 2000. Bruce Jackson, formerly the vice president of
Lockheed Martin, was recruited to draft the Bush administration’s foreign policy platform during
the 2000 election campaign, and was a cofounder of the lobbying group Committee for the
Liberation of Iraq (Juhasz 2006:139), as well as a board member of Project for a New American
Century (PNAC). Upon taking office, Dick Cheney owned stock in both Halliburton and
Lockheed Martin.
The criminologist Dawn Rothe explains the conflict of interest created by Cheney’s
shares in Halliburton after he became vice president:
Normally politicians put their stock assets into a blind trust after being elected to
high office, so that someone else manages their stock portfolio. However, Cheney
continued to hold 140,000 shares of unvested stock that is worth $7.6 million at
2005 stock prices. This could not be managed or sold by anyone until 2002,
because it was unvested; thus it could not be put into a blind trust. Therefore
Cheney had a direct financial interest in the value of Halliburton’s stock and the
financial profitability of Halliburton the first two years of his vice presidency.
(Rothe 2006:220)

Dawn Rothe writes that “Halliburton’s revenue from state defense contracts . . . nearly doubled (from $1.1 to $2.3
billion) under Cheney’s five-year tenure as CEO compared with the five prior years. For example, in 1995
Halliburton jumped from seventy-third to eighteenth on the Pentagon’s list of top contractors, benefiting from at
least $3.8 billion in federal contracts and taxpayer-insured loans . . .” (Rothe, 2006:220).
1
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Cheney also owned large amounts of Halliburton stock in a blind trust that would be available to
him after his time in government.
After working in the H.W. Bush administration, Cheney joined the American Enterprise
Institute, and was a signer of PNAC’s “Statement of Principles.” Before entering the Bush Jr.
White House, then, Cheney was an important congressional supporter of the military-industrial
complex, one of its top state managers, and then a manager and shareholder of two of its largest
corporate beneficiaries, with an indirect tie (through his wife) to another major defense
contractor, itself linked to the movement for regime change in Iraq.

Donald Henry Rumsfeld.

Largely in control of foreign policy, Cheney recruited his former mentor Donald
Rumsfeld for Secretary of Defense. Rumsfeld was educated at Princeton, earning a bachelor’s
degree in political science. He was a congressman for Illinois between 1963 and 1969 before
taking positions in the Nixon administration, first as the head of the Office of Economic
Opportunity, and then as US ambassador to NATO. During his time as NATO ambassador,
Rumsfeld befriended the former Deputy Secretary of Defense and Cold War architect, Paul
Nitze. As Secretary of Defense under Ford, like Nitze, he exaggerated the threat of the Soviet
Union. He did this as part of an effort to obstruct the move towards détente begun under the
Nixon administration and to persuade Congress to increase the defense budget.
Shortly before leaving the White House in 1977, Rumsfeld made arrangements with G.
D. Searle to take over management of the company as president and CEO. In this role, he was
instrumental in marketing aspartame, an artificial sweetener that had been linked to malignant

133

brain tumors. (G. D. Searle, already under heavy FDA scrutiny for lying about drug testing
protocols, was prevented from marketing the sweetener until Reagan took office and created a
more permissive environment for corporate malfeasance.) Rumsfeld also stayed involved in
politics during this period. He was on Reagan’s foreign and defense policy campaign advisory
committee and was subsequently appointed Reagan’s Middle East envoy, in spite of a general
lack of knowledge about the region. He met with Saddam Hussein twice, in 1983 and then again
in 1984. In 1984, his assignment was to assure Hussein of American support in the Iran-Iraq
War, even though it was at that time clear that Hussein had used chemical weapons against the
Iranians.
Rumsfeld also participated in the top-secret Continuity of Government program,
beginning in 1989. This program simulated emergency federal government operations in the
event of a nuclear weapons attack on the United States. In one iteration of the program,
Rumsfeld was assigned to play the role of Secretary of Defense during a limited Soviet attack on
Europe. In this scenario, according to Andrew Cockburn, Rumsfeld chose to ignore ways to
deescalate the crisis in favor of initiating a thermonuclear war (Cockburn 2007:86-87).
In the 1990s, Rumsfeld held four more corporate management positions before his
second term as Secretary of Defense. In one of these, he served on the board of directors for the
Swiss construction firm, ABB, which sold two light water nuclear water reactors to North Korea.
(He later denied knowing about these sales after the Bush administration denounced North Korea
as a terrorist regime (Cockburn 2007:89-90)). It is ironic, then, that in 1997 Rumsfeld also
headed the congressional Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States.
This commission was sponsored by PNAC to challenge the view—supported by the CIA—that a
ballistic missile defense system was no longer necessary for US national security after the
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disappearance of the Soviet Union. The commission argued instead that North Korea, Iran, and
Iraq (which later became Bush’s “axis of evil”) were “rogue” nations with ballistic missiles that
constituted immediate threats to US national security. In making this claim, it presented no new
evidence, and simply offered a more pessimistic interpretation of existing intelligence. In this,
Rumsfeld’s commission followed the strategies of Nitze’s Committee on the Present Danger,
which served a similar function in the 1970s.
Rumsfeld’s long career in government and business before entering the Bush
administration shows that he was “devoid of moral scruples,” as Cramer and Duggan (2012:233)
aptly put it.2 He was a pragmatic liar, a recidivist national security threat inflator, and was
apparently motivated by power lust and greed. He used the same tactics as Secretary of Defense
under Ford, and as head of the 1997 ballistic missile commission, that would be used in the Bush
administration to promote the Iraq War.

Paul Dundes Wolfowitz.

Cheney selected Paul Wolfowitz for Undersecretary of Defense. Wolfowitz earned a
bachelor’s degree in political science from Cornell University, and a PhD in political science
from the University of Chicago. He completed his dissertation on nuclear weapons proliferation
in the Middle East under Albert Wohlstetter, a Cold War hardliner and important influence on
the neoconservative movement. In 1969, Wohlstetter helped Wolfowitz and Richard Perle join
Nitze and Dean Acheson’s Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy, which successfully
lobbied Congress to continue support for antiballistic missile (AMB) systems. There, Wolfowitz

2

For more details that support this interpretation, see Cockburn (2007).
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and Perle wrote policy papers for Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson—another early
neoconservative influence—who was a leading proponent of the ABM system. While finishing
his dissertation, Wolfowitz taught at Yale, where I. Lewis Libby—a future Bush Jr.
administration official—was one of his students.
After Nixon and Kissinger negotiated the Strategic Arms Limitation treaty with the
Soviet Union in 1972, Jackson pressured Nixon into replacing the senior staff of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency. Hoping to gain support in the Senate for the treaty, Nixon
selected Fred Iklé, another Cold War hardliner, to head the agency. On Wohlstetter’s
recommendation, Iklé recruited Wolfowitz for the agency (Mann 2004:34). Then, in 1976
Wolfowitz served as a member of an outside, “independent” intelligence group assembled by
Ford’s CIA Director George H. W. Bush to challenge the CIA’s intelligence estimates on the
Soviet Union’s military capabilities. Team B, as the group was called, produced an alternative
intelligence report to the National Intelligence Estimate, in which they falsely claimed that the
CIA had consistently underestimated the Soviet threat and had failed to learn from its mistakes.
The report made several ominous predictions about the growth of Soviet military capabilities, all
of which turned out to be false or grossly exaggerated, and were intended to justify high military
spending and defeat détente (Rovner 2011:113-136). After Team B, Wolfowitz served on the
Committee on the Present Danger.
Wolfowitz served briefly in the Carter administration as Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Regional Programs before taking on a position teaching at the Paul Nitze School of
Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins in 1980. (He left Carter’s cabinet because Iklé
warned him that it would ruin his chance of finding a position in the Reagan administration.) In
1977—before the Iranian Revolution—he argued that the United States needed to control access
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to Persian Gulf oil, and that Iraq would threaten the security of the United States if it took over
Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian oil fields (Juhasz 2006:29). Wolfowitz then joined the Reagan
administration as State Department Director of Policy Planning. (Interestingly, Wolfowitz
personally disagreed with the administration’s official policy of supporting Hussein in the IranIraq War, and favored overthrowing him.) He then served as Reagan’s ambassador to Indonesia
between 1986 and 1989, where he was an apologist for the Suharto regime, including its
genocidal occupation of East Timor, which he supported until it ended in 1999 (Chomsky
2006:134-136). He held another Department of Defense position under Bush, this time as Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, working under Defense Secretary Cheney. Under Cheney’s
direction, in 1992, Wolfowitz, Libby, and Khalilzad authored an important Defense Policy
Guidance. This document, discussed at length in the next chapter, was an important articulation
of the foreign policy that would be adopted by the second Bush administration in 2001.
After working in the H.W. Bush administration, Wolfowitz returned to academia as the
dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. From this post he wrote
apologetics for the Gulf War, and advocated for another war to overthrow Hussein. He argued
that Iraq posed a major regional threat because Hussein was liable to attack Kuwait or Saudi
Arabia and gain major control of the regional oil supply, and hence the global economy (Mann
2004:227-228). He was a signatory of the PNAC “Statement of Principles” and the 1998 letter to
Clinton. He also served on Rumsfeld’s 1997 ballistic missile commission and as a consultant to
Northrop Grumman (Hartung 2002:111).
Rather than a career politician or corporate manager, Wolfowitz was principally a
university intellectual. Because his beliefs aligned with, and he was personally connected to, the
architects and intellectual managers of the Cold War—figures like Nitze, Acheson, and
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Wohlstetter—he was able to attain his first government posts, and then move easily through the
foreign policy bureaucracy in consecutive administrations, Republican and Democratic. He was
an opponent of Hussein and advocated overthrowing him in the early 1980s, though Wolfowitz’s
affiliation with Suharto strongly suggests that he was a pragmatic careerist rather than the
moralist he was often characterized as in the early 2000s (Chomsky 2006:134-136). The political
strategy employed by the Bush administration to start the Iraq War—exaggerate threats and
assail the intelligence community’s estimates—reflected that used by Wolfowitz and his Cold
War mentors to escalate the Cold War.

Condoleezza Rice.

According to Warshaw (2008:49), Bush allowed Cheney to build the administration’s
cabinet as long as key positions went to Bush’s own political allies. One of the most important
was Condoleezza Rice, a family friend who was Bush’s campaign chief foreign policy advisor,
and then National Security Advisor from 2001 to 2004. Though sometimes portrayed as a more
passive member of the administration’s foreign policy team, Rice actively worked to promote the
Iraq War.
Rice studied international relations at the University of Denver and Notre Dame.
Immediately after earning her PhD in international relations at Denver, she taught at Stanford
University as a specialist in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. She held a Council of Foreign
Relations fellowship at the Pentagon during the Reagan years before returning to Stanford in
early 1991. There she befriended Brent Scowcroft (H. W. Bush’s National Security Advisor)
who invited her to participate in the Aspen Strategy Group, and hired her on to the National
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Security Council where she worked as the director of Soviet and Eastern European affairs (Mann
2004:171). In this role, she helped draft corporate globalization policies for former Soviet
countries.
At Stanford, Rice also met George Shultz, who was on the board of Chevron. After
leaving the Bush administration, Rice told him she wanted to become involved in business. He
helped her obtain a position on Chevron’s board of directors, where she worked as an expert on
Kazakhstan as the company moved into the Caspian region, a move that was facilitated by the
policies she had designed previously while working on the NSC. She also served on Chevron’s
Committee on Public Policy during the UN Iraq oil-for-food program, in which Chevron was one
of the few companies that was allowed to sell Iraq’s oil. During the 1990s, Rice also served on
the boards of several other corporations, including Carnegie Corporation, Charles Schwab,
Hewlett Packard, JPMorgan Chase, RAND, and Transamerica. She was also a fellow at
Stanford’s Hoover Institution.
The historical record suggests that Rice was a subservient careerist, willing to abandon
principle and adjust her views as necessary for personal and material gain. This is indicated by
her role on the board of Chevron in the 1990s when the corporation was implicated in various
crimes, such as the 1998 and 1999 killing and torture of Nigerian civilians, and what is one of the
worst localized oil-related environmental disasters in the world, pollution in the Amazon region
of Ecuador (Juhasz 2006:11-118). In his authoritative work on Bush’s war cabinet, Rise of the
Vulcans, James Mann writes that
As always, Condoleezza Rice managed skillfully to stay out of the crossfire.
During the first Bush administration Rice had usually been able to persuade both
factions in the running disputes over Soviet policy that she was on their side. In
the second Bush administration once again she avoided too close an identification
with any particular faction or ideology.
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Those who opposed the invasion of Iraq directed their ire primarily at
others in the administration, towards Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and the
president himself. They rarely paid as much attention to Rice, despite the fact that
as national security adviser, she had quietly played at least as significant role as
any of the others. She had been the prime mover behind the drafting of a new
National Security Strategy that laid the framework for a preventive war. She had
served as the White House coordinator and as the president’s closest adviser,
throughout the entire Iraq operation. (Mann 2004:367)
As an international relations theorist, Rice had been a realist, and in 2000, during Bush’s
presidential campaign, she suggested that Iraq could be handled with containment and nuclear
deterrence (Mann 2004:257). Thus Rice conveniently shifted from a moderate realist position on
Iraq characteristic of the Bush Sr. and Clinton administrations, to drafting the 2002 National
Security Strategy that advanced the unilateralist grand strategy favored by Cheney, Rumsfeld,
and the neoconservatives. Rice was also implicated in a dispute between the White House and
the CIA over who failed to inform the president that the Nigerian uranium story was not credible
prior to the 2003 State of the Union Address. Rice apparently prevented Alan Foley, director of
the CIA’s Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center, from conveying to
Bush that the intelligence was flawed (Risen 2006:110-111).

Colin Luther Powell.

Colin Powell was also closely connected to Bush Jr. prior to serving on his campaign
team and agreeing to be Secretary of State. He had served in the Reagan and Bush Sr.
administrations as National Security Advisor and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
respectively.
Powell attended City College of New York where he joined the Reserve Officers
Training Corps (ROTC). The ROTC was the center of Powell’s college experience, and he rose
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to the level of cadet colonel. After graduating in 1958, Powell fought in the Vietnam War in two
one-year tours. During his second tour in 1968-1969, he was selected to be the American
Division’s staff officer in charge of operations and planning. This was the division responsible
for the My Lai massacre. While it is not clear that he was aware of the My Lai massacre itself, in
this role Powell helped cover up reports of atrocities carried out against Vietnamese civilians and
prisoners by American soldiers (Mann 2004:42-43). Powell believed in the American cause in
the Vietnam War—“defending” South Vietnam from communist aggression—but did not
approve of the civilian management of the war. He believed that the United States lost because it
failed to provide adequate numbers of troops and exited the war prematurely. His experiences in
Vietnam led him to formulate what later became known as the “Powell Doctrine,” which held
that wars should be fought with overwhelming force and only when all diplomatic efforts have
failed. They should have clear objectives, and overwhelming public support, Powell believed, in
order to avoid major defeats as in Vietnam.
After the Vietnam War, Powell served as an Army commander before becoming an aid to
Deputy Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci, and then to Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger. In
the fallout of the Iran-contra scandal, Reagan replaced National Security Advisor John
Poindexter with Carlucci. In turn Carlucci recruited Powell for Deputy Secretary of Defense. In
these roles, Powell helped coordinate the 1983 intervention in Grenada and the 1986 bombing of
Libya. When Weinberger stepped down as Secretary of Defense in 1987, Carlucci was moved
into that position, and Powell became Reagan’s National Security Advisor. Powell was then
chosen by Cheney for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Bush administration, where he
was instrumental in expediting the invasion of Panama in 1989. Interestingly, Powell did not
initially support US involvement in the Gulf War; he asked whether liberating Kuwait was worth
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the cost, and tried to convince Bush to use sanctions and containment. While Powell was not
successful in that effort, he later convinced the H. W. Bush administration to end the US attack
on Iraq sooner than others in the administration preferred, particularly Wolfowitz and his
assistant Libby (Mann 2004:191-192). Powell also opposed prolonging military involvement
when Hussein attacked the Kurds and Shiites.
As Chairman of the JCS, along with Cheney, Powell favored maintaining a large, postCold War military budget, a preference which ultimately revealed the contradiction of his
military doctrine. Towards the end of his career as Chairman, under congressional pressure to
rationalize large military budgets after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Powell approved and
supported the US intervention in Somalia, even though it began as a small-scale operation, and
its objectives became increasingly open-ended (Mann 2004:222-223).
After retiring from the JCS in 1993, Powell moved into the private sector, where he was
active in youth organizations, including the Boys & Girls Club of America and the United Negro
College Fund (Mann 2004:239). From 1996 to 2001, along with Rumsfeld, he was a director of
Gulfstream Aerospace. He also served on the board of America Online. Though not particularly
interested in participating in policy discussion groups—he was not involved with PNAC, or the
early meetings of Bush’s team with the Hoover Institution—Powell was a member of the
Bilderberg Group, the Atlantic Council, the American Academy of Diplomacy, and the Bretton
Woods Committee.
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Table 1. Prior Government, Corporate, and Policy-Planning Network Affiliations of Six Bush
Administration Officials
Name (position in
administration)

George W. Bush
(President)

Prior Senior
Positions in
Federal
Government
-

Dick Cheney
(Vice President)

Chief of Staff
(Ford)
Assistant to
Director of
the Office of
Economic
Opportunity
(Nixon)
Secretary of
Defense
(H.W. Bush)

Donald Rumsfeld
(Defense
Secretary)

Director Office of
Economic
Opportunity
(Nixon)
Chief of Staff
(Ford)
Secretary of
Defense
(Ford)
Middle East
Envoy
(Reagan)

Prior Corporate
Positions/Affiliations

Prior Policyplanning Network
Affiliations

Arbusto Energy
Spectrum 7
Texas Rangers
Halliburton
Proctor & Gamble
Union Pacific
Electr. Data Systems
Morgan Stanley
TRW
IGI Laboratories,
Inc.
US West, Inc.
Brandley, Woods &
Co

Hoover Institution

Gilead Sciences
General Instrument
Corp.
G.D. Searle &
Company
Gulfstream
Aerospace
ABB
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Council on Foreign
Relations
Jewish Institute for
National
Security
Affairs
Project for the New
American
Century
Center for Security
Policy
American
Enterprise
Institute
RAND
Project for the New
American
Century
Freedom House
Committee for the
Free World
National Academy
of Public
Administration
Gerald R. Ford
Foundation
Eisenhower
Exchange
Fellowships
National Security
Advisory
Group to the
Congressional
Leadership

Table 1 - continued
Paul Wolfowitz
(Deputy Defense
Secretary)

Condoleezza Rice
(National
Security Advisor)

Colin Powell
(Secretary of
State)

Deputy Assistant
Secretary of
Defense for
Regional
Programs
(Carter)
Assistant
Secretary of
State for East
Asian and
Pacific Affairs
(Reagan)
Undersecretary of
Defense for
Policy (H.W.
Bush)
Director and
Senior
Director of
Soviet and
East European
Affairs on the
National
Security
Council (H.W.
Bush)

Northrop Grumman

Committee to
Maintain a
Prudent
Defense
Policy
Project for the New
American
Century
Council on Foreign
Relations
Bilderberg Group
Trilateral
Commission
The Aspect
Institute

Chevron
Hewlett Packard
Transamerica
Corporation
JP Morgan
Charles Schwab

Freeman Spogli
Institute for
International
Studies
Hoover Institution
Carnegie
Corporation
Carnegie
Endowment for
International
Peace
RAND
Council on Foreign
Relations
Atlantic Council
Aspen Institute
William and Flora
Hewlett
Foundation

National Security
Advisor
(Reagan)
Chairman Joint
Chiefs of Staff
(H.W. Bush,
Clinton)

Gulfstream
Aerospace
America Online Inc.

Bilderberg Group
Atlantic Council
American
Academy of
Diplomacy
Bretton Woods
Committee
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The Bush Administration’s Think Tank-Corporate Interlocks

Table 1 lists the various think tank associations of the six administration officials
discussed in the last section. Most of these think tanks are in the “core group” described in
chapter 3. Among them, the most important in promoting regime change in Iraq were the Project
for the New American Century (PNAC), the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), and the Jewish
Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA). Though other core group think tanks later
supported the war—including the influential and bipartisan Council on Foreign Affairs (CFR)—
these three organizations pushed for invading Iraq beginning in the 1990s. They are the
neoconservative think tanks that provided sinecures for the neocons of the Bush administration
during the Clinton years and pushed for the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act.
Of these three, PNAC is the most important, as it led the charge for regime change and
was the think tank organization with the greatest number of personal links to the Bush
administration after the CFR (van Apeldoorn and de Graaff 2016:152). It was founded in 1997
by neoconservatives William Kristol (son of Irving Kristol) and Robert Kagan, an Ivy Leagueeducated historian. Its founding members included Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, I. Lewis
Libby, Richard Perle, and several other members of the second Bush administration. PNAC’s
membership largely overlapped with that of AEI and was stationed in an office at AEI’s
headquarters in Washington, DC. Its policies were therefore similar to AEI’s, but its members
created it to focus exclusively on foreign policy (AEI was more broadly focused) (Dorrien
2004:68). In 2000, one of PNAC’s four directors was Bruce Jackson, CEO of Lockheed Martin.
And in the late 1990s until 2000, PNAC and AEI were both funded by the Bradley Foundation, a
right-wing “charitable foundation” that sought to create extreme right political networks. They
also received funding from the Sarah Scaife and John M. Olin foundations, with funding from
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these three foundations accounting for most of their budgets in the mid-90s and early 2000s
(Downey 2015:246-247). While these think tanks also received funding from individuals and
corporations, Downey (2015:247) suggests that the influence of foundations on their politics was
considerable. In the late 1980s, AEI changed its leadership and moved to the right after the Olin
and Richardson foundations withdraw funding. Their funding was subsequently renewed after
these organizational and political changes.
JINSA is an Israel-focused think tank mostly concerned with advancing the hardline antiPalestinian and pro-settlement policies of Israel’s Likud right. A longstanding policy of this
political movement had been a plan to remove hostile Arab powers through military force
(Ahmad 2014). “JINSA has essentially recommended that ‘regime change’ in Iraq should be just
the beginning of a cascade of toppling dominoes in the Middle East,” writes William Hartung.
“If JINSA has its way, the Bush administration will use military means, covert operations, and
strong-arm diplomacy to foment ‘regime change’ not only in Iraq but also in Iran, Syria, Saudi
Arabia, and Egypt” (Hartung 2003:109). Dick Cheney and Douglas Feith were both JINSA
members. Also linking JINSA to the military-industrial complex were board members Admiral
Leon Edney, Admiral David Jeremiah, and Lieutenant General Charles May, each of whom also
worked for Northrop Grumman as a board member or paid consultant (Hartung 2003:111).

Summary: Power Elite Control of the Executive Branch

This survey reveals that the six most important officials in planning the Iraq War were
members of the power elite. However, prior corporate affiliations are not the most important
factors explaining the administration’s collective decision to invade Iraq, as some writers, such
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as van Apeldoorn and DeGraaff (2016) and Juhasz (2006) suggest that it is. Of these six officials,
all of them, with the exception of Bush, first held government, academic, or military positions
before taking office in 2001. Therefore, with the exception of Bush—who in any case had no
foreign policy experience prior to taking office—these officials had formulated their foreign
policy views while working in the federal government, not in the corporate world. And of the six
officials, only Cheney and Rice had close connections to the main corporate beneficiaries of the
Iraq War discussed in the last chapter: Halliburton, Lockheed Martin, Chevron, and JP Morgan.
None of the six officials had a direct working relationship with Bechtel prior to taking office.
However, since Cheney was by far the most powerful foreign policy decision-maker in the
administration—Bush largely deferred to him on foreign policy, and he staffed most of the
foreign policy bureaucracy—his corporate affiliations do largely explain the character of the
policies implemented in Iraq during the occupation, particularly the large number of contracts
that went to Halliburton and Lockheed Martin, and the decision to invade itself. Rice’s affiliation
with Chevron may also explain why it was one of the first corporate recipients of oil exploration
contracts in Iraq and was one of the major exporters of Iraqi oil in the years immediately after the
invasion. However, other major oil companies and contractors also benefited from the
occupation and restructuring of Iraq’s economy, even without prior direct links to administration
officials.
The role of previous government positions, careerism, and power lust are equally
significant factors explaining individual motives to invade Iraq on the part of the key architects.
Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Powell each held high-level Pentagon positions before
coming to the Bush Jr. administration, and Rice held a National Security Council position in the
H.W. Bush administration. Wolfowitz and Rice, though they started their careers in academia,
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were at that stage already closely linked to the Pentagon. As powerful managers of a vast defense
bureaucracy, all of them had personal interests in projecting US global military power and
supporting large defense budgets, which they did throughout their careers. In this they were
supported and enabled by W. Bush. While Cheney, Rumsfeld, and the neoconservatives favored
overthrowing Hussein by the mid-1990s, by the time they had taken office in 2001, it became
convenient for all Bush administration officials, including moderates on Iraq like Powell and
Rice, to support the invasion to preserve their own decision-making power (Rice would be
promoted to Secretary of State in 2006). Throughout their careers, all six officials—again, with
the partial exception of Bush—displayed the kind of personality traits required to advance in the
government foreign policy bureaucracy: a willingness to lie and deceive, inflate national security
threats, and shift perspective as convenient and necessary to maintain one’s post and the power
associated with it.
All members of the Bush administration were linked through conservative personal or
policy-planning networks. Bush was personally linked to Cheney, Rice, and Powell through his
father, and through the Hoover Institution. Cheney, in turn, was linked to Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld,
and Powell through prior working relationships in the H. W. Bush or Ford administrations.
Cheney and Rumsfeld were also closely associated with Wolfowitz and other neoconservatives
chosen for the administration. In turn, PNAC, AEI, and JINSA were each linked to the militaryindustrial complex through their boards of directors and their membership. Bradley Foundation
funding for these think tanks also shows the influence of the corporate elite on the decision to
invade Iraq.
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Conclusion

In this chapter I have shown how the decision to invade Iraq resulted from power elite
control of the executive branch, and the ways in which this control was exercised. These factors
should be considered in conjunction with the power the Bush administration was able to exert
over Congress by pushing for a war resolution in October 2002 just prior to the midterm
elections. In this way, too, the Bush administration power elite were able to consolidate their
control over the decision to invade Iraq, bypassing Congress’s constitutional mandate to declare
war.
There is no simple way to imagine a counterfactual scenario in which the Bush
administration was not a power elite constituency that would not violate the “minimum rewrite”
rule of counterfactual causal analysis. The simplest counterfactual possibility is that Bush might
have lost the 2000 election. The available evidence strongly suggests that if Al Gore had won the
election, the Iraq War would not have happened. Harvey (2012) investigates this question in his
explanatory account of the Iraq War. He concludes that the Bush administration’s specific
worldview and ideology are not the cause of the Iraq War, and that Gore would have invaded
Iraq, too. However, Harvey’s reasoning is built on factual errors. In particular, Harvey asserts
that the Bush administration did not manipulate intelligence on the WMD threat, and that
intelligence in other countries also showed that Iraq had WMDs. Both of these propositions are
simply false. The scholarly consensus is that the intelligence provided to rationalize invading
Iraq was either fabricated by the Bush administration or unreliable (see Pillar 2011). Military
aggression against Iraq only seemed defensible because the Bush administration lied about Iraq’s
WMD capabilities, its intention to attack the United States, and its relationship to al-Qaeda.
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There is no reason to believe that a Gore administration would have also fabricated such threats;
the Democratic Party policy preference for countering Iraq had been sanctions and containment
(Western 2005:182-183)
Invading Iraq only made sense in the context of the worldview and ideology of the Bush
administration. This ideology is the subject to which I now turn.
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CHAPTER 8

IMPERIALIST IDEOLOGY AND THE IRAQ WAR

According to the power elite model, ideology is a necessary condition to sustain
American imperialism and to start wars. The dominant ideology about American defense policy
that most heavily influences the way Americans think is formulated by the power elite. There are
variants of elite ideology pertaining to defense ranging from conservative isolationism,
conservative and liberal realism, liberal internationalism and multilateralism, to hardline
unilateralism, but all of these tend to share the same set of assumptions. These include: American
exceptionalism; the superiority of American-style democracy and capitalism and the right to
impose them on others; ubiquitous threats to national security; and that these threats challenge
the credibility of American military power. All forms of the dominant ideology assume the
United States has the right to intervene in any country to promote or defend its “national
interests.”
Most key foreign policy posts in the Bush administration were occupied by
neoconservatives, though Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld are not usually considered part of the
neoconservative network, and Condoleezza Rice and Colin Powell were entirely outside of it.
Yet, the key architects of the Iraq War were all hardline unilateralists who supported a similar
vision of US military, political, and economic primacy, and understood Iraq as constituting a
grave threat to US national security. In this chapter, I am principally concerned with describing
this shared ideology and showing how it contributed to the decision to invade Iraq. To do this, I
examine three main policy planning documents that ultimately informed Bush administration
foreign policy and the decision to invade Iraq. These include the 1992 Defense Planning
151

Guidance drafted by Wolfowitz and his aids for Cheney’s Defense Department; the 2000 Project
for the New American Century’s Rebuilding America’s Defenses; and the 2002 National Security
Strategy of the Bush administration. Because of the large number of neoconservatives in the
Bush administration, and the influence their ideology exerted on Bush’s defense policy, I also
outline the history of neoconservatism.
According to a power elite model, we would expect to find each element of American
imperialist ideology expressed in the three documents. We would also expect to find ideological
justifications for the Iraq War that reflect the interests of its planners as well their need to sell the
war to the public.

Bush’s Hardline Unilateralism: History and Characteristics

Neoconservativism is a brand of American conservative ideology that is above all
distinguished by “a radical expansive faith in American power,” according to Gary Dorrien
(2004:15) in his authoritative history of neoconservatism. By the 1990s, foreign policy had
become the central focus of neoconservatism. It advocated (and still advocates) the maintenance
and expansion of institutions that support unrivaled American global hegemony as the key to
national security and global stability. It advocates unrestrained foreign policy decision-making
power for the president; Congress, intelligence agencies, the media, the UN, and international
law and treaties are understood to be likely impediments to maintaining national security when
these slow or constrain the president’s ability to use military force to counteract imminent
threats, of which there are many. Aggressive military responses to alleged threats are thought to
be more efficacious than diplomacy. Neoconservatism aligns well with other forms of American
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conservatism in its rejection of strong welfare state measures and its nominal preference for
supply side economics.
Neoconservatism began as an intellectual deviation from and response to democratic
socialist and liberal social movements of the early 1970s. The name for the ideology was coined
by Michael Harrington, the American socialist and editor of Dissent magazine, to designate a
group of former allies who had broken with the Socialist Party over its stance on the Vietnam
War. Like the social democrats associated with Dissent, the neoconservatives were
anticommunist socialists. However, unlike the social democrats, most of them supported the
Vietnam War as an extension of their anticommunism. Harrington called them
“neoconservatives” to distinguish them from the socialists who opposed the war (Dorrien
2004:7).
“Most of the original neocons supported America’s war in Vietnam,” Dorrien explains,
“but more important, all were repulsed by America’s antiwar movement.”
To them it was appalling that the party of Harry Truman and John Kennedy
nominated George McGovern for president in 1972. They despaired over the
ascension of antiwar activism, feminism, and moralistic idealism in the
Democratic Party, which they called “McGovernism.” McGovernism stood for
appeasement and the politics of liberal guilt, whereas the neocons stood for a selfconfident and militantly interventionist Americanism. (Dorrien 2004:7)
The neoconservatives continued to support the Democratic Party until their presidential
candidate Henry “Scoop” Jackson was soundly defeated in the 1976 primary elections (Dorrien
2004:9).
Though they initially rejected the label—they did not associate with the racism and
isolationism of traditional American conservatism—the neoconservatives gradually adopted the
name as they shifted their allegiance to the Republican Party, realizing they had more in common
with conservative Republicans than Democrats. The first neoconservative to accept the label was
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Irving Kristol in 1972. Kristol, the influential editor of the New Republic, was also the first to
move to the Republican Party. The neoconservatives shifted decisively to the Republican Party
after Carter’s victory in 1976. Carter’s foreign policy represented the triumph of McGovernism
in the Democratic Party, the neoconservatives believed.
By the 1990s, after several of its affiliates held high-level positions in the Reagan and
Bush administrations, neoconservatism was the dominant trend in foreign policy thinking on the
Republican right. For the “neocons” of the 1990s, writes Dorrien,
neoconservatism was the form of mainstream American conservatism that stood
for growth, intervention, unilateralism, optimism, and the universality of the
American ideal. It usually espoused the ideology of democratic globalism, but
even its realist versions wanted to base foreign policy on the goal of sustaining
America’s global domination. And it controlled most of the right’s advocacy and
policy institutions, notably the Weekly Standard, Policy Review, Commentary,
The Public Interest, First Things, the National Interest, National Review,
American Spectator, Claremont Review of Books, American Enterprise, Journal
of Democracy, Public Opinion, Orbis, the editorial page of the Wall Street
Journal, the American Enterprise Institute, the Hoover Institution, the Manhattan
Institute, the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, the Center for Security
Policy, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Dorrien adds that “It was the neocons who got most of the conservative foundation money that
paid for think tanks, journals, research assistants, TV studios, and agents who got them on TV”
(Dorrien 2004:17).
For the Iraq War planners in the Bush administration who were ideologically inclined
towards conservative realism, such as Powell, Armitage, and Rice, an elective affinity existed
between their views and those of the neoconservatives. Powell shared the view held by most
neocons that America had prematurely withdrawn from the Vietnam War, and like the
neoconservatives, was concerned with regaining and then sustaining America’s military strength
after the American defeat in that conflict (Mann 2004:52). By 2000, as Bush’s campaign foreign
policy advisor, Rice (2000) also advocated unilateralism and US primacy. For their parts, even
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though they are not usually considered neoconservatives, Cheney and Rumsfeld held nearly
identical views to the neoconservatives, and they did so prior to September 11, 2001. That they
did is not surprising given that Rumsfeld was a close friend of Paul Nitze and shared his hardline
anticommunism, and Cheney was Rumsfeld’s protégé. Cheney and Rumsfeld’s hardline
unilateralism is traceable to and a development of the hardline anticommunism of the Cold War
period, as is neoconservatism.
The convergence of conservative realism and neoconservatism in the emergent
unilateralism of the Bush administration is visible over time in key policy planning documents
that influenced the Bush administration’s foreign policy, including its views on and approach to
Iraq. It is to these documents that I now turn.

The 1992 Defense Planning Guidance

The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) is a Defense Department report, typically issued
every two years, that is intended to instruct civilian Pentagon managers and military leaders on
how to prepare forces, budgets, and strategies for the next decade. The 1992 DPG was especially
important to policy makers because it was supposed to outline US grand strategy in the new postCold War world. At that time there were calls to reduce defense spending and yield a “peace
dividend” that would direct federal funds to domestic civilian programs and services. But the
Bush Sr. administration’s Defense Department was managed by Cheney, and staffed with other
Cold War hardliners—neoconservatives like Wolfowitz, Libby, and Khalilzad—who favored
sustaining high levels of military spending after the Cold War. Cheney directed Wolfowitz to
draft the DPG, who enlisted the help of Libby, Khalilzad, Perle, and Wohlstetter. A draft of the
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document was widely circulated among the top-level Pentagon managers before it was leaked to
the press by an official who thought it should be publicly debated.
The document’s authors called for an unrivaled US global domination in which the
United States insured the interests of other nations by pursuing its own national security and its
own interests around the world. They outlined two broad strategic objectives.
Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the
territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order
of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. This is a dominant consideration
underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to
prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would,
under consolidated control, be sufficient to gain global power. (Ehrenberg et al
2010:10)
One aspect of this first objective was that “the U.S. must show the leadership necessary to
establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that
they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their
legitimate interests” (Ehrenberg et al 2010:10).
The second overarching objective “is to address sources of regional conflict and
instability in such a way as to promote increasing respect for international law; limit international
violence; and encourage the spread of democratic forms of government and open economic
systems.” In working towards this objective, “the U.S. cannot become the world’s ‘policeman,’
by assuming responsibility for righting every wrong,” but
will retain the preeminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs
which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which
could seriously unsettle international relations. Various types of U.S. interests
may be involved in such instances: access to raw materials, primarily Persian Gulf
oil; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles; threats to
U.S. citizens from terrorism or regional or local conflict; and threats to U.S.
society from narcotics trafficking . . . (Ehrenberg et al 2010:10-11)
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Iraq is identified as a specific national security threat, and “In the Middle East and Southwest
Asia, our overall objective is to remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve
U.S. and Western access to the region's oil.” (New York Times 1992)
The DPG also emphasized unilateral militarism, and nowhere mentioned the United
Nations. While “coalitions hold considerable promise for promoting collective action,” the draft
notes, “we should expect future coalitions to be ad hoc assemblies, often not lasting beyond the
crisis being confronted, and in many cases carrying only general agreement over the objectives
to be accomplished” (Tyler 1992). Moreover, “The United States should be postured to act
independently when collective action cannot be orchestrated” and “may be faced with the
question of whether to take military steps to prevent the development or use of weapons of mass
destruction” (Tyler 1992).
The DPG embarrassed Bush, Baker, and Scowcroft for its brazen rejection of the postWorld War II international order, which was understood to be built on cooperation among states,
rather than hegemony by one superpower. Most senior members of the Bush administration
distanced themselves from the document; fearing the end of his career, Wolfowitz claimed he
never saw it before it was leaked. But Cheney, Powell, and the neoconservatives in the Defense
Department actually supported it. Powell openly, unapologetically defended it, built as it was on
his “base force” plan for post-Cold War national security. Powell, like Cheney, supported
sustaining high levels of military spending after the Cold War to maintain military primacy, and
preparing the military to meet a variety of regional threats, including Iraq, North Korea, and Iran.
Cheney had Libby prepare a revised DPG for public relations purposes, but the final version
Cheney left upon leaving the White House kept in place much of Wolfowitz’s language about
unilateralism (Dorrien 2004:37-43).
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The original DPG influenced the grand strategy articulated by the neoconservatives
throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s after they came to power in the White House.

The Project for the New American Century: Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces
and Resources for a New Century
In the 2000 presidential elections, PNAC’s members worried that Bush was not
proposing an aggressive enough foreign policy, influenced as he was by the realists on his
advisory committee (Shultz, Powell, and Rice). Chaired by Irving Kristol and directed by Robert
Kagan, Devon Gaffney Cross, Bruce Jackson, and John Bolton, the group produced a detailed
position paper called Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy Forces and Resources for a New
Century, which they hoped would influence Bush’s foreign policy and his cabinet appointments
if he won the election (Dorrien 2004:136-137). Written on behalf of PNAC, the document’s
principal author was Thomas Donnelly, with project co-chairs Donald Kagan and Gary Schmitt.
The major thrust of the argument advanced in Rebuilding America’s Defenses is that
unless the next president dramatically increases defense spending, the United States will not be
able to sustain its military supremacy, and the post-Cold War global “Pax Americana” will be
lost. The new president “must increase military spending to preserve American geopolitical
leadership,” the document reads, “or he must pull back from the security commitments that are
the measure of America’s position as the world’s sole superpower and the final guarantee of
security, democratic freedoms and individual rights” (Donnelly 2000:4). The assumption
throughout the document is that American military supremacy has preserved a global peace in
the 1990s, but that certain states, such as Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and China, wish to undermine
both (Donnelly 2000:i, iii). These states are likely to be increasingly dangerous to the global
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order in the twenty-first century, so the belief that military spending and supremacy can be
relaxed in the post-Cold War period is not warranted.
The document was written in the spirit of the 1992 DPG, for “the basic tenets of the
DPG, in our judgment, remain sound” (Donnelly 2000:ii). Like the DPG, Rebuilding emphasizes
numerous threats to the global order and American national security. “[W]ith Europe now
generally at peace, the new strategic center of concern appears to be shifting to East Asia.”
Therefore, “The missions for America’s armed forces have not diminished so much as shifted.
The threats may not be as great, but there are more of them” (Donnelly 2000:3). In fact, “there
has been no shortage of powers around the world who have taken the collapse of the Soviet
empire as an opportunity to expand their own influence and challenge the American-led security
order” (Donnelly 2000:1) (In this regard, the end of the Cold War is blamed for Hussein’s
invasion of Kuwait.) If the United States fails to keep these “powers” at bay, moreover, the
“credibility” of American military power will be in question: “A retreat from any one of these
requirements [to maintain regional “stability”] would call America’s status as the world’s leading
power into question” (Donnelly 2000:5). Elsewhere in the document readers are told that “The
true cost of not meeting our defense requirements will be a lessened capacity for American
global leadership and, ultimately, the loss of a global security order that is uniquely friendly to
American principles and prosperity.” (Donnelly 2000:v). So, not only will American power be
weakened, but so too will American “principles” (i.e., commitments to democracy, freedom, and
capitalism) and American national wealth—if the president does not commit to adding $15 to
$20 billion per year to the defense budget, and making strategic preparations as outlined by
PNAC. These include “defending the homeland,” especially from the threat of ballistic missiles
and WMDs; achieving the ability to fight two large-scale wars simultaneously; military
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technological “modernization”; and maintaining “constabulary” forces—preserving peace in
regions like the Balkans and in the north and south of Iraq.
In an oft-quoted passage from Rebuilding, the authors remark that “the process of
transformation . . . is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event-like a
new Pearl Harbor” (Donnelly 2000:51).

The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States

The neoconservatives got their new Pearl Harbor on September 11, 2001. A year later, as
the administration was ramping up its propaganda campaign to sell the Iraq War, it released its
National Security Strategy (NSS). It was nominally authored by Bush, but it was written by
Condoleezza Rice. The NSS was apparently intended to begin priming the public for the
unilateral approach the administration was prepared to take in attacking Iraq, and the notion of a
preemptive war in self-defense against unconventional weapons and terrorists.
Bush began by noting that the Cold War ended in victory for “the forces of freedom”
(e.g., the United States) and a “single sustainable model for national success: freedom,
democracy, and free enterprise.” “These values of freedom,” the document continues, “are right
and true for every person, in every society—and the duty of protecting these values against their
enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving people across the globe and across the ages . .
.” (Bush 2002:no page number). The United States must use military force to promote a “balance
of power” that favors such freedom, and it must stand for “the rule of law; limits on the absolute
power of the state; free speech” and so on.
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There are two important enemies standing in the way of a global order that favors
freedom: terrorists and “rogue states” that may also harbor terrorists. These threats, the NSS
explains, are different from those of the past in that they are imminent threats that could harm
Americans at any moment. Therefore, to defend itself, the United States may need to resort to
unilateral, preemptive action: “While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support
of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our
right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing
harm against our people and our country” (Bush 2002). Regarding Iraq, the NSS says “At the
time of the Gulf War, we acquired irrefutable proof that Iraq’s designs were not limited to the
chemical weapons it had used against Iran and its own people, but also extended to the
acquisition of nuclear weapons and biological agents” (Bush 2002). Of course, the NSS doesn’t
mention that the United States assisted Iraq in the use of chemical weapons, nor does it cite the
evidence that Iraq had disarmed itself of WMDs by the end of the 1990s. “Given the goals of
rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we
have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and
the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do
not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first” (Bush 2002). Deterrence and
containment must therefore be superseded by a more aggressive approach. After the 9/11
terrorist attacks, this was likely to hold a superficial plausibility for many Americans.
According to international law preemptive war is legal, the NSS claims, because terrorists
and rogue states constitute “imminent threats.” Whereas as an imminent threat usually
constitutes “a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack,” the
concept must be adjusted “to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.” “Rouge
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states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks
would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass
destruction—weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without
warning” (Bush 2002).
Preemptive wars are in self-defense and in defense of allies, of course, and in the service
of peace. Therefore, “We must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge” (Bush 2002).
And, “To contend with uncertainty and to meet the many security challenges we face, the United
States will require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as
well as temporary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of U.S. forces . . .”
(Bush 2002). The United States must continue to sustain its global empire, in other words.

Conclusion

These documents illustrate that the architects of the Iraq War had developed a worldview
long before coming to office in 2001 that could justify, however implausibly, a war against Iraq,
both internally to policy planners and to the public. Their shared ideology emphasized the
importance of American global hegemony—political, economic, and military. This “benevolent
global hegemony,” as neoconservatives Irving Kristol and Robert Kagan referred to it, was
understood to guarantee world peace and promote the interests of all other countries. Ensuring
US and Western access to Persian Gulf oil was central to this worldview, though in the more
public articulation of the 2002 NSS, this is left out. For the American public, the threat of
terrorism and rogue states could serve to justify global military domination and preemptive war,
even if it meant that policy planners had to lie about the threat of WMDs. Presumably, the Bush
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administration understood that access to oil would not be a legitimate casus belli for the general
public, but could count on public ignorance about international law and propaganda about
weapons of mass destruction to gather their support for preemptive war. Of course, their own
ideology emphasized that preemptive and unilateral wars are legal within the framework of
international law.
The analysis of these documents reveals a nearly perfect symmetry with the ideal typical
ideology outlined in chapter 3. What was innovative about and specific to the Bush
administration’s hardline unilateralism was its more or less open rejection of international norms
of cooperation through the multilateral institutions and open rejection of international law in its
formulation of preemptive war. In most other regards, the administration’s ideology shares much
in common with that of previous administrations and other strains of American imperial
ideology. American exceptionalism is implied throughout these planning documents: the United
States is the “final guarantor” of world peace; its values are universally valid for all people and
nations; it only fights wars in self-defense; it defends and works within the parameters of
international law; and so on. The United States must promote democracy, capitalism, and
“freedom.” There are ubiquitous enemies that may attack at any time. The threat these enemies
posed was dramatically exaggerated, of course: Iraq did not possess WMDs; it was not six
months away from developing nuclear weapons; it did not possess the capability to attack the
United States with biological weapons; it was not linked to al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, or the
9/11 attacks; and it was cooperating with UN weapons inspectors. The doctrine of credibility was
also in the background of Bush administration policy planning. Finally, US and Bush
administration personnel complicity in Iraq’s past WMD crimes against Iran and Iraqi Kurds is
absent from the Bush administration’s worldview.
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The Iraq War would not have happened if the Bush administration had not crafted the
ideology that it did and acted upon it. If the administration had believed in working within the
framework of existing international law, for instance, it would not have started the Iraq War. For
international law holds that war is only to be taken in response to an armed attack or if
authorized by the United Nations Security Council (Friel and Falk 2004:2). The administration’s
longstanding commitment to global military domination—to the unconstrained pursuit of its own
perceived “national interests”—outside of the framework of multilateral institutions and
international law, justified to the key war planners the decision to invade Iraq without the legal
mandate of the Security Council and without credible evidence of an imminent threat. Within the
ideological universe of the administration’s thinking, Iraq, as a major oil-producing country, was
thought to be of central importance to a world political, economic, and military order controlled
by the United States. Hussein was perceived as a challenge to this order, so it was reasonable to
remove his regime from power and replace it with one that would be receptive to American
interests in Iraq’s oil.
Much of the American public, ideologically predisposed to support a militaristic foreign
policy, could agree with the decision as long as it was premised on the claims that Iraq posed an
imminent threat to the United States, that Iraq was somehow responsible for 9/11, and that the
Bush administration’s intentions for a post-Hussein Iraq were to bring democracy and capitalism
to the country, which could be reasonably assumed to be good for its people and its national
development. It is reasonable to surmise that if the administration had not inflated the threat of
Iraq—indeed, fabricated it entirely—Congress and the public would not have supported the war.
Nor would Congress and the public have supported the war if Cheney’s actual intentions for the
military occupation phase were made public.
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Of course, ideology cannot influence the public by itself. It requires mediums. These are
the subjects of the following two chapters.
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CHAPTER 9

ELITE MEDIA BIAS, PUBLIC OPINION, AND THE IRAQ WAR

In the runup to the Iraq War, the American media did not all become outlets of
neoconservative ideology per se. But it is infamous that the news media, including “liberal”
outlets such as the New York Times and the Washington Post, tended to cover the war debate in a
way that did not challenge the Bush administration’s claims and that privileged their arguments
over those of dissenters, including officials and analysts who had worked on Iraq and were in a
position to know that the administration was lying its way into war. In an already militaristic
post-9/11 climate, this helped facilitate broad public support among Americans for the war
effort.
An elite model of war mobilization postulates that the media behaved this way due to
structural features of the corporate media identified by a propaganda model: (1) size and
concentrated ownership of media corporations; (2) corporate advertising; (3) dependence on
official sources in government; (4) disciplining flak; and (5) dominant ideology. We would
expect to find that these institutional constraints led to self-censorship and conformity to the
Bush administration’s line among journalists and reporters covering the politics of the Iraq War.
And we would expect to find evidence that the media amplified the Bush administration’s
sustained propaganda campaign demonizing Saddam Hussein, which began in January 2002,
intensifying in September 2002 until the launch of the war in March 2003. And following an
elite model of war mobilization, we would expect public opinion in favor of the war to increase
with the intensity of the propaganda effort. Providing evidence to support these assertions is the
goal of this chapter.
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The chapter begins with an outline of the general characteristics of the media’s coverage
of the conflict with Iraq in 2002 and 2003 and a discussion of known explanations for the
character of this coverage. I then present a more focused analysis of the media’s coverage of key
Bush administration claims and evidence available at the time that would have cast doubt on
these claims. Throughout the analysis, I consider the movement of public opinion in favor or
against the use of military force against Iraq as the debate in the federal government and media
unfolded.

General Characteristics of Media Coverage of Iraq Prior to the Iraq War and Explanatory
Factors
That the mass media tended to support the Bush administration’s propaganda is
uncontroversial; the story of the American media’s supportive coverage in the buildup to the Iraq
War has been told many times by different analysts (e.g., Exoo 2010; Friel and Falk 2004;
Massing 2004; Moeller 2004; Western 2005:175-219). The balance of evidence indicates that the
media tended to support the Bush administration’s perspective on Iraq’s alleged unconventional
weapons, its threat to the United States and connection to al-Qaeda, and the legality of
preemptive war. In newspapers, critical reporting was typically buried in the back pages, and
facts that challenged administration perspectives were usually glossed over in the context of the
administration’s narrative. Thus, the picture conveyed by the media was that Iraq possessed
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including chemical and biological weapons; it had an
active nuclear weapons program; Saddam Hussein intended to use WMD against the United
States; and that because Iraq posed such an imminent threat, preemptive war was legal and
legitimate, even if it didn’t have the support of the United Nations.
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The reasons the media performed this way are also well known. Most importantly, the
Bush administration made a deliberate effort to market the war to the public and to coopt the
mass media in this effort (Pillar 2011; Western 2005). This involved the careful control and
manipulation of information made available to reporters. As Michael Massing notes in his oftcited press critique in the New York Review of Books, the management of information “could
take both positive forms—rewarding sympathetic reporters with leaks, background interviews,
and seats on official flights—and negative ones—freezing out reporters who didn’t play along.”
He added that “In a city where access is all, few wanted to risk losing it” (Massing 2004:46).
Moreover, the Bush administration held few press conferences that would create opportunities
for interrogation from critical reporters.
Another aspect of the propaganda campaign involved carefully timed public speeches to
bolster public support and counter criticism. Examples include Bush’s 2002 “Axis of Evil” State
of the Union speech, only four months after 9/11, and three months after the invasion of
Afghanistan, when polls showed that Americans largely supported military action against Iraq
(Western 2005:192-193); Bush’s speech at West Point on June 1, 2002, intended to prime the
public for preemptive war against Iraq; Cheney’s August speech to the Veterans of Foreign
Wars, intended to rebut arguments against the war advanced by former White House officials
James Baker and Brent Scowcroft (Woodward 2004:163); and Bush’s speech at the United
Nations on September 12, which occurred one year after the 9/11 attacks, and just after the
administration began to vigorously push the case for war.
The propaganda campaign also involved a Pentagon-managed program to recruit retired
generals to promote the war on the major television networks, particularly Fox News, NBC, and
CNN, though the “analysts,” as they were called, appeared on all major network stations. Many
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of the recruits held management positions in defense firms that sought to win contracts from the
Iraq War or were lobbyists for the defense industry, though most of them did not disclose
conflicts of interest to the networks or to the public. The recruits were given access to Pentagon
meetings where Rumsfeld gave Power Point presentations on the talking points of the
propaganda campaign. According to David Barstow, who broke the story about the program in
the New York Times in 2008, the program managers “marveled at the way the analysts
seamlessly incorporated material from talking points and briefings as if it was their own.” One
insider quoted in Barstow’s investigation said the analysts were “taking verbatim what the
secretary [of Defense] was saying or what the technical specialists were saying” and “saying it
over and over and over” (Barstow 2008) on the major network television stations.
The Pentagon propaganda program reinforced the media’s normal tendency to rely on
“official experts” for foreign policy analysis. In the elite press—outlets like the New York Times
and Washington Post—reporters tended to rely on high-level government officials and unreliable
Iraqi defectors, particularly those associated with the Iraqi National Congress (Kurtz 2004;
Western 2005:214).
A related factor that limited critical voices from reaching the media was that Democrats
in Congress largely supported the administration’s Iraq policy out of fear that criticizing a
popular president prior to midterm elections would hurt their chances for reelection. This was
especially true of the most senior Democratic senators, potential presidential candidates like
Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden, and John Kerry, who did run against Bush in 2004. Bush had very
high approval ratings after 9/11 and the public largely believed that the Republican Party was
stronger on national security than the Democratics. Congressional Democrats therefore could not
afford to appear “soft” on Iraq in the period just after 9/11. The consequence of this for the
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media was that there were fewer official sources they could interview with alternative
perspectives on the administration’s case for war (Massing 2004:46).
One more factor constraining media coverage to the administration perspective was flak
from conservative media outlets like Fox News and the neoconservative Weekly Standard, from
popular right-wing pundits like Rush Limbaugh, and from angry readers. The conservative
media, which overwhelmingly supported the administration, branded journalists who strayed
from the Bush administration’s line as “traitors” or “liberals,” while angry readers wrote hate
mail and threats to outlets that were sometimes critical of the Bush administration, such as the
Washington Post (Kurtz 2004). Rather than risking their careers and reputations, many
journalists chose not to criticize the administration (Massing 2004: 46-47).

Specific Characteristics of Media Coverage and the Movement of Public Opinion

Having already begun planning for the invasion of Iraq upon taking office, when in
November 2001 public opinion heavily favored military action against Iraq, the Bush
administration sought to ensure sustained public support through the invasion of Afghanistan,
after which preparation for Iraq would begin. Three fourths of Americans, according to Gallup
polls, supported invading Iraq to remove Hussein (Newport 2001). After the confrontations with
Iraq in the 1990s, when Hussein was seen as an aggressor, was alleged to have attempted an
assassination of George H. W. Bush, and was portrayed as uncooperative with UN weapons
inspectors, the American public in the early 2000s was already predisposed to see Hussein as an
enemy (Western 2005:192-193).

170

The media and intellectual class were similarly predisposed. In December 2001, Judith
Miller published a front-page story in the New York Times that featured interviews with Iraqi
defectors and former weapons inspectors who alleged that Iraq was still pursuing WMDs,
including nuclear weapons. The dramatic headline read: “A NATION CHALLENGED:
SECRET SITES; Iraqi Tells of Renovations at Sites for Chemical and Nuclear Arms” (Miller
2001). Miller had been writing about Iraq since the early 90s and in 1998 met with Ahmed
Chalabi, who connected her with Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri—her source for the December
article—and other defectors. By 2000, she had established connections with several defectors
who provided accounts of Iraq’s unconventional weapons programs and efforts to hide them. Her
articles would draw on these sources to amplify the Bush administration’s propaganda campaign
throughout 2002 and 2003.
After the “axis of evil” state of the union address, the media began to increase coverage
of Iraq’s alleged WMD programs and defiance of UN resolutions. According to Western’s
account, though there was some critical commentary on Bush’s speech, “Some of the most
influential news organizations sided with the hardliners’ portrayal of Iraq as the most immediate
threat to the United States. The Washington Post, for example, warned that ‘Iraq, busy rebuilding
its weapons of mass destruction in the absence of U.N. inspectors, represents the most immediate
threat, and the . . . tool of forcible regime change—of military actions—must also be
considered’” (Western 2005:196).
In addition to amplifying the administration’s message, throughout this period the media
also committed significant acts of omission that supported the administration’s push for war.
According to media analysts Edward S. Herman and David Peterson, the media did not at any
time cover the 2002 bombings of Iraq. “Remarkably,” they write, “although Iraq complained
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about these offensive breaches of the peace, nobody [in the media] paid attention, despite the fact
that Iraq filed documentation about them on a regular basis with the UN Security Council and the
Secretary-General, as it had been doing for many years” (Herman and Peterson 2011:36).
Massing observes that in the summer of 2002 there was little coverage of the debate in the
intelligence community about the administration’s use of data about Iraq (Massing 2004:25-26).
“Before the war, for instance, there was a loud debate among intelligence analysts over the
information provided to the Pentagon by Iraq opposition leader Ahmed Chalabi and defectors
linked to him. Yet little of this seeped into the press,” Massing (2004:26) writes. Another major
omission that occurred in the New York Times involved the legality of preemptive war with Iraq.
Friel and Falk (2004:15) observe that none of the Times’ seventy editorials on Iraq between
September 11, 2001, and March 21, 2003, mention the words “UN Charter” or “international
law.” Key legal facts, such as the fact that possession of unconventional weapons was not a legal
casus belli, were not discussed in these editorials (Friel and Falk 2004:19-20).
When the administration ramped up its propaganda campaign in September, part of its
strategy was to leak information to Judith Miller at the New York Times, and then cite her articles
to support the case for war on public television and at the United Nations. On September 8, the
Times published Miller’s front-page story, coauthored with Michael Gordon, entitled “US Says
Hussein Intensifies Quest for A-Bomb Parts.” The article’s first paragraph announced that
More than a decade after Saddam Hussein agreed to give up weapons of mass
destruction, Iraq has stepped up its quest for nuclear weapons and has embarked
on a worldwide hunt for materials to make an atomic bomb, Bush administration
officials said today. (Gordon and Miller 2002)
The officials in question worked in the White House Iraq Group. The materials, Gordon and
Miller explained, included thousands of aluminum tubes intended for use in the manufacture of
centrifuges to enrich uranium. While they qualified their reporting by noting that Iraq was “not
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on the verge of deploying a nuclear weapon,” they emphasized the administration’s perspective
and recycled the White House Iraq Group talking points:
Hard-liners are alarmed that American intelligence underestimated the pace and
scale of Iraq's nuclear program before Baghdad's defeat in the gulf war. Conscious
of this lapse in the past, they argue that Washington dare not wait until analysts
have found hard evidence that Mr. Hussein has acquired a nuclear weapon. The
first sign of a ''smoking gun,'' they argue, may be a mushroom cloud. (Gordon and
Miller 2002)
Here, the Times amplified the neoconservative view that intelligence about Iraq’s unconventional
weapons had been historically unreliable and that preemptive action was necessary to prevent
Hussein from acquiring nuclear weapons and altering the “strategic balance in the oil-rich
Persian Gulf.” The morning that Gordon and Miller’s article was published, Cheney, Rumsfeld,
Powell, and Rice appeared on the Sunday morning talk shows where they referred to Gordon and
Miller’s article. On CNN’s Late Edition, Rice repeated that “We don’t want the smoking gun to
be a mushroom cloud,” a phrase the administration intoned in subsequent interviews and press
conferences.
Bush delivered his speech to the United Nations General Assembly on September 12,
warning that Iraq attempted to buy aluminum tubes to enrich uranium, possessed chemical and
biological weapons, and was therefore in breach of UN resolutions to disarm. The speech was
endorsed by the editorial boards of the leading papers (Western 2004:203-204). The editors of
the New York Times, for instance, wrote that “President Bush gave some welcome coherence to
Washington's policy yesterday in a strong and, for the most part, sensible speech to the United
Nations.” They simply assumed Iraqi unconventional weapons capabilities were a matter of fact:
“Iraq, with its storehouses of biological toxins, its advanced nuclear weapons program, its
defiance of international sanctions and its ambitiously malignant dictator, is precisely the kind of
threat the that the United Nations was established to deal with” (New York Times 2002).
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Remarkably, what had only six days earlier been a stalled “quest for a-bomb parts” was now an
“advanced nuclear weapons program”!
The New York Times and the press in general privileged the administration’s perspective,
even as dissenters tried to reach the press with theirs. In the days after the Times published
Gordon and Miller’s September 8 article, David Albright, a physicist and former weapons
inspector who directed the Institute for Science and Security, spoke with Miller several times in
an effort to correct what he thought was unbalanced reporting on the intelligence community’s
assessment of the aluminum tubes. Albright knew Miller well; in 1998 he had linked her with an
Iraqi defector who worked with him at the Institute. He was also intimately familiar with the
aluminum tubes question, having been contacted by a government official to investigate the
tubes after they were intercepted in 2001. According to Albright and experts in the US
Department of Energy and the IAEA, the tubes were more likely for building rockets than
centrifuges. According to Massing (2004:36), who interviewed him, “Reading the September 8
article, Albright felt it was important the Times take note of these dissenting views” (Massing
2004:36).
Miller and Gordon published a follow-up article on September 13, but again emphasized
the administration’s views, and downplayed the split in the intelligence community. They did not
quote Albright or any other official who disagreed with the CIA and the administration.
“Senior officials acknowledged yesterday that there have been debates among intelligence
experts about Iraq's intentions in trying to buy such tubes,” Miller and Gordon noted, “but added
that the dominant view in the administration was that the tubes were intended for use in gas
centrifuges to enrich uranium.” According to senior officials, they continued, “George J. Tenet,
the director of central intelligence, has been adamant that tubes recently intercepted en route to
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Iraq were intended for use in a nuclear program . . . They also said it was the intelligence
agencies' unanimous view that the type of tubes that Iraq has been seeking are used to make such
centrifuges” (Gordon and Miller 2002b). The debate about their intended use, however, was only
a “footnote, not a split” in the intelligence community, according to the anonymous senior
official quoted by Gordon and Miller.
Frustrated with Gordon and Miller’s reporting, Albright took his story to Joby Warrick at
the Washington Post. Warrick did write an article about the debate in the intelligence community
and apparent efforts on the part of senior officials to quiet dissent among intelligence analysts,
but it was placed on page A-18, and “caused little stir,” according to Massing (Massing 2004:3839). As Massing recounts, by mid-October, the press did begin to run some reports questioning
the administration’s case for war. Feith’s secret intelligence unit was also revealed at this time
and reported in a front-page article in the New York Times. But overall, according to Massing, “A
survey of the coverage in November, December, and January reveals relatively few articles about
the debate inside the intelligence community. Those articles that did run tended to appear on the
inside pages. Most investigative energy was directed at stories that supported, rather than
challenged, the administration’s case” (Massing 2004:45). This finding was supported by an
analysis in the Washington Post of its own coverage (Kurtz 2008).
Another figure who spoke out against the administration was Scott Ritter, a retired
Marine and former UNSCOM Iraq chief weapons inspector. Ritter campaigned vigorously
throughout 2002 and 2003 to challenge the Bush administration’s claims about Iraq’s WMDs.
According to Ritter, Iraq had “qualitatively” disarmed itself of WMDs, and could pose no threat
to the United States. In a July 20, 2002 Boston Glob article, Ritter wrote that
While we were never able to provide 100 percent certainty regarding the
disposition of Iraq's proscribed weaponry, we did ascertain a 90-95 percent level
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of verified disarmament. This figure takes into account the destruction or
dismantling of every major factory associated with prohibited weapons
manufacture, all significant items of production equipment, and the majority of
the weapons and agent produced by Iraq. (Ritter 2002)
Ritter was given space in the Boston Globe and independent news outlets like In These Times
(Healy 2002), but his assessment was disparaged by Barry Bearak of the New York Times, who
accused Ritter of having an “Iraq complex” and a “messianic side” for criticizing the
administration, and holding that the United States should adhere to international law and the US
Constitution (Bearak 2002).
Albright, Ritter, and many other experts were available and willing to provide an
alternative perspective to news reporters on Bush’s case for war against Iraq. One of the few
news companies in the United States that did give such dissenters significant attention was the
small company then called Knight-Ridder, along with some of its associated newspapers around
the country. Warren Strobel and Jonathan Landay interviewed several military officers,
intelligence professionals, and diplomats who told them about their “deep misgivings” about the
impending war with Iraq. Strobel wrote that
These officials charge that administration hawks have exaggerated evidence of the
threat that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein poses—including distorting his links to
the al-Qaida terrorist network—have overstated the amount of international
support for attacking Iraq and have downplayed the potential repercussions of a
new war in the Middle East.
They charge that the administration squelches dissenting views and that
intelligence analysts are under intense pressure to produce reports supporting the
White House's argument that Saddam poses such an immediate threat to the
United States that pre-emptive military action is necessary. (Strobel 2002)
The officials interviewed by Strobel and Landay challenged many of the specific factual claims
made by administration officials. But besides the Knight-Ridder chain and alternative news
outlets like In These Times, The Nation, or Democracy Now!, the debate in the intelligence
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community and federal government about the intelligence the administration was using to justify
an invasion was virtually invisible.
The effect of such media coverage in the fall of 2002 was almost certainly to increase
public opinion in favor of military action against Iraq. Once debate about the potential costs of
the war began, public opinion in favor of war fell to only 53 percent in August. But by the end of
September, it increased to 58 per cent. About 80 percent of the public now believed Iraq had
unconventional weapons and 62 percent believed Hussein was planning to use them against the
United States (Western 2004:204-205). By early October, two-thirds of Americans believed that
Hussein was involved in the 9/11 attacks, and 79 percent of them believed that Iraq was on the
verge of acquiring nuclear weapons (Western 2004:210). The propaganda campaign was
apparently having the desired effect.
Another major media distortion involved coverage of the UN weapons inspection process
in early 2003.
On January 27, Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei reported to the UN about the ongoing
weapons inspections that began in December. Blix’s report was critical of Iraq and carefully
worded. He noted that “Iraq appears not to have come to genuine acceptance—not even today—
of the disarmament which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the
confidence of the world and live in peace” (Blix 2003). The reason for this was that Iraq had not
cooperated in certain procedural aspects, namely guaranteeing safe passage for surveillance
planes and helicopters, and preventing public protests. Blix also noted shortcomings in
substantial cooperation pertaining to documentation of the elimination of weapons. However, he
began by noting that
Iraq has on the whole cooperated rather well so far with UNMOVIC in this
field. The most important point to make is that access has been provided to all
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sites we have wanted to inspect and with one exception it has been prompt. We
have further had great help in building up the infrastructure of our office in
Baghdad and the field office in Mosul. Arrangements and services for our plane
and our helicopters have been good. The environment has been workable. (Blix
2003)
ElBaradei’s report on the search for nuclear weapons was less equivocal than Blix’s
report. ElBaradei maintained that the IAEA had confiscated and destroyed all elements of Iraq’s
nuclear weapons program by 1994, and that in December 1998, when it was forced to leave Iraq
due to the US bombing, “we were confident that we had not missed any significant component of
Iraq’s nuclear programme” (ElBaradei 2003). His conclusion and central finding was that “we
have to date found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons programme since the
elimination of the programme in the 1990s” (ElBaradei 2003).
In news reports and editorials on these presentations, the New York Times misrepresented
their substance in a way that made them appear to fit the Bush agenda (Friel and Falk 2004:2531). In writing about Blix’s speech, the Times implicitly assumed that Iraq had unconventional
weapons, and emphasized its lack of cooperation. In her front-page story entitled “Inspector Says
Iraq Falls Short,” in the lead paragraph, Julia Preston wrote that Blix “gave a broadly negative
report today on Iraq’s cooperation with two months of inspections, providing support to the Bush
administration’s campaign to disarm Iraq by force if necessary” (Preston 2003). While the
editorial board noted that Blix “had not yet uncovered hard evidence that conclusively proved
that Iraq is developing prohibited weapons,” a few sentences later, they asserted that “Without
Baghdad’s full cooperation, inspectors cannot disarm Iraq.” “Secretary of State Colin Powell,”
they added, “warned Baghdad yesterday that not much time remains to begin disarming” (New
York Times 2003d). Though Preston dedicated one paragraph to ElBaradei’s key finding
regarding nuclear weapons, the editors did not mention it, noting instead that ElBaradei “pointed
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to important unanswered questions” about Iraq’s nuclear program. Friel and Falk (2004:25-26)
correctly observe that ElBaradei’s only specific unanswered questions concerned the status of
Iraq’s nuclear program prior to 1991, and did not bear on the key finding that Iraq had disarmed.
The Times did not mention this detail.
In editorializing on ElBaradei’s February 14 UN report, the New York Times again did
not mention his key finding that no nuclear weapons program existed in Iraq—which affirmed
his January 27 report—and again implied that it possessed unconventional weapons, even though
this was never an assertion made by Blix or ElBaradei. The editorial also contained outright
falsehoods:
What should not be missed is that the positive aspects of the reports dealt largely
with secondary matters like process and access. On the essential issue of active
Iraqi cooperation in the disclosure and destruction of prohibited unconventional
weapons, the inspectors could find little encouraging to say. (New York Times
2003b)
That the IAEA was confident that Iraq had no nuclear weapons program was not a “secondary
matter,” but the key finding of its inspections with regard to UN Resolution 1441. And in his
January 27 UN report, ElBaradei stated categorically that Iraq had fully cooperated in
inspections. Moreover, in the February 14 report itself, he again stated categorically that “Iraq
has continued to provide immediate access to all locations” (Friel and Falk 2004:28).
On March 8, the day after Blix and ElBaradei reported again to the Security Council that
no proscribed weapons had been found, and that Iraq had improved cooperation with inspectors
and destroyed banned missiles, the New York Times editorial board finally acknowledged what
had been the central findings of the inspections all along:
The main message from Hans Blix was that Iraqi cooperation has increased in
recent days and weeks, and that Iraq has begun to move beyond access and
procedural questions to the actual destruction of prohibited weapons, notably the
bulldozing of missiles that exceed the range permitted by the United Nations. On
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the crucial question of nuclear weapons, the other chief inspector, Mohamed
ElBaradei, went further, saying that so far he had found no evidence that Iraq had
restarted the nuclear weapons programs it had been forced to abandon more than a
decade ago. He also reported that claims made by Washington and others that Iraq
had recently made illegal purchases of uranium and prohibited nuclear
components had been investigated and found to be unsubstantiated. (New York
Times 2003a)
Yet, in the next sentence, the editors simply assumed, once again, and without evidence, that Iraq
nevertheless had unconventional weapons and was refusing to disarm: “Baghdad is still a very
long way from living up to the Security Council's demand for it to give up its unconventional
weapons” (New York Times 2003a). Moreover, even though the Times editors did finally
acknowledge the key findings of the inspections, at this stage it was too late to influence the
debate, as it was now clear that the administration would soon start the war.
In striking contrast to its coverage of Blix and ElBaradei’s reports was the media’s
coverage of Powell’s UN speech on February 5. Echoing then Senator Joe Biden’s assessment of
the speech—which was shared by many congressional Democrats who favorably received
Powell’s speech—the Washington Post published an editorial titled “Irrefutable.” “After
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's presentation to the United Nations Security Council
yesterday, it is hard to imagine how anyone could doubt that Iraq possesses weapons of mass
destruction,” the editors began. “Mr. Powell left no room to argue seriously that Iraq has
accepted the Security Council's offer of a ‘final opportunity’ to disarm. And he offered a
powerful new case that Saddam Hussein's regime is cooperating with a branch of the al Qaeda
organization that is trying to acquire chemical weapons and stage attacks in Europe”
(Washington Post 2003b). The New York Times editorial board, though more tempered than the
Post’s, cautioned that the United States should “let diplomacy work,” but called the speech
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“convincing” and wrote that “It may not have produced a ‘smoking gun,’ but it left little question
that Mr. Hussein had tried hard to conceal one” (New York Times 2003c).
The propaganda campaign continued to move public opinion to support the
administration’s war effort. On February 5, 2003, after Powell’s speech, a Washington Post-ABC
News poll showed that 61 percent of Americans thought the administration presented enough
evidence to support a military invasion and that 61 percent believed Iraq was trying to develop
nuclear weapons (Washington Post 2003a). Other polls showed that 87 percent were convinced
or thought it was likely that Iraq was supporting al-Qaeda (Western 2005:214). Gallup showed
that support for war increased to 63 percent in February, immediately after Powell’s speech, and
in March, 64 percent supported invading Iraq, with 33 percent opposed (Jones 2003).

Conclusion

This review of media coverage of diplomacy with Iraq prior to the 2003 invasion shows
that the media performed according to the expectations of a propaganda model, and that the
reasons for the nature of this coverage were those specified by the model. The news media
depended overwhelmingly on high-level Bush administration officials, official experts provided
by the administration, and unreliable Iraqi opposition figures in their sustained propaganda
campaign to promote the war. News and editorial analyses of the claims made by the
administration tended to uncritically promote their arguments, and even the liberal media simply
adopted their perspectives, especially on Iraq’s alleged nonconventional weapons. More critical
reporting tended to be placed on the inner pages of newspapers so that readers were less likely to
see them, while front-page articles emphasized the administration’s dubious claims.
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As for the causal efficacy of the propaganda model, if American news corporations were
structured differently—in a way that made them less dependent on market dynamics that bear on
profits, and thus less dependent on government sources—then they would have been more likely
to report in the critical fashion articulated by liberal pluralist theories of the media. The fact that
independent news organizations which do not depend on corporate funding did report more
critically on the Bush administration’s war campaign supports this point. There is also evidence
that some news companies worried about the affect the war would have on advertising revenue
(Hart 2004). Reporters worried that critical reporting could impede their access to the Bush
administration. And because elite opinion heavily favored military intervention, and most
members of Congress who opposed the war chose not to speak out against the administration,
reporters had few sources of alternative perspectives to the those of the Bush administration.
Flak from right-wing media outlets and threats from readers also helped condition media
conformity. Finally, it is clear that elite ideology provided the general framework of
understanding that informed media coverage. The Bush administration was portrayed as
responding to a legitimate international threat, and media inquiry as to the material interests
actually motivating the war were extremely rare. Coverage lacked historical context. Like the
Bush administration, the media inflated the threat Iraq posed to the United States. This was
reflected in New York Times front-page headlines about Iraq, which for months began with
“THREATS AND RESPONSES” before the more specific subtitle. By contrast, smaller media
outlets like Kight-Ridder and independent news services not subject to the same constraints on
the corporate media provided much more critical coverage.
As expected by the broader elite mobilization model of war, the movement of public
opinion increasingly in favor of intervention and increasingly in agreement with the Bush
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administration’s central propaganda claims, strongly suggests that the national media’s
deferential coverage helped the Bush administration garner public support for the war. Moreover,
because the news media was the principal source of information for the public about foreign
policy (Rampton and Stauber 2003:174), it is likely that if the media had been more critical of
the Bush administration, the public would have been more skeptical of its claims. As for the
cause of the Iraq War itself, if the public opposed the Bush administration’s war effort in larger
numbers, especially among Republican and swing voters, then it is at least likely that the
administration and congressional Republicans would not have risked losing broad public support
by starting the war.
In the buildup to the invasion of Iraq, then, the media performed a key ideological
function in priming the general public and Congress to support the Iraq War. Academia, the
other major source of ideology on foreign policy in the society, also contributed to the war. This
is the topic of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 10

ACADEMIA AND THE IRAQ WAR

In previous chapters, I examined the role of Bush administration elites and the ideology
they elaborated in the 1990s as principal causes of the Iraq War. And in the last chapter, I
showed how the American mass media supported the Bush administration’s war campaign. In
this chapter, I turn attention to the direct and indirect ideological support lent by elite universities
and influential professors to the Bush administration’s Iraq campaign. I focus especially on the
“liberal hawks” from elite universities who supported the war effort, and the liberal ideology
developed by international relations and international law scholars in the 1990s from which both
liberals and neoconservatives drew in crafting pro-war arguments.
Though neoconservatism was a minority position in academia, liberal university
intellectuals were drawn on extensively as official experts in publications like the New York
Times in defense of the war, and their arguments bore remarkable similarity to those made by the
Bush administration (Friel and Falk 2004). This is not surprising in light of the fact that in the
1990s, a liberal, neo-Wilsonian ideology was ascendant among policy-oriented intellectuals and
university scholars that converged in important respects with neoconservatism (Smith 2007). In
fact, Bush drew on theories articulated by these intellectuals in crafting the administration’s
national security strategy. That eminent liberal university professors would support the invasion
of Iraq—some even worked in advisory capacities for the Bush administration—also recalled
times when liberals and neoconservatives united in support of the same foreign policy objectives
in the 1990s, such as “humanitarian intervention” in Kosovo.
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The historical significance of these intellectual convergences and political collaborations
are easily missed given the unique character of neoconservatism and the fact that the
neoconservatives vehemently distinguished themselves from liberal foreign policy intellectuals.
But these ideological similarities are what allow international relations scholars to conceptualize
both liberal thought and neoconservatism as variants of a single “liberal hegemony,” the
prevailing ideology in the foreign policy community (Walt 2018). While significant differences
do exist between liberal foreign policy ideologies and neoconservatism, and dissent among
liberal elites against the Iraq War often rested on these differences, the similarities allowed many
others to support it, especially in the face of the political pressures to do so.
The liberal neo-Wilsonianism of the 1990s was a collective product of elite university
scholars, private foundations, and policy research centers linked to the Democratic Party and the
Clinton administration. Bush’s hardline unilateralism also had intellectual origins in the
universities, where it was articulated in different ways by figures like Paul Wolfowitz at Yale
and Johns Hopkins, and Condoleezza Rice at Stanford. The argument made in this chapter,
therefore, is that the American university system made significant ideological contributions that
were drawn on by Bush administration officials, other foreign policy elites and the media to
justify the invasion of Iraq, even if the university system itself cannot be said to constitute a
“necessary cause” of wars more generally. Moreover, on important defense policy questions, the
views of the public, government officials, members of congress, and media personnel are
undoubtedly influenced by prior education, which in turn reflects the ideological formulations of
leading academics at elite universities.
That it was the university system that fostered this support is an important qualification.
For an elite model of war mobilization predicts that universities will tend to reproduce elite
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ideology due to their structural relationships to the state and corporate sector. This includes
dependence on state and private foundation patronage for research and the presence of former
government officials and other power elites in the leading academic departments. Especially in
the policy-oriented disciplines, these relationships allow the power elite to control a large part of
the relevant research, and through policy-planning networks, the ideology that informs policy
making. As we will see, these factors operated in academia in the 1980s and 1990s to allow the
ascendance of an imperial neo-Wilsonianism that informed liberal thinking in the Democratic
Party, as well as the Bush administration’s national security strategy.

Democracy Promotion and Human Rights in the Academy, c. 1980-2000

The intellectual historian Nicolas Guilhot (2005) traces the professional formalization of
democracy and human rights promotion as a “discipline” to the early 1980s, when the Reagan
administration established the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a quasi-nongovernmental organization established to promote democracy abroad. In establishing the NED,
the neoconservatives in the Reagan administration sought to appropriate the ideology of human
rights promotion from the Carter administration, and use it as tool for their own foreign policy
objectives. Broadly, this entailed using “democracy promotion” to defeat communism, much as
it had in previous administrations. “Democracy,” as the neocons understood it, encompassed a
conception of human rights not rooted in international law, as it was for Carter, but in the formal
structures of constitutional democracy; human rights were held to be entitlements that would
emerge from constitutional forms of government. The purpose of this particular
conceptualization was to remove the enforcement of human rights from the purview of the
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United Nations, which the neoconservatives held was an ineffective enforcement mechanism.
Rather, human rights would emerge from within nation states as a consequence of adopting
constitutional forms of democratic government, where they could be assisted by Reagan’s new
democracy promotion programs.
The NED was (and still is) a grant-awarding institution funded by Congress through the
State Department to provide funds for programs in developing countries to assist in the formation
of democratic institutions. It also funds research on democracy in developing countries. Grants in
developing countries may assist activities such as “financing ‘democratic’ opposition forces . . .
translating Western political literature, training pollsters, promoting human rights education,
fostering an entrepreneurial culture, easing the internationalization of neoliberal economics
through symposia and textbooks, sustaining independent news reporting, and briefing
government officials on media strategy” (Guilhot 2005:85-86). Though such activities
constituted the bulk of NED funds, the first grant it ever awarded was actually to fund research
undertaken by sociologists Juan Linz, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Larry Diamond on democracy
in the Third World. Given their close relationship to the Reagan administration—Diamond was a
researcher at the conservative Hoover Institution—Guilhot maintains that more than serious
scholarship, this research was “meant to provide the semblance of a theoretical framework for
NED activities” (Guilot 2005:91).
The NED’s research function grew in 1989-1990 with the launching of the quasiacademic Journal of Democracy, and then in 1994, with the creation of the International Forum
for Democratic Studies, which hosts conferences on democratic development, and brings
together scholars, Endowment personnel, and government officials from the United States and
around the world. The activities of the Forum are managed by its Research Council, which
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consists of approximately one hundred members, mostly political scientists, people who have
been involved with NED, or elites who are approached to lend their name and authority to the
institution (Guilhot 2005:92). These members create extensive links between the NED and core
group think tanks and elite university research centers. Though not peer reviewed, the Journal of
Democracy is highly regarded by many political scientists,1 and was a major impetus to the
growth of the study of democracy and human rights promotion in the 1990s.
A parallel and complementary development in academia in the 1980s and 1990s was the
popularization among political scientists of new democratic transition theses that supplanted the
older modernization theory of development. Modernization theorists held that in order for
developing societies to democratize, a number of historical preconditions had to be met first,
such as the adoption of Western values and sufficient industrial development. Inspired by the fall
of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, some political scientists
began to believe that the transition to democracy could occur much more rapidly than assumed in
modernization theory. Rather than cultural development or capital investment, they identified
strong national leaders as the new agents of change in developing countries. According to the
political scientist Tony Smith, “The ideas leaders brought to their reforming mission, the conflict
management styles they adopted . . . their character as fathers of their people, founders of a new
order—all these aspects of change seemed to acquire at this historical juncture an importance
they had hitherto not possessed” (Smith 2007:130). “Hence the appearance of a wave of books
on democratic transitions that centered on the character of strong leadership with the right ideas,”
Smith says. “In some cases, [university] curriculum innovations included entire new programs on

1

I owe this insight to Dr. Emily Hauptmann, an authority on the politics of political science research, whose
graduate seminar on this topic I audited in the Spring semester of 2020. Google also ranks the journal in 6 th place
among political science journals on the basis of H index scores.
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such matters as leadership, decision making, styles of negotiation, and conflict resolution”
(Smith 2007:130-131). Thus many political scientists adopted a view of democratic transition
and how it could be achieved that corresponded to the strategy of “democracy promotion”
initiated by Reagan and propounded by the NED.
Another important theoretical innovation developed by political scientists during this
period, and promoted by the NED, was democratic peace theory (DPT). In summary, Smith says,
democratic peace theory holds that just as leaders in a democracy come to power
through negotiated compromises based on non-violence and enshrined in the rule
of law, so in much the same way democratic states can resolve conflicts among
themselves. The preference for nonviolent problem-solving approaches is
enhanced by the transparency, predictability, and sense of accountability of
constitutional democratic leaders at the domestic level that may spill over into
their relations with leaders of other democracies.
Moreover, to the extent that democratic politics exists alongside open, capitalist
economic institutions, the opportunity is present for integrating world markets and
creating thereby interdependent economies, which in turn should contribute to
peace among nations by giving each people a tangible stake in the well-being of
others. As the rule of law basic to domestic democratic order and necessary for
economic openness comes to be institutionalized in multilateral organizations, a
collective security system might be consolidated capable of maintaining the
peace. (Smith 2007:99)
More succinctly, the basic claim of DPT is that, as a matter of empirical fact, democracies do not
go to war against each other. For DPT theorists, then, the foreign policy prescription that
followed from this conclusion was that the United States should attempt to promote democracy
in countries where it has not yet taken root. The more democratic the world becomes, it should
follow, the more peaceful it will be. This, of course, is a more sophisticated reincarnation of the
classic formulation of Woodrow Wilson (Smith 2007:63-67;97).
DPT was popularized by renowned Ivy League professor Michael Doyle, who in 1983
wrote two influential essays defending Immanuel Kant’s “democratic peace” thesis. Doyle’s
argument inspired “a rapidly expanding and dynamic field of democratic peace theory” in the
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academy, according to Smith (2007:97), so that in the 1990s much work went into elaborating
and validating it. In this collective effort, Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs played a crucial institutional role (Parmar 2012:234). The Belfer Center has been funded
by the Ford Foundation, and is housed in Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, which in
turn is funded by the Kennedy family (Parmar 2012:235). It is the home of the leading
international relations journal International Security, a policy-oriented scholarly journal that is
consistently among the top-five most cited journals in the international relations field (Parmar
2012:234-235). In the early 1990s, several articles in International Security elaborated DPT, and
in 1996, with funding from the Carnegie Corporation, its contributors published a DPT reader.
One final development that needs to be considered in the intellectual foundations of
liberal foreign policy in the 1990s is the emergence of the doctrine of “humanitarian
intervention.” The origins of this concept and associated concepts like the “responsibility to
protect” go back to 1987, when Bernard Kouchner, a founder of Doctors Without Borders, and
the French jurist Mario Battati developed the idea of “the right to intervene” in states that
perpetrated gross human rights violations against their own people or were unable to prevent
them. After what were widely perceived to be failures of the United Nations to avert
humanitarian catastrophes in Rwanda and Serbia, international law scholars, governments, and
international organizations followed Kouchner and Battati in developing this concept (Sands
2004:179). They began to reconsider the classic Westphalian notion of national sovereignty,
which bars intervention in sovereign states, and is foundational to the modern system of
international relations. The opposing concept they developed was the notion of “sovereignty as
responsibility,” whereby a state’s sovereignty comes with an obligation to protect its population,
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so that states which abrogate this responsibility thus forfeit sovereignty and may be subject to
outside military intervention.
These concepts were developed by an international network of scholars and activists, but
had articulate proponents in the United States, such as Thomas Franck, a New York University
law professor who “laid the groundwork for a juridical blessing of progressive liberal
imperialism,” according to Smith (2007:169-172). One of the most prominent American scholars
to advance the doctrine of humanitarian intervention was Samantha Power, author of the Pulitzer
Prize-winning A Problem From Hell: America in the Age of Genocide, published in 2002 with
support from George Soros’s Open Society foundation (Power 2002:569). Power was the
Founding Executive Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the Kennedy School
of Government before becoming a professor there. Canadian-American scholar Michael Ignatieff
co-founded the center with Power, and was the Center’s director from 2000 to 2006. In 2000,
Ignatieff participated in the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,
organized by the Canadian government to make recommendations to global elites on a
framework for implementing humanitarian intervention. The report produced by the International
Commission in 2001, titled “The Responsibility to Protect,” outlined the legal innovations that
were eventually adopted by UN General Assembly in the fall of 2005.

The Transformation of Liberal Theory to Imperial Policy

Influenced by the theories outlined above, the Clinton and Bush Jr. administrations
incorporated democracy and human rights promotion into their foreign policy agendas, in turn
heavily influencing how both the Democratic and Republican Party establishments thought about

191

the use of military force. For in the process of transformation from academic theories to official
policies, DPT and democratic transition theories were militarized, often against the
recommendations of their academic proponents in the case of DPT, though other academics
supported this transition. Humanitarian intervention itself was a legitimizing framework for the
use of military force, and the Clinton administration drew on it to justify bombings in Bosnia and
Kosovo.
DPT and the new democratic transition thesis were introduced to the Clinton
administration by Larry Diamond, the NED-sponsored sociologist mentioned earlier. Diamond
became the editor of the Journal of Democracy in 1990, and was closely associated with the
Progressive Policy Institute (PPI), the Democratic Party’s public policy think tank. In 1991, he
authored the PPI’s Policy Report, entitled An American Foreign Policy for Democracy, in which
he advanced the DPT thesis, and maintained that promoting democracy is vital to America’s
national security. Parmar (2012:233;332) observes that Bill Clinton appears to have lifted almost
word-for-word Diamond’s language about promoting democracy as a new strategy for ensuring
US national security in a December 1991 speech. “Democracies don’t go to war with each
other,” Clinton asserted. “Democracies don’t sponsor terrorist acts against each other. They are
more likely to be reliable trading partners, protect the global environment, and abide by
international law” (Clinton 1991). The Clinton administration militarized DPT by dividing the
world into a zone of democratic peace, and the zone of autocratic rogue states that threatened the
zone of peace (Parmar 2012:233). As Parmar notes, such a worldview helped legitimize
American military power, and “secured America’s self-image as a good state—all while
maintaining powerful armed forces and military budgets at near Cold War levels and heading off
demands for a ‘peace dividend’ ” (Parmar 2012:237).
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Humanitarian intervention served a similar function for the Clinton administration.
Challenging the liberal intellectual consensus on the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, a number of
scholars have advanced accounts of American participation in these wars which demonstrate that
Clinton’s humanitarian concerns were thin covers for US imperial interests (Gibbs 2009; Herman
and Peterson 2007; Johnstone 2002). By intervening in Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999, the
Clinton administration actually sought to assert US hegemony over Europe at a time when
Western Europe was trying to distance itself from US imperial institutions.
Especially concerning to US state planners were European plans for a new military
alliance, Eurocorps, and planning for the Euro currency zone, which were seen as potential rivals
to NATO and the dollar’s privileged status as the global reserve currency, respectively (Gibbs
2009:24-33). As a mechanism for securing trade relationships, and an important component of
the military-industrial complex, NATO served important political and economic functions in
Europe for the United States. At a time when the raison d’etre for NATO was in question, and
credible threats to US power were lacking, the United States thus sought to check European
assertiveness. Humanitarian intervention served as the pretext for doing so, providing a new
lease on life for NATO and other Cold War institutions (Gibbs 2009:44).
Neither military intervention, however, received Security Council authorization. Thus the
Kosovo intervention in particular has come to be widely regarded as an “illegal but legitimate”
defense of human rights in liberal intellectual culture (Chomsky 2006:79-101). Yet, with regard
to US participation in the Bosnian war, in a richly documented study, Gibbs observes that
During 1993-1994, US Officials continued their earlier policy of opposing EU
peace plans—which sought a compromise agreement among Bosnia’s ethnic
groups—and effectively blocked their implementation. Partly due to US
opposition, the EU mediation efforts failed. At the same time, the United States
furnished military equipment to its Muslim and Croat allies in the Bosnia conflict
through a large-scale covert operation. In late 1995, US officials brokered the
193

Dayton Accords, which finally did end the war. The implementation of these
Accords took place under the aegis of a NATO-directed peacekeeping force, thus
accomplishing the long-standing US objective of finding a new function for
NATO. At a substantive level, however, the Dayton Accords were not much
different from the earlier EU-sponsored peace plans the United States had
opposed (Gibbs 2009:12).
During this period, moreover, the Croats and Bosnian Muslims carried out atrocities against
civilians while receiving diplomatic and military support from the United States. For instance, it
was only after a massive US-backed retaliatory strike on the Serbs for alleged atrocities in
Srebrenica that the peace talks began. (It appears, moreover, that the Croats may have
deliberately provoked the Serbian attack in Srebrenica.)
The US bombing of Kosovo in 1999 served as another check on European autonomy.
The humanitarian pretexts for this intervention are seriously compromised by the fact that the
United State rejected available diplomatic solutions and that the bombing was widely anticipated
to increase ethnic cleansing, rather than prevent it, which is in fact what happened (Chomsky
2006:98-99).

Liberal Academics Who Supported the Invasion of Iraq

Not all academics involved in developing the theories discussed above would have
supported the Iraq War, and in fact many of them did not. However, many of them did, and they
received special attention in the media as official experts.
We will recall that the international law debate about the invasion of Iraq concerned (a)
whether the United States had the right to use military force against Iraq without a Security
Council resolution; that is, whether the November 8 2002 Resolution 1441 authorized the use of
force if Iraq did not cooperate with the UN weapons inspectors; and (b) whether the United
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States could legally use military force against Iraq if it was in “material breach” of previous
Security Council resolutions; that is, whether Resolution 687 authorized the use of force against
Iraq if it failed to comply with its disarmament obligations. These questions also turned on the
reality of Iraq’s possession of unconventional weapons.
Distinguished American international law professors such as Thomas Franck, Ruth
Wedgewood (Johns Hopkins), and Richard Gardner (Columbia University), offered their support
for the Bush administration’s legal arguments. Gardner was quoted in the New York Times as the
UN was wrapping up deliberations over Resolution 1441: ''We have the right to use force
because there has clearly been a material breach [of past Security Council resolutions].” In the
same article, Franck says requiring a second vote “would irredeemably weaken the resolution”
(Preston 2002).
In March 2003 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan announced that an invasion of Iraq
without Security Council backing would constitute a violation of the UN Charter. To provide a
counterargument, the New York Times drew on Ruth Wedgewood, who according to Friel and
Falk (2004), was the most cited legal expert in the Times on Iraq just prior to the invasion. ''I just
disagree with the secretary general's legal view because there are fundamental Security Council
resolutions that underlie this,'' Wedgewood said. What she meant is that even without a new
Security Council resolution, prior resolutions from the 1990s authorized the United States to
disarm Iraq, “for the sake of the peace and security of the region,” according to the Times.
Gardner was also quoted, only he made the incredible claim that the 1990 resolution that
authorized Western states to expel Iraq from Kuwait now authorized the United States to invade
Iraq and overthrow Hussein, “to restore peace and security in the area” (Tyler and Barringer
2003).
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These arguments were characterized by ambiguity about the relevance of a new Security
Council authorization, for the liberal hawks also invoked the Kosovo precedent. Michael
Glennon, for instance, asked rhetorically, “Why would the Security Council spend two months
deciding whether to authorize the use of force if its decision were not binding? How can the
council's decision bind Iraq but not the United States?”
The administration's answer has never been articulated publicly. But its
underlying theory probably was inherited from the Clinton administration's
Balkan policy. Asked whether the United States was still seeking explicit Security
Council approval to attack Iraq, Secretary Powell said, ''The president has
authority, as do other like-minded nations, just as we did in Kosovo.'' (Glennon
2002)
Apparently seeing no objectionable contradiction, he went on to explain that because other
nations had violated the Charter, the United States can too:
The international legal system is voluntary and states are bound only by rules to
which they consent. A treaty can lose its binding effect if a sufficient number of
parties engage in conduct that is at odds with the constraints of the treaty. The
consent of United Nations member states to the general prohibition against the use
of force, as expressed in the Charter, has in this way been supplanted by a
changed intent as expressed in deeds. (Glennon 2002)
Either the United States needed Security Council authorization, or it did not. If it did not, then
the United States was free to violate international law and the US Constitution as thought
necessary, while other countries were not free to violate international law if the United States
disagreed with their actions.
In Anne-Marie Slaughter’s version of the argument—Slaughter was Dean of Woodrow
School of International Affairs at Princeton—“By giving up on the Security Council, the Bush
administration has started on a course that could be called ‘illegal but legitimate,’ a course that
could end up, paradoxically, winning United Nations approval for a military campaign in Iraq—
though only after an invasion.”
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The relevant history here is from Kosovo. In 1999, the United States, expecting a
Russian veto of military intervention to stop Serbian attacks on ethnic Albanians
in Kosovo, sidestepped the United Nations completely and sought authorization
for the use of force within NATO itself.
Slaughter went on to explain that the war would turn out to be legal if the United States either
found WMD, or was welcomed by Iraqis and helped rebuild the country. But the United Nations
“cannot be a straightjacket, preventing nations from defending themselves or pursuing what they
perceive to be their vital national security interests,” (Slaughter 2003) she concluded.
Wedgewood and Gardner also invoked the Kosovo precedent to justify invading Iraq
(Tyler and Barringer 2003).
It is remarkable how closely these arguments reflected those advanced by the Bush
administration, and how uncritically these scholars accepted the administration’s claims that Iraq
was an imminent threat. But even more remarkable were the imperial apologetics offered by the
likes of human rights expert Michael Ignatieff and Yale historian John Lewis Gaddis.
In an infamous front-page article in the New York Times Magazine, titled “The American
Empire; The Burden,” Ignatieff defended American imperialism and the Bush administration’s
plan to invade Iraq. “Being an imperial power” he explained,
means laying down the rules America [sic] wants (on everything from markets to
weapons of mass destruction) while exempting itself from other rules (the Kyoto
Protocol on climate change and the International Criminal Court) that go against
its interest. It also means carrying out imperial functions in places America has
inherited from the failed empires of the 20th century -- Ottoman, British and
Soviet. In the 21st century, America rules alone, struggling to manage the
insurgent zones—Palestine and the northwest frontier of Pakistan, to name but
two—that have proved to be the nemeses of empires past.
It also means “Multilateral solutions to the world's problems are all very well, but they have no
teeth unless America bares its fangs” (Ignatieff 2003).
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Ignatieff placed the Bush administration’s foreign policy in the context of traditional
American imperialism. Though “The 21st century imperium is a new invention in the annals of
political science, an empire lite, a global hegemony whose grace notes are free markets, human
rights and democracy, enforced by the most awesome military power the world has ever known,”
the Bush administration’s National Security Strategy is consistent with traditional Wilsonian
idealism in its commitment to “the single sustainable model for national success.”
Invading Iraq was an “imperial operation” according to Ignatieff, to be taken on by a
“reluctant republic” that would “become the guarantor of peace, stability, democratization and
oil supplies” in the Middle East. Moreover, “Iraq represents the first in a series of struggles to
contain the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the first attempt to shut off the potential
supply of lethal technologies to a global terrorist network.” Again, the uncritical acceptance of
the Bush administration’s shaky pretexts was remarkable in light of available evidence that
seriously undermined their claims. Ignatieff accepts the Bush administration narrative throughout
the entire article, and even defends the administration’s obvious hypocrisy. The Bush
administration actually supported Hussein during his worst crimes in the 1980s, but “The fact
that states are both late and hypocritical in their adoption of human rights does not deprive them
of the right to use force to defend them.” To his fellow defenders of human rights, Ignatieff
explains that
The disagreeable reality for those who believe in human rights is that there are
some occasions—and Iraq may be one of them—when war is the only real
remedy for regimes that live by terror. This does not mean the choice is morally
unproblematic. The choice is one between two evils, between containing and
leaving a tyrant in place and the targeted use of force, which will kill people but
free a nation from the tyrant's grip. (Ignatieff 2003, emphasis added)
If the “people” he refers to are Iraqis, Ignatieff seems to think killing them may be justified if it
frees them from Hussein’s rule. Ignatieff’s is a strange conception of human rights.
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The distinguished Yale historian of the Cold War, John Lewis Gaddis, offered similar
imperial apologetics in a series of lectures he gave at the New York Public Library in 2002, and
then published in book form in 2004. Like Ignatieff, Gaddis (2004) places the Bush
administration’s defense policy in the longer tradition of benevolent American imperialism,
going back to Thomas Jefferson’s “empire of liberty,” and comparing Bush’s defense policy to
that of John Quincy Adams and Woodrow Wilson. In fact, Gaddis regards Bush as “quite
Wilsonian” (Bai 2004). The chapter on the Bush administration offers a defense of the 2002
National Security Strategy and the invasion of Iraq.
Gaddis believes that Bush’s NSS is a significant improvement over Clinton’s less
assertive foreign policy. Unlike Clinton, who approached foreign policy issues in a piecemeal
fashion, the Bush administration articulated a grand strategy, Gaddis explains. A key part of this
grand strategy is democracy promotion, which may prevent the conditions for terrorism from
emerging in authoritarian regimes. Gaddis approves of this objective, and approves of the Bush
administration’s invasion of Iraq as an extension of the war on terrorism, and says that terrorism
justifies violating Iraq’s and other countries’ sovereignty. If terrorists don’t play by the rules,
then Americans can’t either if they are going to defeat them (Gaddis 2004:86).
Though he is entirely uncritical of the administration’s basic premises about WMD,
terrorism, and international law, Gaddis does correctly perceive that the invasion of Iraq was
intended to have a demonstration effect that would deter other nations in the region from
opposing US primacy. Afghanistan represented one such “Agincourt”—the British victory over
the French in 1415—and the administration needed to keep up the “momentum” by invading
Iraq. Then, “if we could repeat the Afghan Agincourt along the banks of the Tigris and the
Euphrates, then we could accomplish a great deal.”
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We could complete the task the Gulf War left unfinished. We could destroy
whatever weapons of mass destruction Saddam might have accumulated since.
We could end whatever support he was providing for terrorists beyond Iraq’s
borders, notably those who acted against Israel. We could liberate the Iraqi
people. We could ensure an ample supply of inexpensive oil. We could set in
motion a process that could undermine and ultimately remove reactionary regimes
elsewhere in the Middle East, thereby eliminating the principal breeding ground
for terrorism. And, as President Bush did say publicly in a powerful speech to the
United Nations on September 12, 2002, we could save that organization from the
irrelevance into which would otherwise descend if its resolutions continued to be
contemptuously disregarded. (Gaddis 2004:93-94)
Like the other liberal hawks, Gaddis here accepts most of the Bush administration’s central
claims and assumptions about Iraq and national security as true. It is also not clear why
overthrowing Hussein is unfinished business from the Gulf War, since there was never a Security
Council authorization to do so.
Gaddis’s critique of the Bush administration is based on strategic concerns rather than
empirical claims about WMD and terrorism, or concerns about morality or international law.
Bush’s problem, Gaddis avers, is that he just didn’t know when to stop the “shock and awe,” by
which he means “the determination of the Bush strategists to shake up a status quo in the Middle
East that had become dangerous to the security of the United States” (Gaddis 2004:99). By
invading Iraq without international support, Bush risked failing to provide “reassurance” to the
world that US power would be used for constructive rather destructive purposes, especially since
the occupation was run so “raggedly”. Moreover, Bush might be wrong that democracy
necessarily will stop the spread of terrorism (Gaddis 2004:101-103). It could turn out, Gaddis
explains, that democracy may not work in Afghanistan and Iraq if leaders are not elected who
will be US allies and won’t support terrorism. In this case, the United States will have to turn to
“empire” and impose less free, but more stable “authoritarian” governments in these countries.
“How else have great powers imposed their authority in the past when confronted with anarchy,
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resistance, ethnic rivalries, cultural differences, and disparities in economic development?”
Gaddis asks. “Empires have a bad reputation in this post-colonial age because of the oppression
they inflicted. It’s worth remembering, though, that they also at times brought order, prosperity,
and justice” (Gaddis 2004:106).
If the United States turned to empire, it “would appear at first glance to be the biggest gap
of all between promises made and performance delivered” by the Bush administration’s defense
policy. But that’s only if we don’t “place the Bush grand strategy within the larger context of
American history, where the idea of an ‘empire of liberty’ has deep roots” and recognize that
empire and liberty are compatible (Gaddis 2004:107). In short, American imperialism has always
been justified because Americans have always meant well.
At the end of his book, Gaddis explains that it is okay to be patriotic and that we have a
responsibility to fight for our country’s freedom, messages he conveyed to his graduate students
at Yale (Gaddis 2004:116;118). For his service to the Bush administration’s agenda, he was
invited to the White House to discuss his book (Bai 2004).
To take one more example, another liberal academic who supported the Iraq War, though
in a different way, was sociologist Larry Diamond (2004; Smith and Diamond 2004). Like most
liberal academics, Diamond did not support the initial invasion itself because he preferred a
multilateral approach with UN support. However, he did not regard the invasion as “imperial” in
character because it was based on what he believes were legitimate security concerns, and he
welcomed the opportunity the invasion and occupation brought to bring democracy to Iraq. He
therefore offered his expertise in democracy promotion to the Bush administration as an advisor
to the Coalition Provisional Authority. But rather than the neocolonial regime forced on the
country, or the very act of invading itself and the destabilization this created, Diamond’s
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explanation of “What Went Wrong in Iraq” focuses mostly on insufficient US forces to control
the “security” of Iraq, and militias that undermined US efforts to build democratic institutions.
He praised the interim constitution’s respect for “liberal values,” especially “individual rights.”
Diamond’s critique of the Bush administration’s democracy building thus focuses on tactical
mistakes such as not sufficiently including the UN in the administration of the country, or
problems associated with not having international legitimacy by invading without UN support.
But Diamond does not fundamentally disapprove of US objectives in Iraq.

Conclusion

Neoconservatism, hardline unilateralism, and liberal internationalism, once incarnated as
public policy, take on forms that yield similar imperial policies, whether Democrats or
Republicans are in power. Democracy and human rights promotion, though usually associated
with liberalism, in the 1980s was appropriated and developed as official policy by the Reagan
neoconservatives. In the National Endowment for Democracy the neocons created an enduring
and bipartisan policy instrument that linked the state with academics who helped formulate US
foreign policy. Along with policy research centers like the Belfer Center and the Carr Center for
Human Rights Policy, and other professors at elite universities, NED-linked researchers helped
articulate a neo-Wilsonian ideology based on academic theories, including democratic peace
theory, democratic transition theories, and humanitarian intervention. These academic
innovations heavily influenced liberal foreign and defense policy in the 1990s, and in traveling
from the university to the offices of power in Washington, they became instruments of American
military imperialism. In this transformation, liberal thinking began to converge with what would
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become the Bush administration’s National Security Strategy, and in the case of some influential
professors, the convergence entailed a conscious and deliberate defense of American imperialism
and the invasion and occupation of Iraq.
These developments may not have been necessary for the Iraq War to happen, but they
made it easier for at least some Democrats and liberals to support it, and ensured that there was
no shortage of liberal experts available to the media to substantiate the Bush administration’s war
propaganda and vindicate violations of international law. The ideological pillars of neoWilsonianism bolstered the neoconservative and unilateralist imperialism of the Bush
administration, providing moral, national security, and legal rationalizations for the American
military primacy that was at the core of the Bush administration’s grand strategy. If global
democracy is consistent with world peace and national security, as Bush explained in the 2002
NSS and in speeches promoting the war in early 2003 (Record 2010:110), then the United States
would be justified in going to war against Iraq and transforming it into a market democracy, to
be followed by the rest of the Middle East. As proponents of the new liberal development thesis
suggested and as the Bush administration claimed, all of this could be easily achieved. And if the
United States failed to attain Security Council authorization, war might be illegal, but it would be
a legitimate defense of human rights and American “national interests.” According to Smith
(2007:69), liberal intellectuals in the 1990s provided much more sophisticated articulations of
these ideas than had the neoconservatives. By the time Bush came to power in 2001, these were
available for incorporation into his national security strategy and administration rhetoric more
generally.
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Indeed, even if in a perverted form, all three components of the liberal ideology are
captured by Bush press secretary Scott McClellan, who explains why Bush went to war against
Iraq thusly:
Although I didn’t realize it at the time we launched our campaign to sell the war,
what drove Bush toward military confrontation [with Iraq] more than anything
else was an ambitious and idealistic post-9/11 vision of transforming the Middle
East through the spread of freedom. This view was grounded in a philosophy of
coercive democracy, a belief that Iraq was ripe for conversion from a dictatorship
into a beacon of liberty through the use of force, and a conviction that this could
be achieved at nominal cost. The Iraqis were understood to be modern, forwardlooking people who yearned for liberty but couldn’t achieve it under the brutal,
tyrannical regime of Saddam Hussein. (McClellan 2008:128-129)
In the March 17 speech in which he gave Hussein his final ultimatum, Bush said: “Unlike
Saddam Hussein we believe the Iraqi people are deserving and capable of human liberty. And
when the dictator has departed, they can set an example to all the Middle East of a vital and
peaceful and self-governing nation” (Record 2010:110). Language mirroring DPT appeared
increasingly in the administration’s thinking after the invasion (see Record 2010:110-111).
As suggested by the power elite model of war mobilization, the liberal ideology was a
product of elite universities and was crafted with support from private and state funding sources;
in the case of Larry Diamond’s work, the NED; in the case of the Belfer Center researchers, the
Carnegie Corporation and Kennedy family; and in the case of Carr Center researchers, the
Kennedy family and George Soros. Such funding was not necessary for some professors to
advance these ideas, but it did help them gain wide acceptance in academia.
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CHAPTER 11

CONCLUSIONS: THE POWER ELITE MODEL OF WAR MOBILIZATION AND THE IRAQ
WAR

In chapters 5 through 10, I provided an explanation of the invasion of Iraq according to
an elite model of war mobilization. The balance of evidence in these chapters offers broad
support for the model in that this evidence illustrates the structural characteristics of the model
and the relationships of these characteristics to the expected outcome of war. In this concluding
chapter, I will review my argument and compare it to those advanced by state-centric, Marxist,
and Open Door theorists. I contend that the balance of evidence provided in this dissertation
supports my model better than theirs; that is, that this model is a better explanation of the Iraq
War. On this basis, I conclude with a set of policy prescriptions that would change the character
of American foreign and defense policy so as to ensure that the United States complied with
international law, and used war and covert military force only when these were actually
necessary for national defense, rather than as tools of imperial domination.
The 2003 invasion of Iraq, it is clear, was not a preventive war to eliminate Iraq’s
nonconventional weapons capabilities. It is unlikely that eliminating weapons of mass
destruction was even a sincere motive of Bush administration officials, though the evidence does
not permit absolute certainty about this (Butt 2019). However, it is clear that the administration
made claims to justify the invasion that they did not have good reasons to believe, and in this
sense, they effectively lied to the American public and to the world. To achieve their
predetermined goal of invasion, administration officials had to politicize the intelligence
gathering process so that the CIA would appear to support their claims. This involved putting
pressure on CIA analysts to arrive at conclusions that would justify an invasion, or at least
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appear to, and creating alternative institutional sources of “intelligence” that would also support
the favored policy.
The longer history of the Bush administration officials and their dealings with Iraq also
suggests that their motives were insincere. Most significantly, in the 1980s, Bush administration
officials working in the Reagan and Bush Sr. administrations openly supported Hussein while he
was committing the very crimes they would later fault him for to justify two wars against Iraq.
The main reason for the 2003 invasion, it appears, is that Bush and the other principal
architects of the war sought to assert US military primacy with an awesome demonstration of
American power that would a) consolidate executive branch power over expanded military
institutions, and b) direct state subsidies to industrial defense corporations. As explained in
chapter 8, these officials were all adherents to a primacist grand strategy, the cornerstone of
which was unrivaled American military power and global hegemony predicated on military,
political, and economic predominance. Control of Gulf region oil was understood as key to
sustaining this primacy. Moreover, Bush, Cheney, and Rice came to the administration as
representatives of the fossil fuel industry. Iraq’s large oil supplies, then, and its weak military
status help explain why it was a specific target for such a display of force.
However, in understanding this motive, more significant than prior corporate affiliations,
with the exception of Bush himself, the key Bush administration officials discussed in chapter 7
were all formerly managers of the defense bureaucracy, of the military-industrial complex
(MIC), and all of them including Bush had internalized the requisite values for holding such
offices. For Bush, the son of George H. W. Bush, participation in the bureaucracy itself wasn’t
necessary for such socialization, and he fully trusted his father’s former partners. Not
surprisingly then, the shared unilateralism of the administration, neoconservative or otherwise,
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reflected in the most advanced form the institutional imperatives of the military-industrial
complex described in chapter 3. Cheney, Rumsfeld, and the neoconservatives sought almost total
freedom and unimpeded power for the president in managing national security, and military
primacy and unilateralism were idealized by all administration officials.
Whatever other idiosyncratic reasons individuals within the administration may have had
for wanting to invade Iraq, fundamentally, the invasion and occupation represented an exercise
and consolidation of power for the state managers of the defense bureaucracy, and a massive
transfer of wealth to the corporations that contracted with the Pentagon, State Department, and
Agency for International Development, either once the post-9/11 military buildup began, or after
the invasion of Iraq during the occupation.
The ideological impulses that motivated the invasion were mostly derived from
intellectual sources inside the neoconservative movement, sustained by elite-funded policyplanning organizations like the American Enterprise Institute and the Project for the New
American Century. However, the administration’s hardline unilateralism also converged in
important ways with liberal internationalism as it had developed in the 1990s in the university
system and policy-planning networks linked with the Democratic Party. This allowed many
liberal intellectuals and Democratic Party leaders to support the invasion of Iraq, and to help
Americans understand Bush’s National Security Strategy as a normal, if innovative,
reformulation of American defense policy, and one that was needed to protect Americans from
another terrorist attack like that which occurred on 9/11. In fact, the Bush administration’s
foreign policy ideology, or “grand strategy,” was remarkably similar to what came before it,
whether liberal or conservative, a new frankness about unilateral action and primacy
notwithstanding.
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The war probably would not have happened if the American media system functioned
differently from the way it does. The media did not serve as a check on state power in the run up
to the war, and did not provide a “marketplace of ideas” so that Americans could evaluate the
advantages and disadvantages of invading Iraq and make an informed decision that considered
the factuality of administration claims and relevant historical context. Rather, the Bush
administration deftly manipulated media coverage, ensuring that the media collectively
performed more like an authoritarian state propaganda agency rather than a set of autonomous,
independent institutions hypothesized by pluralist accounts of American society. The media
promoted the war effort by uncritically channeling the Bush administration’s claims and
assumptions about Iraq. The effect of such media manipulation and deference appears to be that
public opinion in favor of military action against Iraq was sustained and further mobilized in the
eighteen months after the 9/11 attacks as the administration gradually shifted focus from
Afghanistan to Iraq.

Alternative Explanations: Pluralist States, Capitalist States, or Opening Iraq’s Door?

Wars present a store of clues and evidence that can make several different explanations
seem plausible, especially if different weight is given to different factors that may be widely
recognized as relevant. For their parts, sociologists and scholars critical of American imperialism
have offered state-centric, Marxist, and Open Door theories of the invasion of Iraq. But how well
do they stand up to the explanation offered by an elite model?
Michael Mann, it will be recalled, has defended a state-centric theory of American
militarism in general, and of the invasion of Iraq in particular. He has been dismissive of MIC
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theories, and believes that American economic and military imperialism are unconnected, save
for the dollar’s status as global reserve currency and the way this sustains US military power
(Mann 2013:229).
About the invasion of Iraq, Mann argues that it represented a “new imperialism” unlike
anything that came before the Bush administration. Its roots are in the neoconservative
movement. Mann explains that
the Democrats would not have reached [the new imperialism] unaided, and nor
would Republican Party elders brought up on more pragmatic policies. Neither
envisaged unilateral, uninvited and essentially unprovoked invasion of foreign
countries—except tiny countries viewed as being in the American “backyard,”
like Grenada and Panama. Major interventions during the 1990s had differed. In
the 1991 Gulf War Saddam had violated international law by invading Kuwait
and the US had assembled a UN-backed coalition which included his Arab
neighbors. In Bosnia and Kosovo ethnic civil wars were raging and intervention
was begged for by the groups suffering most and aided by the UN and NATO. . . .
But in these cases American militarism was more or less normal for the post-1945
period. Behind them lay a mainly pragmatic and defensive notion of military
power. If we were threatened, we could respond, with overwhelming force if
necessary. But there was no sense of using militarism offensively to remake the
world into a better place. (Mann 2003:7-8)
Mann’s gloss on twentieth century American history is obviously flawed. For example, the
United States did not have any UN support in bombing Kosovo, and did not have Security
Council authorization in bombing Bosnia, and the invasion of Vietnam was not a “pragmatic and
defensive” response to a national security threat, but outright aggression. And messianic visions
for making the world a better place were not new with neoconservatism. This understanding of
history prevents Mann from seeing the continuities that exist between Bush’s “new imperialism”
and the thrust of post-World War II American foreign policy. It also implies that military
imperialism does not have systemic or structural causes. Indeed, as a residue of his antiMarxism, Mann explicitly rejects the ideas that societies are “systems” and that structural
explanations of wars are possible (e.g. Mann 2013:243).
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About the MIC and the Iraq War, Mann says that “The larger U.S. military-industrial
complex is . . . active in lobbying for the maintenance and renewal of America’s massive
military . . ., but it rarely lobbies for war, and there is no evidence it did so here,” in the case of
Iraq (Mann 213:241). This makes sense if the MIC is understood as only industrial defense firms
that push for war by lobbying, but not if it includes state management, defense firms’ linkages to
the broader corporate sector, and the networks of defense-focused individuals and organizations
funded by the corporate rich. As explained in chapter 6, invading Iraq fit within an ideological
framework that was functional for sustaining the MIC and was financed by corporate elites
interested in sustaining it.
How then does Mann explain the Iraq War? In his 2003 book he writes that
In reality the invasion was fueled by a mixture of motives to which the new
imperialists would not openly admit. Some of them might be considered suspect
motives—oil, revenge and a believe that it could dominate the Middle East by
military force. The desire to dominate also had mixed motives—oil again, defense
of Israel, but it also contained a genuine desire to bring freedom and democracy to
the region. Saddam was seen as an evil tyrant, whom the US could usefully
remove, while the UN could not. So underlying all these reasons was a supreme
confidence that American military power could being them all to pass. (Mann
2003:218)
By “revenge” Mann refers to vengeance for Hussein’s assault on Shiite and Kurdish allies after
the war, his regime’s obstinate survival, and alleged attempt to assassinate H. W. Bush in 1993.
While he cites the right documents (e.g. the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance), he does not
closely investigate their content, leaving this explanation facile and unconvincing.
In his 2013 work on American imperialism, however, while still maintaining the
fundamental separateness of American economic and military imperialism (Mann 2013:242),
Mann nonetheless concedes that the pre-invasion State Department plans for Iraq demonstrated
“the main direct connection between economic and military imperialism” (Mann 2013:239) in
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the Bush administration’s foreign policy. Still, he goes on to explain that Bush’s “military
intensification was ideologically germinated” and that “there has . . . been little connection”
between military and economic imperialism in the Bush administration’s defense policy (Mann
2013:241, 242).
Another sociologist to advance a state-centric explanation of the Iraq War is Muhammad
Idrees Ahmad (2014). Initially, it is difficult to categorize Ahmad’s explanation, for he
incorporates a kind of elite network analysis called a “flex net” approach, which shows the
political network connections among Bush administration officials and neoconservative
intellectuals. But Ahmad’s analysis is not a political economy analysis of elites in the tradition of
Mills (1956) or Domhoff (2014). He ultimately concludes that wars in general, and the Iraq War
in particular, do not have “monocausal” explanations, agreeing with Mann that “explanations of
war that focus exclusively on larger structures have only limited utility. The world is too
complex to be explained by all-encompassing models” (Ahmad 2014:171-172). The agency of
historical actors must be considered along with institutions and structures, he explains. Ahmad
thus focuses extensively on the neoconservative network and its individual member connections
to Israel and Judaism to explain how the Bush administration came to invade Iraq. His is
ultimately a variation on the Israel lobby argument advanced by Mearsheimer and Walt (2007).
Like Mann, Ahmad is dismissive of the MIC as a cause because, like Mann, he
understands it solely as the defense industry and as a kind of institutionally distinct lobby.
Without saying who his interlocuters are, Ahmad says “Those who argue that the war was waged
on behalf of the MIC infer its role from the inevitable profits that accrued to military contractors
like SAIC and Lockheed Martin.” However, Ahmad explains that “the MIC has been able to
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generate profits without actually needing a war” (Ahmad 2014:30). “The case also fails on
empirical grounds,” Ahmad continues, for “it leaves unstated the question of agency.”
To the extent that evidence of lobbying is offered, it points to neoconservative
think tanks such as PNAC, Centre for Security Policy (CSP) and the Jewish
Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA). To be sure, a bevy of retired
generals with links to arms manufactures did parade on prime-time US television
to promote the war. But they were merely cheerleading a venture others had
conceived.” (Ahmad 2014:30-31)
This is all Ahmad says about the MIC. About “hegemony and dominance” as motives—motives
I argue are associated with the MIC—Ahmad (201428-30) points out that various establishment
figures outside the administration were opposed to the invasion. However, that reveals absolutely
nothing about the motives of the top decision makers who were actually in power.
In spite of the otherwise impressive rigor in detail of Ahmad’s book, his explanation is
simply wrong viz-a-viz the basic historical facts. Ahmad’s explanation places most of the
influence for the invasion of Iraq on the neoconservatives, who, he says, after 9/11 were able to
“persuade” Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld to invade Iraq (Ahmad 2014:167). Yet, as Cramer and
Duggan (2012) point out with regard to the Israel lobby thesis, and as I have also shown, neither
Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, or Rice needed to be persuaded to invade Iraq, which was already on
the agenda of the first National Security Council meeting of the administration in January 2001,
and for which there had already been planning for several months prior to September 2001. And
it was Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Rice—the administration’s primacist hardliners—who put
Iraq on the early agenda of the administration, not the neoconservatives. Rather, it appears that
the neoconservatives were brought into the administration by the hardliners to support the
invasion, but were sidelined when they disagreed with Bush and Cheney. For example, the
neoconservatives favored total privatization of Iraq’s oil while the State Department’s Future of
Iraq Project ultimately settled on the production sharing agreements (i.e. partial privatization)
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discussed in chapter 6. The neoconservatives also opposed Saudi Arabia, and after 9/11, favored
turning against it, correctly pointing out that Saudi Arabia financially supported al-Qaeda, and
that 15 of the 19 9/11 hijackers were Saudis. But the administration continued to support the
Saudi monarchy, even apologizing to the monarchs after Richard Perle brought Laurent
Murawiec of the RAND Corporation to criticize Saudi Arabia at a meeting of the Pentagon’s
Defense Policy Review Board (Cramer and Duggan 2012:224). Cramer and Duggan (2012:225)
show that the primacist policy preferences were chosen over those of neoconservatives in several
important policies related to the Iraq War and the Middle East. They also point out that when
prominent neoconservatives like David Frum (Bush’s speechwriter) broke with the
administration in 2006 they did so because they felt marginalized. It appears, then, that the
invasion was not a war on behalf of Israel at the behest of the neoconservatives, even if the war
aligned with the foreign policy objectives of Israel’s Likud right, and even if there were
administration connections to prominent Israel lobby organizations.
Turning to Marxist theories, while Mann’s explanation of the Iraq War is unsatisfactory,
he does make some important points regarding Marxist explanations of the Iraq War. Contrary to
Marxist theorists like Robinson, who argues that the invasion of Iraq “violently opened up the
country to transnational capital and integrated it into new global circuits,” and “at a time when
the global economy was showing serious signs of stagnation” (Robinson 2014:123), Mann points
out that there was no economic decline explaining Washington’s increased presence in the
Middle East. “[T]here was no relative decline in American economic power between 1970 and
2000—no market or gross national product share decline needing new military solutions” Mann
(2013:230) observes. However, more relevant to Robinson’s transnational class thesis—which
maintains that nationally specific markets are less relevant than transnational class interests—is
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Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes’ observation that the Iraq War probably hurt the American
economy and spurred the world-wide great recession of 2008:
The U.S. economist Robert Wescott estimated in the years immediately following
the beginning of the Iraq war that the value of the stock market was some $4
trillion less than would have been predicted on the basis of past performance.
Uncertainties caused by the war, the resulting turmoil in the Middle East, and
soaring oil prices dampened prices from what they “normally” would have been.
This decrease in corporate wealth implies that consumption was lower than it
otherwise would have been, again weakening the economy. (Stiglitz and Bilmes
2008:125)
The Federal Reserve, they go on to explain, sought to offset the adverse effects of the war by
keeping interest rates lower than they might have been, encouraging national spending that was
unsustainable. “The low initial interest rates allowed households to borrow more against their
houses, enabling America to consume well beyond its means,” ultimately leading the 2007-2008
recession once interest rates rose (Stiglitz and Bilmes 2008:126).
All of this is perhaps not surprising, for as Mann also points out with regard to Marxist
theories, the national defense strategy of the Bush administration was not in any way
economistic in character. “While militarism pervades the writings of the intellectuals among
them, they [the neoconservatives] are silent on international economic issues, which seem to
interest them not at all” (Mann 2013:233). I agree with this analysis; macroeconomic issues are
entirely absent from the documents reviewed in chapter 8, aside from empty claims in the 2000
PNAC report that insufficient military spending will hurt the American economy.
Another obvious problem for the Marxist, transnational capitalist class explanation is the
fact that the American power elite were divided on the invasion, including a notable break
between the old H. W. Bush Republicans and the Bush-Cheney White House. James Baker
(2002) and Brent Scowcroft (2002) even opposed the war in part on economic grounds. There
was also opposition to the war from the leadership of most Western capitalist nations that was
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not obviously only premised on tactical disagreements (Pond 2004), as Robinson claims it was.
Robinson’s Marxist theory does not explain these differences among elites.
In sum, for state-centric and Marxist explanations of the Iraq War, either the basic
conceptual frameworks do not align with empirical reality, as with Mann and Ahmad’s
conceptualization of the MIC, which leads to a failure to consider relevant factors such as
decision power and personal ambition, or there is not enough evidence indicative of the relevant
causal factors, as with Foster and Robinson’s theories. And in the case Ahmad’s Israel lobby
explanation, it simply does not align with the historical facts on record.
What about Open Door theories? Van Apeldoorn and de Graaff’s analysis (2016) of
American grand strategy in the post-Cold War period is rich with useful data on the corporate
and government backgrounds of officials from the Clinton, Obama, and Bush administrations.
They link these backgrounds—particularly the corporate backgrounds, extensive in each
administration—to what they refer to as an Open Door grand strategy that has characterized
American foreign policy since the late nineteenth century through the Obama administration.
Militarism, according to this theory, serves to open foreign markets for American investment.
Unlike Williams’s classic Open Door thesis, and more consistent with Marxist theories, van
Apeldoorn and de Graaff (2016:35) see corporate elites in the offices of state power formulating
such policies as a response to objective accumulation crises in the American economy.
With regard to the Iraq War, van Apeldoorn and de Graaff (2016:73) observe that 27 of
30 top Bush officials had corporate backgrounds, and consistent with the analyses presented in
chapters 7 and 8, they point out the think tanks affiliations of these officials, and outline the
characteristics of the administration’s ideology. And like I have argued in chapter 6, van
Apeldoorn and de Graaff argue that the invasion and occupation of Iraq were intended to open
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Iraq’s economy for American corporate investment, as evident in the Coalition Provisional
Authority Orders. Hence the Open Door objective of the invasion.
The major problem with van Apeldoorn and de Graaff’s explanation of the Iraq War is
that it is plagued by a functionalism that is similar to that which weakens Marxist theories. Van
Apeldoorn and de Graaff try to accommodate agency in their explanation, but I do not believe
they are successful. The implication of their method and theory is that corporate representation in
the government can be assumed to directly influence specific policies in virtue of the large
number of corporate representatives throughout the administration. However, the distribution of
power within an administration varies—in the Bush administration it had shifted decisively to
the Pentagon managers—and in the case of the invasion of Iraq, it seems to be the brainchild of
Cheney and the other principal architects. Rather than achieving national economic strength
through political and economic expansion, gaining and exercising broad decision power appears
to have been their main purpose of the war. Moreover, the invasion does not appear to have been
precipitated by an accumulation crisis, and subjective fear of one does not appear to have
factored into the administration’s decision to invade. In the last analysis, the principal architects
waged the war more as power-seeking state managers rather than as growth-oriented
representatives of the capitalist class. Specific corporate connections that may explain why
certain corporations received contracts in Iraq does not change this.

Policy Implications

Debates about the causes of American militarism in general, and about the causes of the
Iraq War in particular, are not merely academic, but have important policy implications. If the
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goals are to make American society less militaristic, and to ensure that military action is resorted
to as a foreign policy tool of last resort, then understanding the true causes of militarism is
necessary for implementing effective reforms. If a power elite model of war mobilization
accurately describes the structural causes of militarism in the United States, what policies could
be implemented that would move American foreign policy away from an imperial model and
towards one based on international cooperation and diplomacy?
At the most fundamental level, if the military-industrial complex creates incentives for
ambitious, power-seeking individuals and groups to use war and preparation for it as means for
exercising and expanding their own power, then the military-industrial complex should be
drastically curtailed to levels consistent with what is necessary to secure national defense and
provide assistance for legitimate peacekeeping and humanitarian purposes. This implies a
transition from a permanent war economy to a peace economy that produces commodities that
can be consumed in the civilian market economy, rather than military commodities that are
manufactured solely to be destroyed and to cause death, the production of which benefits
virtually no one except for the corporate rich. Rather than subsidizing war production, the federal
government could contract major industrial defense corporations for green industrial production
and national infrastructure repair. Once the permanent war economy is eliminated, the
opportunity for powerful individuals to exploit it for their own purposes will no longer exist.
But how could such a transformation happen if the very people who benefit from the
permanent war economy are the ones who control public policy? How then can control of policy
be wrested from the power elite? Achieving more democratic control of American society would
require several changes. First, the widespread use of first-past-the-post, winner-take-all elections
should be replaced with electoral forms that allow voters to choose third party candidates, such
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as ranked choice voting or fusion voting. This would allow citizens to vote for candidates who
might adopt anti-war and anti-imperialism positions without the risk of effectively throwing
away their votes, and allowing a less preferable candidate to win, as is the case with the current
system. Other electoral reforms would also be necessary. To prevent corporate-backed
candidates from having more public visibility than third party candidates, legal limits should be
placed on corporate spending on election campaigns and purchasing air time, and incentives
should be put in place for candidates to use public funds, as with the Maine Clean Election Act,
which provides state funding for candidates who promise not to use private funds in their
campaigns.
To further democratize American politics, and allow the public to understand how
policies are formed and whose interests they serve, think tanks should be legally required to
publicly disclose their sources of funding and indicate how this funding could or does influence
their policy recommendations. Think tanks are not objective, independent sources of information
about public policy, so they should be required to make this evident to the public. Americans
might think differently about major foreign policy membership organizations and think tanks like
the Council on Foreign Relations if they understand that such organizations are heavily funded
by defense corporations that benefit from the policies these organizations tend to advance.
To ensure that the power elite can no longer dominate mass media discourse, and
strongly influence the way Americans think about war thereby, the corporate mass media system
of the United States should be democratized. The mostly privatized mass media system does not
ensure independent, critical reporting that holds powerful people accountable for their actions,
and does not offer a range perspectives to American citizens that enables them to fully
understand the implications of a given policy decision. As Robert McChesney (2008) has argued,
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public funding should therefore be made available for independent and community media and
national public media. In the United States, public media are very poorly funded, with public
media outlets like NPR receiving only a small percentage of revenues from state subsidies.
Publicly funding the media would make news companies less dependent on corporate advertising
and profitability, allowing them to work more independently from state-corporate power.
Implementing media antitrust laws would also give media conglomerates less control over
national media markets, and enable smaller media companies to compete for national audiences.
Even with the advent of social media and Internet news, such reforms are necessary to create a
more open media system, as the Internet has not served to democratize the mass media in any
significant sense. Most reporting about foreign affairs that is available to the public still comes
from major news corporations, even if it is circulated across peoples’ computers instead of
television sets, radios, or printed newspapers. As much as social media may be utilized to
circulate independent news analyses, it has also proven to be a significant source of statecorporate misinformation for the public, as was revealed so vividly during the Trump years.
Moreover, social media users are prone to using it to follow sources of information that reinforce
their preexisting views.
Other kinds of reforms are also necessary to loosen elite control over the policy-making
process. As CIA veteran Paul Pillar argues, “The Iraq War experience alone is reason enough for
a serious national examination of [intelligence] politicization and of reform that might reduce it”
(Pillar 2011:313). As it is currently structured, and as so clearly revealed by the Bush
administration’s Iraq war campaign, the intelligence “community” is not able to produce
intelligence reports and analyses independently of the political objectives of the executive
branch. Pillar (2011:311-330) recommends several reforms that could allow the intelligence
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agencies to work more independently from the president, and thus to produce more objective
analyses. These include giving the director of national intelligence a long, fixed term, instead of
the current arrangement in which this office is a political appointment made by the president. A
board of governors analogous to the Federal Reserve Board of Governors could also be
established to emphasize the independence of intelligence agencies. Congress could be more
closely involved in intelligence debates through the creation of a non-partisan congressional
intelligence office akin to the Government Accountability Office and Congressional Budget
Office. Another option is that policy makers could be required to take special courses on “correct
methods for assessing overseas situations” (Pillar 2011:320). And because so many policy
makers are political appointees—“in-and-outers” with political objectives shaped by their
professional affiliations with the corporate world (Pillar 2011:323)—reducing the number of
political appointees in government and replacing them with career intelligence analysts would
also increase the independence of the intelligence community from state-corporate power.
Ultimately, while such policies are needed, because of the disproportionate power elites
exert over the political process in the first place, to implement such sweeping reforms will
require powerful, nationally organized social movements to mobilize widespread public support
for politicians who will support these policies. This may necessitate that antiwar organizations
and social movement organizations for electoral, media, and other kinds of reform work more
closely together, which would have the added benefit of strengthening their influence as
individual social movements; historically, by itself the antiwar movement has been a small,
marginal presence in American society and politics. Such collaboration would require that
progressive social movement leaders think systematically about policy changes in terms of
structural changes to the state and political economy, rather than understanding social problems
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and related policies in isolation from the class structure of the society and the elite policyplanning process, or as a question of partisan politics; both of the major political parties in the
United States are invested in the permanent war economy, and both parties at the highest levels
of state management are power elite-dominated institutions.

Suggestions for Future Research

Academic researchers have their part to play in the social movement for a more peaceful
United States. They can use their research abilities and knowledge to educate the public and
inform the work of social movements for peace. However, to be more effective in these
endeavors, it is probably necessary for more American academic social scientists to dedicate
themselves to the study of the political economy of American militarism than is the case at the
present time. If the relative lack of interest in the topic reflects career incentives that are created
by the elite patronage system that sustains much of academic research in the United States, then
efforts should be made to increase state funding for colleges and universities. This would allow
emerging scholars to more easily pursue research that isn’t oriented toward the needs of state and
corporate elites. Academic departments could also facilitate such research by promoting nontechnocratic forms of research, interdisciplinary, interdepartmental collaboration, and research
methods besides the standard multiple regression statistical analysis and qualitative interviewing
that are the staples of most social science graduate programs.
Such considerations aside, sociologists and other historical social scientists might expand
and improve on the ideas that have been presented in this dissertation. Substantial empirical
work on the military-industrial complex, based on hard economic data and interview research
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with industrial engineers and other insiders, has not been conducted since Seymour Melman’s
seminal writings, to my knowledge. And there is little consensus, at least among sociologists,
about the causes of American imperialism and militarism. This is in large part because
sociologists simply haven’t dedicated themselves to rigorous historical studies American military
interventions. In this dissertation, I have tried to provide a robust framework of analysis for
carrying out such research and an example of how it could be done. Pursuing further case studies
will allow researchers to refine or substantially modify the elite model of war mobilization as
needed. Because more recent history has a greater influence on policy decisions and agendas in
the present moment, researchers might dedicate themselves to the study of the major US war
efforts of the post-Cold War period, particularly US involvement in Bosnia, Kosovo,
Afghanistan, and Libya. Unlike the Iraq War, these wars are widely believed to be “good wars”
that were waged for humanitarian purposes, or legitimate self-defense in the case of Afghanistan.
In each case, existing research seriously challenges this mythology, and future case studies may
reveal that these wars are explained well in terms of a power elite model of war mobilization.
Future researchers might also closely examine the numerous clandestine wars the United States
has fought, as these are less known to the general public, and the social causes of what appears to
be a “new Cold War” with Russia and China.
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